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**“THE FAIR HAND OF MANAGERS:
MANAGERS' VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE CORRECTIVE JUSTICE
STRATEGIES AND THEIR ANTECEDENTS”**

THESE
présentée et soutenue publiquement le 25 septembre 2008
en vue de l'obtention du
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par

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To Raphaël, Marie, Héloïse and Claire.

*“Just as ancient peoples needed, above all, a common faith to live by, so
we need justice”.*

Durkheim (1930/1998, p. 382)

*“‘Justice’, as we shall use the term, means the active process of
remedying or preventing that which would arouse the sense of injustice”*

Cahn (1949, p. 13)

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The three studies that are presented in chapters 1, 2 and 4 and the conceptual model that is proposed in chapter 3 of this dissertation are the main pieces of a global research program that tries to give answers to the question “*how and why do managers correct injustice in the workplace?*” As such, they have already been presented at international conferences, and been published or about to be published in French- and English- speaking international journals (see Appendix B).

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GENERAL ABSTRACT

Traditional organizational justice research has documented the impact (in)justice perceptions have on a host of employees' attitudes and behaviors. This perspective has been named the *reactive perspective* of organizational justice. Other works show what an organization has to do to be considered as behaving in a just way. This orientation has been called the *proactive orientation* of organizational justice. Proactive justice studies are scarcer especially concerning the way supervisors manage their subordinates' justice perceptions. Given the impact managers have on their subordinates at work, in this dissertation I attempt to better understand the dynamics of their just and unjust behaviors.

Reactive justice studies have well documented the influence managers have in the shaping of their subordinates' perceptions. Managers have the power to *correct* organizational injustices at work. In particular, a robust finding is that a manager behaving interactionally fairly can compensate for unjust formal procedures and unfair reward allocations. However, to the best of my knowledge, no study has specifically investigated these *corrective justice behaviors of the managers* from a proactive point of view. Thus, I aim to understand "***How and why do managers correct injustice at work?***" I address this global question in four complementary ways.

In a first study, I investigated the antecedents of managers' tendency not to use interactional corrective justice behaviors. Interactional justice perceptions concern the extent to which employees feel they have been treated with politeness, respect, and compassion (interpersonal justice) and whether they believe they have received adequate, timely, and personalized explanations (informational justice). Given the positive effects of both interpersonal and informational facets of interactional justice, it is puzzling that managers often, when they have to announce a decision that they know will have a negative and / or

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unfair impact on their subordinates, distance themselves and act in interactionally unjust ways – a phenomenon referred to as the “Churchill effect”. My first study tested this Churchill effect and distinguished its interpersonal and informational dynamics. I conducted an experiment (n=118) that showed that on the one hand the informational injustice component was linked to situational factors (managers avoided giving explanations when they view the situation itself as being unjust). On the other hand, the interpersonal component was predicted by interindividual factors (managers behaved unjustly by avoiding showing politeness, respect, and compassion when they lacked adequate social competencies).

Thus, the results confirmed the existence of the Churchill effect, showing that the more unjust the managers found a situation, the less likely were they to correct it, using informational justice. Moreover, the less assertive the managers, the less likely were they to correct the injustice using interpersonal justice. Besides, manager’s identification with their firm had a negative impact on their interpersonal and informational justice behaviors. Identification also had a moderating effect on the relationship between managers’ procedural justice judgments and their informational justice behaviors so that this relationship was stronger for high identifiers. However, the experiment also showed that managers might use other kinds of corrective justice strategies than interactional justice behaviors.

I conducted a second exploratory study (n=35) to identify managers’ other corrective justice strategies. This study helped reveal a heretofore unstudied strategy to correct injustice at work. This strategy consisted of allocating something extra, belonging to the company, not for its formal or intended use, to restore justice (for example, managers might distribute benefits such as free time, personal use of equipment, extra training or bonuses to victims of injustice). It occurred “under the radar” (without more senior managers’ or other employees’ knowledge). Thus, I labelled this strategy an *invisible remedies* strategy.

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In this second study I compared this strategy to the other managerial corrective justice strategies that emerged from the data. Managers were more likely to use invisible remedies to compensate for organizational distributive injustices that resulted from the deficiencies in the formal reward system (i.e. lack of bonuses and pay increases, low salaries, promotions that were refused...) rather than to correct other types of injustices. They were more likely to react in this way when injustices violated their sense of equity rather than their sense of equality or need. Finally, their primary motivation appeared to be to restore justice in the workplace even if they knew that these attempts mainly mitigated negative reactions in the short run without fundamentally solving any real source of injustice in the long run.

In order to better understand this invisible corrective justice strategy, I built a conceptual model linking the organizational justice literature and sociological studies about organizational theft. This work allowed me to make research propositions concerning the forms invisible remedies might take in the workplace and the conditions under which managers are most likely to use them. In particular, I proposed that the more important morality is for a manager, the more likely he or she is to use invisible remedies to correct a work injustice.

I labeled *Robin Hoodism* the use of this strategy by the managers and the *Robin Hood effect* the impact invisible remedies can have on employees' subsequent behaviors. This impact was proposed to be favorable for the manager and unfavorable for the firm. Further, I proposed that invisible remedies can reduce the negative reactions resulting from distributive, procedural and interactional injustices due to their ability to address employees' instrumental, relational and moral motives.

Finally, in a scenario study (n=187) preliminary quantitative support was found for aspects of the proposed model, namely the importance of distributive and interpersonal injustices and of managers' moral identity in predicting the managers' allocation of invisible

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remedies. The research showed that an interaction between distributive and interpersonal injustice experienced by a subordinate predicted managers' Robin Hoodism, and that the moral identity of managers moderated this interaction. Managers who were low moral identifiers did behave as modern organizational Robin Hoods to correct either distributive or interpersonal injustices experienced by their subordinates. However, only managers who were high moral identifiers corrected interpersonal injustices in this way even at a high level of distributive justice.

KEYWORDS

Organizational justice,
managers' corrective justice strategies,
assertiveness,
empathy,
identification,
invisible remedies,
Robin Hoodism,
moral identity.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

G.I.1. ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE RESEARCH

The favorability of a promotion decision is a significant predictor of the recipient's organizational commitment and intention to quit right after the allocation. But the justice¹ judgment about this outcome, or about the procedure that was followed to attain it, significantly predicts organizational commitment, turnover *and* job satisfaction not only during this short-term post-allocation phase but also *before* the decision and *one year later* (Ambrose & Cropanzano, 2003). "The traditional emphasis in organizational justice work has been on [such] demonstrations of the basic justice phenomena" (Blader & Tyler, 2005, p 331).

As an introductory definition, I propose that when individuals assess the fairness of an event at work, they are evaluating whether or not this event is morally appropriate or ethically proper (Cropanzano, Stein & Nadisic, 2008). Since Adams' seminal article (Adams, 1965) organizational justice research shows that fairness matters for many people in many situations. His equity theory proposed that, to be sure that they're treated fairly, people sometimes even accept to have their own outcomes lowered (Adams, 1963). With regard to the fairness of the procedures and social interactions, research has also shown a "fair process effect" (Folger, Rosenfield, Grove & Corkran, 1979). It focuses on the "positive effect that people's procedural fairness perceptions have on their subsequent reactions" (Van den Bos, 2005, p. 274). This fair process effect is arguably the most replicated and robust finding in the literature on organizational justice and one of the most frequently observed phenomena and

¹ As is usual in the organizational justice literature, I use the two terms justice and fairness interchangeably.

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among the basic principles in the organizational behavior and management literature (Greenberg, 2000).

As for managers who are in a proactive position, which means that they allocate working means and rewards to their subordinates, justice matters too. In a case vignette study on managers who had to make bonus allocations, it was proved that justice motives per se figure prominently in the way managers resolve allocation problems (Meindl, 1989). Finally, third-party observers can also react to violations of justice: numerous customers who were made aware of a report on Nike's employment practices in Third World countries, which showed that employees had quite often been physically and sexually abused, withdrew their support from the company. As a result, Nike's sales decreased and its stock prices went down significantly (Ellard & Skarlicki, 2002).

Employees' justice judgments have been traditionally studied in organizational justice research in situations in which an authority figure makes some sort of decision that impacts one or more members of a collective. This is why justice is "almost always examined in a hierarchical decision-making context" (Colquitt, Greenberg, & Scott, 2005, p. 595). The underlying model that researchers have in mind is as follows: a supervisor allocates resources to subordinates. This allocation conforms with some distributive rule, generally the equity rule, and is a result of a formal procedure, that people assess in order to assure that this procedure is fair. When the allocation is concretely made and communicated, a social interaction occurs between the supervisors and their employees. It is then that the interpersonal and informational characteristics of this social process make the employees feel interpersonally and informationally more or less fairly treated.

Four types of justice judgments exist. First, employees make *distributive justice judgments* when receiving rewards in exchange for the work they have done. These rewards, whether they are constituted by pay, bonus, benefits or other, can be considered as

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“distributive justice antecedents” that affect perceptions of distributive justice (Ambrose & Arnaud, 2005, p. 66). The judgment itself follows a mechanism based on the contribution (or equity) rule (Adams, 1965). That is the employees calculate a ratio of the amount they receive and the inputs they make and then compare their personal ratio to a referent other. The employees feel that they are treated with fairness if they find that the two ratios are equal. Employees can react positively even if their outcome is unfavorable, provided that their inputs have been correspondingly reduced, or, if their inputs have remained stable, provided that the referent person’s ratio remains similar.

People also make *procedural justice judgments*. It is generally assumed that there are seven antecedents to procedural justice (Ambrose & Arnaud, 2005, p. 66; Thibaut & Walker 1975, 1978; Leventhal, 1980; Leventhal, Karuza & Fry, 1980; Colquitt, 2001): the opportunity to express one’s views, the opportunity to have some influence on the outcomes, the consistency with which the procedure is applied, the suppression of bias in the decision making process, the accuracy of the information used for the decision, the right to appeal the outcome and lastly the ethicality of the procedure. These antecedents are deemed second order antecedents: it is when they receive outcomes, such as pay or bonuses... (which are first order antecedents) that the employees make their procedural judgment. When these seven antecedents are present, employees feel that the procedure is fairer than when these antecedents are absent. However, there could be some variation in the number of procedural justice antecedents. In this respect, there has been a warning that procedural justice must not be assimilated to its antecedents (Mikula, 2005). Still, a lot of studies have proved that these seven antecedents are relevant to many allocations and situations (Colquitt, 2001, Jouglaard-Trischler & Steiner, 2005).

A last aspect of justice concerns interactional justice (Bies & Moag, 1986) – the perceived fairness of a supervisor’s treatment, which consists of two dimensions:

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interpersonal and informational justice judgments (Greenberg, 1993a; Colquitt, 2001).

Employees who experience an interaction with an authority try to determine its informational fairness, by seeing if the following five antecedents are present: candid communication, thorough explanations, reasonable explanations, timely communication and personalized communication. They make their interpersonal justice judgment by seeing if four further antecedents are present: politeness, dignified treatment, respect, and absence of improper remarks and comments.

Note that some conceptualizations of justice (for example the *group-oriented conceptualizations² of justice*) consider only two global justice judgments: the justice judgment about the allocation and the justice judgment about the process, which is often simply called procedure, in a broad sense (i.e., encompassing both the judgment regarding formal procedures and the judgment regarding informal interpersonal and informational justice). This view acknowledges that the procedural, interpersonal and informational justice judgments are closer to each other than to the distributive justice judgment (see table 1).

TABLE 1:
Correlations between the Different Types of Justice

| <i>Corrected population correlations</i> | Distributive justice | Procedural justice (in a strict sense) | Interpersonal justice | Informational justice |
|--|----------------------|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Distributive justice | | .57 | .42 | .46 |
| Procedural justice (in a strict sense) | | | <u>.63</u> | <u>.58</u> |
| Interpersonal justice | | | | <u>.66</u> |

Adapted from Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter & Ng, (2001)

² The group-value model (Lind & Tyler, 1988), the relational model (Tyler & Lind, 1992) and the group engagement model (Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2003).

GI.2. THE IMPACT OF ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE AT WORK

Why is it important to study justice judgments? For organizational justice researchers the answer is usually: because of their strong effects at work. A large body of research has shown that more favorable effects result when employees feel justly treated versus when they feel unjustly treated (Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter & Ng, 2001). Two positive effects of justice can be distinguished, according to the main type of justice considered: the fair process effect and the fair distributive effect.

The *fair process effect*, or the positive effect that a fair process³ has on recipient's subsequent attitudes and behaviors, is now a well-documented phenomenon (Folger et al., 1979; Greenberg 2000, Van den Bos, 2005). It has almost become the standard on which one evaluates the interest of organizational justice research. Along the same lines, before the introduction of procedural justice (Thibaut & Walker, 1975, 1978; Leventhal, 1980; Leventhal et al., 1980; Greenberg & Folger, 1983), another important effect had been proved: the positive effect that distributive justice has on subsequent attitudes and behaviors (Adams, 1965) labelled the *fair distribution effect*. This effect has been pointed out only recently (Lind & van den Bos, 2002; Skitka, Winkler, & Hutchinson 2003, van den Bos, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997). Notice that the fair process effect and the fair distributive effect pertain to recipients' (or observers') positive reactions vis-à-vis the allocator, who is in an organizational context, a manager or the firm.

However, whatever the interactional, procedural or distributive nature of the justice effect, its importance is not fully accounted for as long as one considers it without reference to its context. It has been stated that the effect by itself is "obvious – indeed, mundane" (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 2005, p. 527). There is an other important and robust finding in the

³ Which may correspond to the fairness of a formal procedure or the fairness of an informal interaction (and its interpersonal and informational components).

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organizational justice literature: the *interactive effect*, which refers to the tendency for outcome favorability to interact with procedural fairness or interactional fairness to influence employees' work attitudes and behaviors. Mainly, it takes the following form: "High procedural fairness reduce[s] the effect of outcome favorability on employees' support for decisions, decision makers, and organizations, relative to when procedural fairness [is] low." (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 2005, p. 526). When employees experience a negative outcome, if the procedure or the interaction is fair, then, this will mitigate their negative attitudes and behaviors. A similar interactive effect with respect to outcome favorability and distributive justice, was found in experiments (van den Bos et al., 1997; Lind & Van den Bos, 2002). Whatever the kind of justice considered, the well-documented interactive effect shows that fairness can mitigate negative reactions that could follow a negative outcome.

Three integrative theories of organizational justice have tried to explain the mechanisms by which justice judgments impact attitudes and behaviors, i.e. the fair process and fair distribution effects (Colquitt, Greenberg & Zapata-Phelan, 2005). Each explanation gives a different account for why people react so strongly to justice and injustice in the workplace. The *group-oriented conceptualizations of justice* suggest that justice is valued because it indicates a full membership in the work group and hence helps employees to foster self-esteem (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2003). *Fairness Theory* relates the unfavorable event to an identifiable source of responsibility (for example the supervisor or the organization as a whole). Thus, when people process their "would" (would I have been better off if the event that currently impacts me had not happened?), "could" (could the managers responsible of this state of fact have acted differently?) and "should" (should they have behaved differently?) judgments, their justice judgment is critically useful. It gives employees clear information about whom to blame for their negative

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outcomes (Folger & Cropanzano, 2001). Finally, for the *heuristic conceptualizations*⁴, procedural or interactional justice may be the base of the whole justice judgment for people who do not have enough information to process their distributive justice judgment about an outcome they receive (Lind, Kulik, Ambrose, & de Vera Park, 1993; van den Bos, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997; Lind, 2001), the reverse also holds: people use their distributive justice judgments as a cue to assess their global justice judgment when they lack information about the process. More generally, employees' justice judgment's role is important as it reassures them and allows them to cope with stressful uncertain situations (Lind & Van den Bos, 2002; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002).

All three theories help explain the interaction effect between the favorability of the outcome and justice. For the group-oriented conceptualizations, justice reduces the effect of short-term outcome valence because employees give more importance to long-term relationships. For Fairness Theory, the interactive relationship is due to the fact that high justice means that there is no one to blame and therefore no injustice, thus no antagonistic reactions, even in presence of an unfavorable event. For heuristic conceptualizations, when receiving a negative outcome, people may feel uncertain and they may fear being in a out-of-control condition. Depending on which information is available, individuals process their distributive, procedural or interactional justice judgment. If the outcome, procedure or interaction is seen as fair, this makes people think the situation is stable and under control. This reassures them and helps them to accept the negative outcome.

Thus, justice is important because it has favorable effects on employees' behaviors at work through the fair process effect and the fair distribution effect. Justice is especially important when outcomes are negative, a phenomenon known as the interactive effect between outcome favorability and fairness. Justice is also important because its absence can

⁴ Fairness Heuristic Theory (Lind, Kulik, Ambrose, & de Vera Park, 1993; Van den Bos, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997; Lind, 2001) and Uncertainty Management Theory (Lind & Van den Bos, 2002; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002).

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have deleterious effects at work. According to Conlon, Meyer, and Nowakowski (2005), people can react to injustice at work in three different ways. They can decrease their “good” behaviors (like organizational citizenship behaviors, compliance, or performance), increase their “bad” reactions (absenteeism, turnover, or neglect), or even start to behave in “ugly” ways (by sabotaging or implementing organizational retaliatory behaviors).

Finally, one robust and intriguing result of justice research is that the different types of justice not only interact with outcome favorability but also the one with the other. Scholars have found that the justice judgment regarding the process (the formal procedure as well as the informal interaction) interacts with distributive justice (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996). Specifically, unfavorable reactions are strongest when both forms of fairness are low, Negative responses are greatly reduced when one or both of procedures or outcome is judged as fair. Thus, by being interactionally just a manager can mitigate unfavorable reactions that could arise due to unfair outcomes. However, as I will show in chapter 1, managers are unlikely to behave interpersonally fairly when they have to implement and announce an unfair decision.

The three integrative theories of justice have proposed an explanation to account for this interactive effect between the fairness of a distribution and the fairness of a process (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 2005). First, for the relational models of justice when authorities are procedurally just, employees give less importance to the fairness of their short term outcomes and remain confident that in the long run, their interests will be fairly taken into account by their managers. Second, according to Fairness Theory (Folger & Cropanzano, 2001), the effect of outcome fairness on employees’ reactions depends on the degree to which they hold the decision maker accountable for the decision. A fair process means that the manager is not responsible for the unjust outcomes. For example, an external factor, such as loss of customers, can mean employees earn less through no fault of their own (Greenberg, 1990a).

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Employees view their manager as more responsible for a distributively unjust outcomes when the manager exhibits lower procedural or interactional fairness. Third, according to Uncertainty Management Theory (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 2005), employees use procedural fairness judgments to make sense of the events in situations that have a high degree of uncertainty (Lind & van den Bos, 2002). A high level of procedural fairness can either make an outcome seem more distributively fair, or can give employees a sense of global control and reassurance concerning the general rules and functioning of their firm.

From a moral perspective of justice (Folger, 2001; Folger & Cropanzano, 1998, 2001), procedural injustice (and interpersonal injustice in particular) raises moral concerns more strongly than other aspects of justice because it constitutes a lack of dignified treatment from a clearly identified source. Although unfair outcomes are an inevitable part of organizational life, employees feel they deserve to be treated with dignity and respect. Therefore, when procedural (and in particular interpersonal) and distributive injustices coincide, employees are more willing to retaliate against their managers (Skarlicki & Folger, 1997).

The moral perspective shows that justice is important as an end in itself. Thus, one might treat people fairly simply because it is the right thing to do. As I will show in chapter 4, the interactive effect between the justice of the outcome and the justice of the process can also occur with respect to managers' justice corrective behaviors. The moral view of justice will be used to predict the shape of this effect.

G.I.3. THE CORRECTIVE JUSTICE ROLE OF THE MANAGER

Traditional organizational justice research has investigated the impact of justice on a host of employees' attitudes and behaviors and explored the reasons why they react so strongly to fairness and unfairness. This perspective, consisting of studying what effects the

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fairness of outcomes, procedures or interactional treatment has on employees' reactions and the motives that explain these reactions, has been termed the *reactive perspective* of organizational justice (Greenberg & Wiethoff, 2001). Related work shows what a manager has to do to be considered as behaving in a just way (Bobocel & Zdaniuk, 2005; Chen, 1995; Deutsch, 1985; Martin & Harder, 1994). Studies of the organizational features and managerial behaviors that are likely to be considered just, has been termed the *proactive orientation* of organizational justice (Greenberg & Wiethoff, 2001). The proactive justice perspective, especially regarding procedural and interactional justice, has received less research attention than the reactive justice perspective. Surprisingly, very few proactive studies have focused on the way supervisors manage their subordinates' justice judgments (for exceptions see Greenberg, 1988, 1990b). Given the impact managers have on their subordinates (Yukl, 2006), it would be worthwhile to try to better understand the dynamics of their just and unjust behaviors, in order to be able to help managers to behave in ways that are likely to be regarded by their subordinates as fair.

Reactive justice studies have well documented the influence managers have in the shaping of their subordinates' judgments. For example, Skarlicki and Folger (1997) showed that managers have the power to *correct* organizational injustices at work. They hypothesized and found that employees reacted the most negatively when the justice of the outcome and the justice of the process were at a low level. They also proposed that interactional justice demonstrated by the manager could be a substitute for organizational procedural justice. Indeed, the results showed that a manager behaving interactionally fairly could compensate for unjust formal procedural rules. More precisely, when experiencing low levels of distributive and procedural justice, employees engaged in retaliatory behaviors at work only when interactional justice was also at a low level. In other words, the results showed that managers could correct distributive and procedural injustices by being interactionally fair and

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thus prevent retaliation and revenge by their subordinates. Other studies provide consistent evidence that managers' interactional justice behaviors can compensate for low distributive and procedural injustice (Cropanzano, Slaughter & Bachiochi, 2005; Goldman, 2003). Research has even shown that managers trained to be interactionally fair helped their subordinates to better react to a distributive injustice and to experience less insomnia (Greenberg, 2006). Managers are also likely to use means other than interactional injustice to provide justice to their subordinates. They might mitigate a negative outcome using discretionary and informal decision making power, especially in the numerous cases when there are no formal rules to guide them (Blader & Tyler, 2003).

Little research has empirically investigated the actions taken to correct and mitigate perceived injustice at work. These behaviors have been discussed in various ways. Reb, Goldman and Cropanzano (2006) referred to *remedial actions*. When these actions are implemented at the organizational level to correct injustices provoked by the manager, they are called *organizational remedies*. Correcting injustices by compensating the victim is referred to as *compensatory justice* and correcting injustices by punishing the perpetrator is known as *retributive justice* (Darley & Pittman, 2003). *Restorative justice* has been widely used to refer to an action aimed at restoring a sense of justice through renewed value consensus between the victim, the perpetrator and the whole community (Umbreit & Coates, 2006; Wenzel, Okimoto & Feather, 2006; Zehr, 2002). In this sense, restorative justice can be distinguished from retributive justice, which involves imposing a punishment, in the form of adjudication or revenge.

From a more general social psychological point of view, a recent work has attempted to conceptualize the dynamic process and the mechanisms that underlie the repair of a relationship between two parties in which a transgression has occurred (Dirks, Lewicki & Zaheer, in press). The model proposed by these authors identified different factors that can

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damage a relationship after a transgression has occurred: trust, negative affect and negative exchange. Propositions were made concerning the power of symbolic actions like apologies or substantive actions like incentives to repair each of these factors. This work shows the importance to attempt to correct a transgression in order to prevent its negative consequences.

The *corrective justice behaviors of the managers* is a promising area in which to run proactive studies about organizational justice. In the present dissertation, I refer to the range of actions aimed at correcting injustices in the workplace as *corrective justice*, a label first introduced by French (1964) to describe a way of seeking “to remedy mistakes in the allocation of rewards and penalties” (French, 1964, p. 412).

More precisely, I studied in the present dissertation *managerial corrective justice*. Correcting an injustice can involve correcting the transgression that was *the source* of the injustice. This would be the case if a manager allocated different tasks to a subordinate because the current tasks they are handling have been unjustly allocated to them (see chapter 2). Alternatively, correcting an injustice can also involve correcting its *consequences*. For example, a manager that shows interpersonal justice to subordinates can help better react to negative outcomes and experience less insomnia (Greenberg, 2006). In addition, correcting an injustice can involve the use of material means, such as financial compensation, or symbolic means, such as the justification provided for an unjust decision.

Therefore, I define *managerial corrective justice behaviors* as the material and symbolic strategies used by managers to correct either the sources or the consequences of injustices experienced by their subordinates at work. Injustice is pervasive at work and often independent of direct managers’ behaviors (Frost, 2006). The organization doesn’t often try to correct these systemic injustices that remain and produce negative effects (Beugré & Baron, 2001; Sheppard, Lewicki & Minton, 1992). Therefore it is of particular interest to study

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managerial corrective justice behaviors regarding injustices experienced by their subordinates and produced by the organization itself.

G.I.4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Given the importance of employees' (in)justice judgments, the important role that managers can play in shaping their subordinates' justice judgments, and the current gap in the literature regarding managers' proactive, corrective justice behaviors, I posed the following question:

How and why do managers correct injustice at work?

This global question can be expressed in three more focused research sub-questions (Q1, Q2 and Q3):

Recent calls have been made to identify and empirically test the *antecedents* of just and unjust managers' behaviors (Colquitt & Greenberg, 2003). The few studies to date in this area mainly concerned the determinants of interactional justice behaviors (Folger & Skarlicki, 1998; Korsgaard, Robertson & Rymph, 1998; Gilliland & Schepers, 2003). One paradoxical result shown by these studies is that, in spite of the efficiency of interactional justice in correcting other forms of injustice, managers were unlikely to use it. In chapter 1, I sought to add to this body of work investigating interactional "fairness as a dependent variable"⁵ (Folger & Skarlicki, 2001) by identifying and testing antecedents of managers' unfair

⁵ This expression puts the emphasis on the fact that what is under study is the justice behaviors. In fact, in the organizational justice field, the real dependent variables are always fairness judgments about these behaviors (usually employees' judgments) and thus cannot be fairness behaviors by themselves.

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interactional behaviors, that make bad times worse instead of correcting the injustices experienced by their subordinates.

Four factors were tested: the distributive and procedural unfairness of the situation to which the managers had to react, their level of empathy and assertiveness and the extent to which they identified with their organization. In addition, this research tested whether both aspects of interactional justice (interpersonal justice, and informational justice) had distinct antecedents. In sum, this first study attempted to answer my first research question:

Q1: What factors prevent managers from using interpersonal and informational justice to correct injustices at work?

However, managers' behaviors toward their subordinates at work go far beyond their mere use of interpersonal and informational treatment. For instance, managers might use their *discretionary and informal decision making power* (Blader & Tyler, 2003) to correct injustices in other, more concrete, ways - a possibility that to date has not been included in the concept of interactional justice. It is of great interest to identify these other corrective behaviors and their antecedents. Hence, my second research question:

Q2: In what other ways do managers correct unfairness at work?

In chapter 2, I answered this second research question by identifying a strategy whereby managers actions consist of allocating something extra, belonging to the company, not for its formal or intended use, to restore justice (for example, managers may distribute benefits such as free time, personal use of equipment, extra training or bonuses to victims of

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injustice). Because this often occurs “under the radar” (without more senior managers’ or other employees’ knowledge), this strategy was referred to as an *invisible remedies* strategy.

My third and last research question was specifically focused on a better understanding of this strategy:

Q3: Given managers’ use of invisible remedies, what are the antecedents of this strategy?

I answered this last question in two different ways. First, in chapter 3, I developed a conceptual model in order to better understand this specific managerial corrective strategy. This work allowed me to make research propositions concerning the forms invisible remedies might take in the workplace, the conditions under which managers are most likely to use them, and the impact invisible remedies can have on employees’ subsequent behaviors.

Second, in chapter 4, I tested, firstly, whether the robust phenomenon of the interactive effect between the justice of the process and the justice of the outcome predicted managers’ use of invisible remedies, and, secondly, whether the moral identity of managers moderated the effects of the justice of the process and the justice of the distribution.

G.I.5. A NOTE ON METHODOLOGICAL STRATEGY

G.I.5.1. THE “METHODOLOGICAL FIT”

Research methods used in this dissertation need to be consistent with the characteristics of each specific research question. For Edmondson and McManus (2004), this

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methodological fit is an “implicitly valued attribute of high-quality field research in organizations” (Edmonson & McManus, 2004, p. 1). Because too often “the use of quantitative data and statistical inference constitutes an assumed default approach” (p. 4.), these authors propose a *contingency framework* consisting in three distinct research patterns. In each pattern, the current state of theory and research has to be congruent with methodological choices in order to ensure these two components being mutually reinforcing. In their typology the state of prior theory and research can be seen as an independent variable as it is a fixed context “over which the researcher has no control” (p. 5).

In *mature theories*, researchers have accumulated knowledge over a significant period of time, such that there is general agreement regarding some well-developed constructs, relationships between them, and theoretical mechanisms that explain these relationships. Well-tested measurement scales are widely used across projects. Research in such an area is focused on refining existing theories using highly focused questions. Often, quantitative data coming from surveys or experiments is useful to test formal hypotheses logically derived from theory and prior research. Methods of analysis are usually based on statistical inference.

In contrast, *nascent theory* is characterized by the study of phenomena about which little is known. In some cases, no previous theory exists, so working in this area consists in part of presenting possible new relationships and explanations. Research questions in such areas are often open-ended. The research process is often inductive and involves qualitative data collected by ethnographic immersion or exploratory interviews. Methods of analysis are often based on thematic content analysis, with connections proposed to try to make sense of the data. Tentative answers address how and why questions and thus need not always be formally demonstrated.

Intermediate theory lies between the above two extremes. It concerns tentative constructs that lack conceptual development and measures or involves different models

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coming from separate bodies of work that have never been integrated. Research in this area usually explores alternative explanations of the data and propose new relationships between new and established constructs. Open-ended inquiry in a narrow domain is usually combined with testable hypotheses. New measures of constructs are often tested and qualitative and quantitative data are often analysed with, respectively, content analysis or exploratory statistics. Although research at the intermediate theory level aims to provide provisional theories that are able to integrate separate areas of knowledge, “the blend can be difficult to integrate” (p. 21).

For Edmonson and McManus (2004), in every area of interest one can find theories that are “anywhere on the continuum”, from nascent to mature. (p. 8), depending on the kind of specific questions one is concerned with. It is this congruence between the state of past work and the methodological choices (the research question and the research design) that help a study make “a compelling new contribution to the literature” (p. 25).

The Edmonson and Mc Manus (2004) contingency framework was used to build my methodological strategy.

GI.5.2. THREE CONTINGENT METHODOLOGICAL CHOICES

Following Edmonson and McManus’ (2004) advice, I have tried to make my research methods congruent with the current state of the field regarding each of my research questions.

G.I.5.2.1. Chapter 1: An experiment to investigate the antecedents of managers’ tendency not to use interactional corrective justice behaviors

My first research question regards the antecedents of managers’ unlikelyness to use interactional corrective justice behaviors. Interactional justice is now a mature concept.

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Researchers have accumulated knowledge about this construct, since Bies and Moag (1986) formally introduced it. The splitting of interactional justice in two components, interpersonal and informational justice, is more recent. However, it has already received empirical support showing that both constructs have independent and additive effects on employees' reactions (Greenberg, 1993b, 1994, Colquitt, 2001). A now widely accepted scale has been developed to measure interpersonal and informational justice (Colquitt, 2001). The importance of interactional justice behaviors in correcting distributive and procedural injustice is also well accepted (Cropanzano, Slaughter & Bachiochi, 2005; Goldman, 2003; Greenberg, 2006; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). Regarding the proactive view of interactional justice, only a few empirical studies have so far tested situational antecedents of managers' interactional justice behaviors (Folger & Skarlicki, 1998; Gilliland & Schepers, 2003; Korsgaard, et al., 1998, Patient & Skarlicki, in press) though there has been conceptual work in this area (Masterson, Byrne, & Mao, 2005; Patient & Skarlicki, in press). In addition, the "Churchill effect" explaining why managers may be motivated to distance themselves from their subordinates when communicating them bad news, has been proposed (Folger, 1993) and tested (Folger & Skarlicki, 1998). A conceptual paper has linked the Churchill effect with interactional justice (Folger & Skarlicki, 2001).

Thus, it appears that the field is now ripe for research regarding the antecedents of managers' interactional (in)justice behaviors: What factors are likely to be the main determinants of managers' interactional (in)justice behaviors? Do interpersonal and informational justice behaviors have different kinds of antecedents? Do situational and interindividual antecedents have a distinct impact on interpersonal and informational justice behaviors? These questions are important. Indeed, they allow predictors of managers' interactional justice behaviors to be identified. To date, interactional justice behaviors represent the only managerial corrective strategy studied in the justice literature. Thus, it is a

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good starting point in my study of the forms and antecedents of managers' corrective justice behaviors.

Due to the *maturity* of the extant theory, hypothetical and deductive approach seem well suited to the investigation of these questions. According to Edmonson and McManus (2004, p. 10) "the most compelling test of a theory may be experimental". Specifically, I used an experimental methodology to test formal hypotheses concerning the antecedents of managerial interactional (in)justice behaviors.

The contribution of this work was twofold: (1) new conceptual refinements were proposed that differentiated situational from interindividual antecedents and that predicted distinct effects on interpersonal and informational justice behaviors, and (2) these predictions were tested using an experimental methodology and practicing managers.

G.I.5.2.2. Chapter 2: An exploratory study to investigate additional ways managers correct injustice at work, including their antecedents

I have found some support (see chapter 1), for the hypotheses proposed regarding the antecedents of interactional corrective justice behaviors, which may practically help to make managers behave more fairly at work. However, the results also showed that managers were likely to be interactionally unfair when applying an unjust decision on their subordinates. Why? Because they tried to protect their social self. Thus, interactional justice might not be a widely used managerial corrective strategy.

An important follow-up question becomes: Do managers use other corrective justice strategies? To date, organizational justice researchers have studied corrective justice at the organizational level. Reb, Goldman and Cropanzano (2006) for instance defined an organizational remedy as "an action carried out by an *organization* with the intention of creating in the mind of an aggrieved worker the judgment that the perceived injustice has

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been atoned for.” (p. 34). They studied which actions were implemented at the organizational level to correct injustices provoked by the manager. In contrast, to the best of my knowledge, corrective justice strategies (other than interactional justice strategy) have not been studied at the managers’ level.

This state of prior work is characteristic of a *nascent theory*. No previous theory exists about the phenomenon I was studying. Thus, this research question could not lead to formal theory-driven hypotheses. It had to be open-ended and the method had to be inductive and based on qualitative data. I used an explorative methodology involving qualitative interviews of 35 managers in one firm. They were asked to describe the kind of behaviors they implemented after one of their subordinates had experienced injustice at work. They were also asked to describe their motives and the consequences they thought their reactions brought. The interviews were content coded and analysed using N’Vivo 7® software. Based on this analysis, I presented a tentative typology of managers’ corrective justice strategies at work and identified an under-researched corrective strategy that I named Robin Hoodism. I proposed tentative connections between this strategy and some antecedents linked to the situation or to managers’ characteristics (see chapter 2).

G.I.5.2.3. Chapter 3 and 4: The conceptual model of Robin Hoodism and a scenario study investigating its antecedents

One of the more interesting findings of the explorative study was the identification of the managerial corrective justice strategy of Robin Hoodism: allocating something extra to their subordinates in order to restore justice (for example, benefits such as free time, personal use of equipment, extra training, or bonuses). Because this strategy occurred “under the radar” (without the knowledge of more senior managers or other employees), I referred to this approach as an *invisible remedies* strategy. My final research question was addressed at

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understanding this strategy and its antecedents. Because the concept of invisible remedies was relatively new, conceptual development was required. Accordingly, I integrated different areas of knowledge (including previous work relating to organizational theft, organizational justice, and moral identity). In chapter 3, I proposed relationships between this new construct and other well established concepts (such as distributive justice, interpersonal justice and moral identity). Prior work corresponded to what Edmonson and McManus term “intermediate theory”. Thus, using a “mixed methodology” seemed appropriate. In chapter 4, I used a scenario study involving a new Robin Hoodism scale to test the relationship between managers’ invisible corrective justice strategy, their moral identity and the types of injustice that the managers tried to correct.

CHAPTER 1: UNDERSTANDING THE CHURCHILL EFFECT: WHAT FACTORS PREVENT MANAGERS FROM USING INTERPERSONAL AND INFORMATIONAL JUSTICE TO CORRECT INJUSTICES AT WORK?

1.0. ABSTRACT

In the present study, I investigated the antecedents of managers' unlikeliness to use interactional justice as a corrective strategy. Interactional justice perceptions concern the extent to which employees feel they have been treated with politeness, respect, and compassion (interpersonal justice) and whether they believe they have received adequate, timely, and personalized explanations (informational justice). Given the positive effects of both interpersonal and informational facets of interactional justice, it is puzzling that managers often, when they have to announce a decision that they know will have a negative and / or unfair impact on their subordinates, distance themselves and act in interactionally unjust ways – a phenomenon referred to as the “Churchill effect”. I tested this Churchill effect and distinguished its interpersonal and informational dynamics.

I conducted an experiment (n=118) that showed that on the one hand the informational injustice component was linked to situational factors (managers avoided giving explanations when they viewed the situation itself as being unjust). On the other hand, the interpersonal component was predicted by interindividual factors (managers behaved unjustly by avoiding showing politeness, respect, and compassion when they lacked the social competency of assertiveness).

Besides, manager's identification with their firm had a direct negative effect on their interpersonal and informational justice behaviors. Identification also had a moderating effect on the relationship between managers' procedural justice judgments and their informational justice behaviors so that this relationship was stronger for high identifiers. The results also showed that managers might use other kinds of corrective justice strategies than mere interactional justice behaviors.

1.1. INTRODUCTION

When employees have their salaries reduced by 15%, they may feel unjustly treated and react in an antagonistic way by quitting or stealing from the firm. But if they receive a sincere justification in a sensitive and respectful way, these reactions can be very significantly mitigated (Greenberg, 1990a). Feeling that one has received adequate information and has been shown interpersonal sensitivity and respect – when a procedure is implemented that can have an effect on one's outcomes, especially when this impact is unfavorable – is named interactional justice (Bies & Moag, 1986).

More precisely, the concept of interactional justice has been shown to include two different constructs: interpersonal justice and informational justice (Bies & Moag, 1986; Colquitt, 2001; Greenberg, 1993a; Shapiro, Buttner & Barry, 1994;). Interpersonal justice pertains to the form of the social interactions (the way things are said) and relates to politeness, respect, dignity, and the absence of derogating comments, e.g., sexist or racist remarks (Colquitt, 2001). Some researchers also add emotional support and the absence of intimidation or manipulation (Greenberg, 2006). Informational justice pertains to the content of social interactions (what is said to the employees) i.e. the information given about the procedures used to take decisions. It relates to candid communication, thorough and

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reasonable explanations about procedures, detailed and timely communication, efforts to tailor communication to the employees' specific needs, and efforts to take the necessary time to give the explanations and to remain accessible (Colquitt, 2001; Greenberg, 2006). It has been shown that both constructs have independent and additive effects on employees' reactions (Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter & Ng, 2001; Greenberg, 1993b, 1994).

Regarding the source of interactional justice, Byrne (1999) proposed a model of multifoci justice in which interactional justice was hypothesized to exist at both supervisory and organizational levels. Rupp and Cropanzano (2002) confirmed that separate foci existed for interactional justice. In particular, they showed that supervisory interactional justice is a much more important predictor of criteria relevant to both supervisors and organizations than organizational interactional justice.

Organizational justice research (Bies, 2001) has documented effects of interactional justice (mainly supervisory interactional justice) on a host of employees' attitudes and behaviors beyond the impact of distributive justice (the fairness of the outcomes received, Adams, 1965) and procedural justice (in its restrictive current usual meaning: the fairness of the formal procedures used to determine an outcome, Leventhal, 1980; Thibaut & Walker, 1975). A meta-analysis has distinguished between the effects of interpersonal and informational justice. Interpersonal justice strongly relates to agent-referenced evaluation of authority and relates moderately to job satisfaction, system-referenced evaluation of authority, individual organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBIs) and negative reactions. On the other hand, informational justice strongly relates to trust, agent-referenced evaluation of authority, system-referenced evaluation of authority and is moderately related to outcome satisfaction, job satisfaction, organizational commitment, OCBIs, withdrawal, and negative reactions (Colquitt et al., 2001).

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In spite of the benefits of interpersonal and informational justice, one study found that managers can schedule an unexpectedly short amount of time to announce and explain to their subordinates a dismissal (Folger & Skarlicki, 1998). A survey of 543 human resource managers⁶, showed that interactionally unjust behaviors during layoffs were usual (Gilliland & Schepers, 2003). 25% of the respondents recognized that they had already escorted laid-off employees from the premises immediately after informing them of the layoff. Moreover, 33% indicated they had a different employee clear up the terminated employee's work area to prevent sabotage.

These behaviors are not limited to dismissals. They happen in organizations' everyday life (Dejours, 1998; Dubet, 2006). Managers in charge of their firm's recruitment process sometimes do not even inform candidates that they are not selected and thus leave them to wait in vain for a second interview, without ever giving information or an apology (Bies & Moag, 1986). Managers have also been found to distance themselves from subordinates while communicating to them their annual performance reviews (Korsgaard, et al. 1998; Taylor, Tracy, Renard, Harrison & Carroll, 1995). Others are interactionally unjust in conditions of budget request rejections (Bies & Shapiro, 1987).

The above examples show that managers' interactionally unjust behaviors are especially likely to happen when the decisions to announce are unfavorable. The paradox is that it is in difficult or uncertain situations that interactional justice most strongly shapes employees' work attitudes and behaviors (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Lind & van den Bos, 2002; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997; van den Bos & Lind, 2002). So why do managers add interactional injustice to situations that are already difficult? Or more colloquially: why do "tough times make tough bosses"? (Folger & Skarlicki, 1998).

⁶ The low response rate characterizing this survey (22%) may be due to the fact that respondents who behaved fairly could be more prone to answer and thus might have been overrepresented in the sample. Besides, the highly sensitive subject under inquiry in this study may have led even participants who did not behave fairly to distort their responses in a socially desirable direction.

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Organizational justice research has largely consisted of studying the effects a certain kind of outcome, procedure or treatment has on employees' justice judgments, attitudes and behaviors - the reactive perspective of organizational justice (Greenberg & Wiethoff, 2001). Other research investigates what a manager has to do to be considered as behaving in a just way (Bobocel & Zdaniuk, 2005; Chen, 1995; Deutsch, 1985; Martin & Harder, 1994), by studying the organizational features and managerial behaviors likely to be considered just - the proactive orientation of organizational justice (Greenberg & Wiethoff, 2001). Calls have recently been made to also study the antecedents of these organizational features and managers' behaviors that promote justice perceptions (Colquitt & Greenberg, 2003). So far, relatively few attempts have been made to identify and empirically test these antecedents. This approach could better allow one to understand how to create fairer organizations. Indeed, this line of research is not focused on the reactions to "what" does a manager nor on "how" a manager can behave justly, but on "why" he may be just.

Interestingly, the research conducted in this area mainly concerns the determinants of interactional justice: Folger and Skarlicki (1998) showed the impact that expected blame by managers for a negative decision had on their subsequent behavior. Korsgaard, Robertson and Rymph (1998) tested the effect of subordinates' behavior on managers' interactional justice. Gilliland and Schepers (2003) showed that organizational features also had an impact on just behaviors. Finally, Patient and Skarlicki (in press) studied individual difference variables and showed that the level of moral development and empathy also affected interactional justice.

The aim of the current study is to add knowledge to the recent body of empirical work that considers interactional fairness behavior as a "dependent variable" (Folger & Skarlicki, 2001). It consists of identifying the impact of situational as well as interindividual variables on the interpersonal and informational components of managers' interactional (in)justice behaviors.

Specifically, I am going to study in this chapter a recruitment situation. First, recruitment processes are important management processes to master for a firm (Igalens & Roger, 2007). Second, job applicants are strongly affected by justice, interactional justice in particular (Gilliland, 1993; Gilliland & Hale, 2005; Steiner & Gilliland, 1996). Third and last, recruitment situations are representative of more general management situations and understanding the social-psychological processes linked to justice behaviors in this particular setting can then be used to understand other management situations (Folger & Skarlicki, 2001). The situation I am going to study is a common management situation in which a manager has to announce a negative or unjust decision that has already been made at the organization's level.

1.2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES

My hypotheses are based on three main bodies of research. The first concerns the “Churchill effect”: the most used paradigm to identify situational factors predicting interactionally fair and unfair behaviors (Folger & Pugh, 2002; Folger & Skarlicki, 1998; Folger & Skarlicki, 2001). I compare this paradigm to “moral outrage repair” (Bies, 1987), which makes opposing predictions, and try to reconcile both views. The second body of research I rely on concerns the effect of interindividual differences on interactional justice behaviors. Most research in this area is conceptual (Folger & Pugh, 2002; Masterson Byrne & Mao 2005; Patient & Skarlicki, 2005; c.f., Patient & Skarlicki, in press). Third, I apply research on employee identification with the organization to better understand the mechanisms underlying interactional (in)justice behaviors. Organizational identification has been shown to have an important impact at work, including on justice perceptions (Hogg &

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Abrams, 1988; Hogg & Terry, 2001; Okimoto, in press, a; Olkkonen & Liponen, 2005). To my knowledge, it is the first time this kind of research is used in a proactive study.

1.2.1. THE IMPACT OF THE SITUATION: CHURCHILL EFFECT AND MORAL OUTRAGE REPAIR

The term “Churchill effect” comes from the telegram Winston Churchill sent to the Japanese ambassador in London to declare war on Japan in 1941. The letter, which was polite and respectful in tone, caused great protest among the British population. Churchill justified himself by saying: “When you have to kill a man it costs nothing to be polite” (Churchill, 1950, p. 611). In fact, the reaction of the British shows that there *is*, at the very least, an emotional cost to being interactionally just with someone to whom you are communicating a negative outcome or action. The Churchill effect refers to the British public’s preference for distancing themselves, and having their leader distance himself from, a party that they are communicating a negative and severe outcome to (Folger, 1993).

When managers implement a decision procedure that has negative consequences for an employee, they know that they are inflicting suffering on the employees. A challenging situation is created in which the social identities of both the supervisor and the victims are threatened, and in which each side will want to “save face” (Goffman, 1971). The employees’ self-esteem is threatened by the unfavorable event. The managers self-impressions and reputation are threatened by the manager’s association with the negative outcome they have to communicate. Managers can choose to implement one of two strategies: an approach strategy or an avoidance strategy (Folger & Pugh, 2002).

The approach strategy consists of behaving interactionally fairly by trying to sincerely justify the decision and at the same time show respect and compassion. Bies (1987) refers to this as a moral outrage repair strategy, whereby managers are motivated to demonstrate respect and concern and to provide social accounts (i.e., explanations or apologies) in order to

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reduce the “moral outrage” of the harmed employee. This is the approach strategy chosen by Churchill when he declared war on Japan. In contrast, an avoidance strategy consists of psychologically and physically distancing oneself from the victim, by giving minimizing explanations and by showing no sensitivity or respect, i.e. by being interactionally unjust. This is the alternative strongly favored by the British public when they criticized their leader’s letter. The Churchill effect refers to this avoidance strategy.

Using interactional justice, although likely to lead to more favorable employee behaviors, can expose managers to employee negative reactions. In addition, managers may worry that providing explanations will make them more vulnerable, and that showing compassion can be taken by employees as accepting responsibility and moral blame. For these reasons, managers might think that helping victims save face can, in fact, endanger their own. In these conditions, the Churchill effect is fostered by managers’ desire to protect one’s social self (Folger & Skarlicki, 2001). This avoidance strategy can also lead to a denial of the situation and the derogating of the victims. The paradox is that by trying to protect themselves, managers produce even stronger negative reactions from employees than if they had chosen an approach strategy (Bies, 2001; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997), thereby making bad times even worse. For instance, it is in the interest of the firm to avoid legal wrongful-termination claims. And what research has shown is that the very strongest reason why people choose to file such claims is when they feel they have been treated in an insensitive way *at the time of termination* whatever happened during the whole job relationship (Lind, Greenberg, Scott & Welchans, 2000).

Folger and Pugh (2002) describe the Churchill effect as a non-rational ego defense strategy. However, in at least some cases, managers use the approach strategy of moral outrage repair and behave interactionally fairly. This leads to an important question: Which situational factors make the Churchill effect versus the moral outrage repair more likely? I

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believe that a clear and important characteristic of the situation can help answer the question: is the situation unjust or unfavorable? Indeed, unfavorability and injustice have been shown to be two different constructs, conceptually as well as empirically (Skitka, Winkvist & Hutchinson, 2003).

For Folger and Pugh (2002), the Churchill effect is a special case of the just world theory (Lerner, 1980). According to this perspective, third-party observers often distance themselves from victims who unjustly suffer in order to avoid distress prompted by a situation threatening a belief in a just world. To maintain this belief, people often deny the injustice itself, and find a way to believe that victims deserve their fate and as a consequence they do not merit an approach strategy. The Churchill effect can be viewed as a just world effect that concerns people who are not only observers but also can be responsible for the unjust outcome that affects the victims, creating a “threat to the belief in a just self” (Folger & Pugh, 2002, p 171).

Other researchers have proposed similar analyses. Milgram (1974) identified the same self-protection strategy as the Churchill effect among participants in an experiment in which they had to unjustly treat an innocent victim. Dejours (1998) showed that managers adopt ego defensive strategies of believing that the harm experienced by their subordinates is the employees’ fault or simply due to misfortune, rather than to their own responsibility.

Only when managers are faced with unjust situations should they be motivated to protect their “just social self” by distancing themselves from a victim. In unfavorable (but not unjust) situations, managers will not feel such a danger to their fair ego and therefore should be more likely to follow the moral outrage repair strategy. Thus, I propose that the Churchill effect and the moral outrage repair are not contradictory phenomena, and instead have different boundary conditions. This means that I think the incidents I quoted in the introduction involved events considered as unjust and not only as unfavorable.

Notice that in the organizational justice field, fairness is defined as a subjective justice judgment based on some objective antecedents (Ambrose & Arnaud, 2005). Thus, when I talk about the (in)justice of the situation, I mean in fact two different things. First, this term relates to the objective characteristics of the situation that usually make one judge it unjust, that can be called the justice antecedents (Colquitt, 2001). Regarding the outcome, this means that it is not in line with the contribution of the recipient in comparison with a referent standard. Researchers refer to this rule as the equity rule (Adams, 1965). Regarding the process, researchers refer to the procedural rules identified by Thibaut and Walker (1975) and Leventhal (1980): voice, consistency, no bias, accurate information, possibility to appeal and respect of ethical norms. In this chapter, I will use the generic term of “proper procedure” to refer to a process that respects these rules and I will use “improper procedure” to refer to a process that doesn’t respect these rules. Second, when talking about the (in)justice of the situation, I take the perspective of the manager who judges it. This judgment might be different from the objective presence or absence of the distributive and procedural antecedent rules that I have mentioned. Rather, it is the subjective way managers frame the situation as unjust or simply unfavorable that should influence their interactional justice behaviors. Besides, it is worth asking what kind of injustice (distributive or procedural) managers will be likely to more be sensitive to and would as a consequence predict their interactionally unfair behaviors.

According to the deontic model of justice (Folger, 1998, 2001), procedural justice more strongly raises moral concerns than distributive justice, thereby provoking stronger reactions to injustice. According to fairness theory (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998), a fairness judgment involves three counterfactuals: “Would” the situation have been more favorable if the current event “wouldn’t” have happened? “Could” the person responsible for this event have acted differently? And, finally, “should” the perpetrator have behaved differently?

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Because procedural fairness gives information about the perpetrator's behavior, it is more likely to lead to "could" and "should" counterfactuals. Thus, I propose that when managers frame the situation as procedurally versus distributively unjust (for example, because the procedure is biased or based on inaccurate information) they will be more likely to demonstrate interactionally unjust behaviors.

The situational factors that have to date been shown to impact interactional justice (subordinate behavior (Korsgaard, et al. 1998), organizational context (Gilliland & Schepers, 2003), and managerial blameworthiness (Folger & Skarlicki, 1998)) related only to the informational component of interactional justice. Because an unjust decision is not easy to explain and justify, managers may use fewer social accounts such justifications, when the decision is likely to be regarded as unjust. Likewise, Masterson, Byrne and Mao (2005) proposed that informational justice behaviors are linked to the content of a message and should therefore be predicted by situational rather than interindividual antecedents. Therefore, I expect that a managers' procedural justice judgment of the situation will impact the informational component of their interactional justice behaviors.

Hypothesis 1a: Situations consisting for managers in implementing and communicating inequitable decisions made by improper procedures will lead to lower managers' informationally justice behaviors.

Hypothesis 1b: The impact of situations consisting for managers in implementing and communicating inequitable decisions made by improper procedures on these managers' informational justice behaviors is mediated by managers' perceptions of procedural justice.

1.2.2. THE IMPACT OF MANAGERIAL INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES: EMPATHY AND ASSERTIVENESS

Regardless of the situation, several individual differences have been proposed for why some managers may be more prone than other managers to distance themselves from their subordinates. First, a manager's level of moral development (Kohlberg, 1981) has been suggested, in accordance with the deontic model of justice (Cropanzano, Goldman & Folger 2003; Folger, 1998, 2001; Folger, Cropanzano, & Goldman, 2005) by Patient and Skarlicki (2005) to have an impact. However, the importance of this variable is questionable since, according to one study, 86 % of managers operate at the conventional level of moral development (Weber, 1990).

Four other variables have been suggested as predicting managers' interactional behaviors: empathy (Patient & Skarlicki, 2005; Masterson et al., 2005), agreeableness⁷ (Masterson et al., 2005), self-esteem (Patient & Skarlicki, 2005), and the managers' ability to repair the relationship (Folger & Pugh, 2002). These variables do not concern the intrinsic moral motivation to be fair, but rather the social skills, which make the just behavior possible. In a medical setting for example, it has been shown that it is not sufficient for physicians to be motivated to show empathy, compassion, and respect to their patients when announcing them unfavorable outcomes to succeed. They also need to be socially competent (Stuart & Lieberman, 2002).

In the same way, managers may not have the ability to be interactionally fair in terms of social skills. Social skills or social competence can be defined as the availability and competent use of cognitive, emotional, and behavioral skills that lead to successful social interactions. They include such abilities as empathy, collaboration, conflict management, assertiveness, and leadership (Pohl, Bender, & Lachmann, 2005). Empathy and assertiveness,

⁷ which belongs to the "Big Five" personality taxonomy (McCrae & John, 1992).

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in particular, are two important components of social competence (Pohl et al., 2005; Sanz de Acedo Lizarraga, Ugarte, Cardelle-Elawar, Iriate, & Sanz de Acedo Baquedano, 2003) because they are at the root of emotional and social understanding (Broome, 1991; Thompson, 1998).

Empathy refers to congruent emotional responses to another person's emotional state (Davis, 1983; Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987). An important affective component of empathy is empathic concern: feelings of warmth and concern for a victim (Davis, 1980). Empathic concern is linked to prosocial behavior (McNeely & Meglino, 1994) and interactional justice behavior (Patient & Skarlicki, in press). I refer to empathic concern as empathy in the present chapter.

Wolpe (1958) defined assertiveness as "the proper expression of any emotion other than anxiety toward another person" (Wolpe, 1973, p. 81). Assertiveness was also defined in reference to one's standing up for legitimate rights (Alberti & Emmons, 1970) and has often been used interchangeably with aggressiveness (Galassi & Galassi, 1978). For example, thirteen of the thirty items of the largely used Rathus assertiveness schedule significantly correlate with semantic differential ratings of aggressiveness (Rathus, 1973). Later, Bellack and Hersen (1977) emphasized that assertiveness also refers to the respect of others' rights and proposed positioning it at the midpoint of a continuum whose poles are submission and aggressiveness. In this sense, assertiveness is the ability to respond in interpersonal relations without anxiety and without expressing aggression or anger with undue force (Arrindell, van der Ende, Sanderman, Oosterhof, Stewart, & Lingsma, 1999). More recent scales are consistent with this view, for example the scale for interpersonal behavior (Arrindell & Van der Ende, 1985). Assertiveness relates positively to self-esteem and self-confidence (Rabin & Zelner, 1992), the courage of one's convictions, the ability to defend one's rights and interests and to express positive feelings (Arrindell, et al., 1999). It also predicts others' acceptance

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and support and reciprocal and satisfactory relationships generally (Sanz de Acedo Lizarraga et al., 2003).

In sum, empathy helps a person better understand others while assertiveness allows a person to better express oneself to the others (Pohl et al., 2005). In consequence, when managers have to communicate a negative outcome to their subordinates, empathy allows them to understand what the subordinates feels and thus to better appreciate the demands of the situation, while assertiveness makes possible for them a direct, open and honest expression of this understanding. Empathy and assertiveness are both necessary for many social tasks, for example mediation and negotiation (Sanz de Acedo Lizarraga et al., 2003).

Because Gilliland & Schepers (2003) were not very successful at predicting interpersonal justice behaviors in their survey of human resource managers, they suggested that “psychological explanations” could be more useful for the task than the organizational variables they studied. In a similar way, when they hypothesized interindividual variables (concern for others, empathy and agreeableness) as antecedents of interactional justice behaviors, Masterson et al. (2005) proposed their main effect would be on the interpersonal component of interactional justice behaviors rather than on the informational justice component because interpersonal justice pertains to the way things are said and not to the content of the message.

In the same line of thinking, as empathy and assertiveness pertain to the capability of taking the other’s emotions into account and expressing one’s position, I expect a high level of these social skills to have an impact on interpersonal justice behaviors. Indeed, it is plausible that showing personal sensitivity to the experience of subordinates relies on personal competencies while giving a justification doesn’t. Thus both empathy and assertiveness should be independently linked to interpersonal justice behaviors.

Hence my second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2a: Managers' social skills (empathy) are directly related to their interpersonal justice behaviors so that the lower the managers' level of social skills (empathy), the less interpersonally fair their behavior.

Hypothesis 2b: Managers' social skills (assertiveness) are directly related to their interpersonal justice behaviors so that the lower the managers' level of social skills (assertiveness), the less interpersonally fair their behavior.

1.2.3. THE MANAGERS' IDENTIFICATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION: POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES.

I argue that an additional antecedent to managers' interactional justice behaviors that merits investigating is the managers' identification with their organization. First, relational models of justice have shown the importance of social identity processes in explaining reactions to (in)justice (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Blader, 2003; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Identification with the group moderates reactions to injustice, even for third parties (Okimoto, in press, a). Second, research shows the positive impact of employees' organizational identification on their behaviors at work (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Hogg & Terry, 2001), especially on organization focused behaviors such as extra-role behaviors toward the organization (Olkkonen & Liponen, 2005). Interactional justice behaviors are positive behaviors at work aimed in part at fostering cooperation and as such should be positively impacted by organizational identification with the firm. On the other hand, managers who identify strongly with their firm might be willing to behave consistently with it when the firm is treating their subordinates unfairly or unfavorably. In this case, interactional justice might be negatively impacted by organizational identification with the firm. Thus, it is worth examining, on the one hand, the direct impact on managers' interpersonal and informational

justice behaviors of their organizational identification. On the other hand, identification should also be examined as a possible moderator of the relationship between the justice of a situation and informational justice behaviors, and on the relationship between interindividual differences and interpersonal justice behaviors.

Identification with the organization is defined as the perception of belongingness to the organization (Ashforth & Mael, 1989), and is regarded as a relatively enduring state (Haslam, 2001). Identification forms an individual social-identity, viewed as “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel, 1978, p. 63). Organizational identification has been shown to negatively relate to employees’ turnover intentions, and positively to extra-role behavior and job satisfaction (Riketta, 2005).

Group identification has also been shown to moderate the relationship between justice judgments and subsequent favorable attitudes and behaviors like cooperation at work (Tyler & Blader, 2000; Tyler & Smith, 1999). Moreover, Okimoto (in press, a) showed that not only victims react more strongly to (in)justice when they strongly identify with the group, but also third-party observers. Note that in a situation in which subordinates are unjustly treated, managers may be viewed as third parties belonging to the same group. This means that the more managers identify with the organization, the more strongly they should react when they think their employees experience an injustice.

Still, the direction of their reaction is not straightforward concerning their interactional justice behaviors. As this kind of behaviors is usually seen as positive toward the employees and the organization (Bies, 2001), a strong identification should lead to highly fair interactional justice behaviors. However, if managers mainly identify with the organization, they are likely to react favorably toward the organization but not necessarily toward their

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subordinates. Indeed, according to Olkkonen and Liponen (2005), organizational identification is a multi-foci construct. These authors have shown that identification with the organization as a whole predicted extra-role behavior toward the organization whereas identification with the work-unit predicted extra-role behavior toward the work unit. In case their subordinates experience a procedural or distributive injustice or an unfavorable outcome stemming from the organization, the managers might be likely to react unfavorably toward the employees. Indeed, they might categorize them as an out-group. According to Tajfel (1972), observing poor treatment of outgroups elicits weaker favorable reactions toward the victims and stronger favorable reactions toward the in-group, for example even stronger identification.

Thus, managers who strongly identify with their organization, when having to announce to a subordinate an unjust or unfavorable decision for which the organization is responsible (or likely to be held responsible), might prefer to defend their organization by being interactionally unjust toward the employee. Thus, I propose that in such a situation managers' identification with the organization will negatively relate to their interpersonal and informational justice behaviors.

Hypothesis 3a: Managers with higher (versus lower) identification with the organization will show less informationally fair behaviors when having to announce unfavorable and/or unfair organizational decisions.

Hypothesis 3b: Managers with higher (versus lower) identification with the organization will show less interpersonally fair behaviors when having to announce unfavorable and/or unfair organizational decisions.

Hypothesis 1 states that because of the Churchill effect, managers will be more prone to behave informationally unfairly when they think that their subordinates have been treated

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procedurally unfairly. The psychological mechanism involved relates to the motivation to protect one's social just self. Because managers who highly identify with their organization are likely to view the organization as an extended self, they can be motivated to protect their organization's image as well as their own. Therefore, the Churchill effect should be stronger for managers who identify more strongly with their organization.

Hypothesis 4a: The negative relationship between managers' procedural justice judgments regarding a situation and their informational justice behaviors is moderated by their identification with their organization.

Hypothesis 2 states that managers' level of social skills (empathy and assertiveness) is negatively related to their interpersonal justice behaviors. Indeed, whatever the unfavorability or unfairness of the situation for their subordinates, managers with a low level of social skills are less able to take their employees' perspective with compassion nor to communicate them clear respect. In case they strongly identify with their organization, they will be prone to take their organization's perspective. This will make even more difficult for them to take their employees' perspective or willing to express favorable emotions toward them. Thus, they will not be likely to treat their subordinates with compassion, nor to communicate respect to them. This means that a strong identification with the firm should strengthen the negative impact of their low level of social skills (empathy as well as assertiveness) on their interpersonal justice behaviors.

Hypothesis 4b: The positive relationship between managers' empathy and their interpersonal justice behaviors is moderated by managers' identification with their organization.

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Hypothesis 4c: The positive relationship between managers' assertiveness and their interpersonal justice behaviors is moderated by managers' identification with their organization.

1.3. METHODS

1.3.1. PARTICIPANTS

The sample was 118 MBA students of a business school in Paris, France, who voluntarily chose to participate in the experiment for extra-credit. On average, participants were thirty years old, and thirty percent were female. All participants had previous professional experience (on average 5.2 years), sixty-six percent had experience leading teams within organizations (on average, 2.3 years, 8.4 subordinates).

1.3.2. PROCEDURES

Participants made an appointment for a one-hour session. Upon first arriving at the session (where multiple students completed the same measures in a classroom), participants read several letters from managers of the business school informing them of their task. Specifically, participants were told to enact the role of assistant recruitment managers for a new internship program at the business school, and were told the following: characteristics and aims of the internship program, requirements of the post to be filled, CV and cover letter for two (fictitious) applicants who had ostensibly applied for the internship position, and, in all cases, the decision already made by the business permanent recruiting manager regarding which of the two applicants had been selected, and which had been rejected (see appendix C.3.). Participants were told that their task consisted of writing one rejection letter (for the

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rejected candidate), and one acceptance letter (for the selected candidate). Participants were thus put in a position where they had to implement, and communicate, a decision taken by a higher-level manager within the organization – a common situation within firms and a common situation in which interactional justice is studied (Bies & Moag, 1986; Colquitt, Greenberg & Scott, 2005).

Several steps were taken to include the plausibility of the task, including asking participants to sign a confidentiality agreement, telling them that their letters could really be sent to the candidates, and making sure candidates did not realize that multiple people were working on the same situations, for instance by using two different scenarios, each involving a different pair of candidates (see appendix C.3.6.). The gender of the person who was rejected was reversed across the two scenarios. I also randomly ordered the candidacies in the files to address possible order effects.

Subjects were randomly assigned to one of three conditions (see appendix C.2.): Condition 1. *Equitable outcome and proper procedure (control)*: the profile of the chosen candidate clearly matched the characteristics of the position to be filled while the profile of the rejected candidate did not. Thus, the subjects had to write a rejection letter to the weaker candidate and an acceptance letter to the selected candidate; Condition 2. *Inequitable outcome and improper procedure by mistake (because of an administrative error)*: the profile of the chosen candidate clearly did not match the characteristics of the position to be filled, the participant thus had to write a rejection letter to the candidate who was clearly best suited for the job and an acceptance letter to the candidate who was clearly less suited. This decision was attributed to an administrative mistake, by which the less suitable candidate was inadvertently selected; Condition 3. *Inequitable outcome and improper procedure on purpose (because of nepotism)*: the profile of the chosen candidate clearly did not match the characteristics of the position to be filled, the participant thus had to write a rejection letter to

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the candidate who was clearly best suited for the job and an acceptance letter to the candidate clearly less suited. This decision was attributed to nepotism, the less suited candidate (who got the job) having been unfairly selected by the permanent recruiting manager of the institution because she knew him and favored him “regardless of who else applies”. Condition 2 was designed so that the procedural justice rules of voice, consistency, accurate information, and possibility of appeal were not respected. These relate mainly to the “could” counterfactual in fairness theory, i.e., the perpetrator could have behaved differently. In condition 3 I added the violation of the no bias rule and the violation of general ethical norms, both of which make the “should” counterfactual in fairness theory more salient. This allowed me to obtain different levels of proper vs. improper procedures, which could result in greater variance in managers’ procedural justice judgments, which would in turn better allow me to test my hypothesis H1b involving procedural justice.

After having completed the letters, subjects were asked to rate the distributive and procedural fairness of the hiring decision. Three weeks prior to the letter exercise, participants had completed on line measures of empathy, assertiveness and identification with their organization (their business school, that they would write the letters on behalf of). Demographic information was provided by the MBA admission office.

1.3.3. MEASURES

1.3.3.1. Manipulation checks

The manipulation checks “after looking at the job posting and the candidates’ materials, to what extent do you feel that the candidate (name and file number) was well suited for the job?” (see appendix C.3.7.) showed a significant difference between candidates perceived qualifications for the position, in the expected direction ($t=6,016$ et $p<0,001$). Less qualified candidates were indeed perceived as being less qualified for the position offered

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($m=2,62$), and better qualified candidates were indeed perceived as more suited to handle the internship ($m=4,14$).

1.3.3.2. Independent variables

1.3.3.2.1. The adherence of the situation to rules of equity and procedural justice

Depending on the condition to which they were randomly assigned, one third of the subjects had to announce a proper decision (which should be seen by an observer as distributively and procedurally fair), another third a wrong decision due to a clerical mistake (which should be seen by an observer as distributively unjust and moderately procedurally unjust) and the last third a wrong decision made on purpose on the basis of nepotism (which should be seen by an observer as distributively unjust and very procedurally unjust).

Participants' distributive and procedural justice judgments were measured using the Colquitt's 2001 scales (see appendix C.3.8.). Four items were used to assess distributive justice, for example "is the decision consistent with the candidate's qualifications?" or "does the decision reflect the candidate's experience?" Cronbach alpha reliability was $\alpha=0,95$. Seven items were used to assess procedural justice. Participants were asked to assess the procedures, which had been used by their business school to make the decision to recruit or not recruit the candidate for the internship job. For example "have those procedures allowed the candidate to show his (her) value?" or "have those procedures been free of bias?" Cronbach alpha reliability was $\alpha=0,89$.

Their judgments differed significantly between the three situations in terms of both distributive ($F=72,562$, $p < 0,001$) and procedural justice judgments ($F=29,879$, $p<0,01$). The situation in which the most qualified candidate had been offered the position was judged distributively fairer ($m=14,61$) in comparison to the situation in which the more qualified candidate was by mistake not chosen ($m=6,14$) or not chosen because of his or her

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connections ($m=6,27$). Similarly, the situation in which the most qualified candidate was chosen was judged to be more procedurally fair ($m=22,115$) than the improper-by mistake ($m=15,478$) and improper-on purpose ($m=11,600$) situations. Thus, between conditions 2 and 3, there was a significant difference only in procedural justice and not in distributive justice.

1.3.3.2.2. Assertiveness

Assertiveness was measured using two subscales of Arrindell and Van der Ende's (1985) scale of general assertiveness (see appendix C.1.2.): initiating assertiveness (9 items) and positive assertion (8 items). I followed these authors' advice not to use their overall assertion scale of 50 items whose multidimensional nature is likely to invalidate research findings. I chose initiating assertiveness because of its relevance for my research purpose and positive assertion because of its particular ability to adequately defining and operationalizing the assertion construct (Arrindell & van der Ende, 1985).

Initiating assertiveness relates to expressing one's opinion and contains such items as "offering an opinion that differs from that of the person you are talking to" or "telling a group of people about something you have experienced". Positive assertion refers to the display of positive feelings and includes such items as "telling someone that you like him/her" or "telling someone that you are very pleased with something you have done".

Thus, the social skills measured by these two sub-scales account for the ability to clearly communicate news even if these news are not likely to be welcome by the employees while at the same time not distancing nor derogating the recipients and trying to maintain a positive affective relationship with them. The overall assertiveness scale and its sub-scales have been validated with North American, Dutch, and French subjects and also in samples of executive managers (Arrindell & van der Ende, 1985; Arrindell et al. 1999). I will refer to the two subscales I use as simply "assertiveness" in the current chapter. Cronbach alpha reliability was $\alpha=0,95$.

1.3.3.2.3. Empathy

Empathy was measured using the seven-item empathic concern subscale of Davis' (1980; 1983) interpersonal reactivity index (see appendix C.1.1). Items included: "when I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for them" (reversed) or "I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me". Cronbach alpha reliability was $\alpha=0,73$.

1.3.3.2.4. Identification with the organization

The six-item identification scale used was adapted from Okimoto (in press, a) and Okimoto and Tyler, (2007) (see appendix C.1.3.). Subjects rated rate their agreement with statements such as "the values of (the name of the business school) are similar to mine", "when someone praises (the name of the business school) I feel proud" and "being a student in (the name of the business school) is a large part of who I am". Cronbach alpha reliability was $\alpha=0,86$.

1.3.3.3. Dependent variables

1.3.3.3.1. Informational and interpersonal justice – Coding

Two coders (researchers in organizational justice) independently coded the letters written by the MBA students for interpersonal and informational justice (see appendix C.4.). The two-item interpersonal justice scale and the three-item informational justice scale were based Colquitt's (2001) scales and adapted to the analysis of letters. For interpersonal justice, coders rated (1) politeness and courtesy of the letters, and (2) the respect and dignity shown to the candidates. Cronbach alpha reliability of interpersonal justice scale was $\alpha=0,88$. Informational justice was measured by coders rating (1) the thoroughness of the explanations given (i.e., whether precise reasons were given to explain the decision), and (2) whether the communication was tailored to the candidate (i.e., whether the writers made references to the

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candidates' profiles or if they gave personalized advice about areas for improvement, etc.)

Reliability of informational justice scale was $\alpha=0,72$.

1.4. RESULTS

Table 2 presents the means, standard deviations and correlations.

| | Mean | SD | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
|--|------|------|--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|-------|-------|
| 1. Situation (equity, no bias or mistake=1, inequity, procedural mistake=2, inequity, procedural bias=3) | 2.00 | .80 | n.a. | | | | | | | |
| 2. Distributive justice | 2.32 | 1.39 | -.72** | (.95) | | | | | | |
| 3. Procedural justice | 2.35 | 1.01 | -.65** | .72** | (.89) | | | | | |
| 4. Empathy | 3.79 | .50 | .10 | -.04 | .05 | (.73) | | | | |
| 5. Assertiveness | 4.28 | 1.24 | -.25* | .11 | .26* | -.01 | (.95) | | | |
| 6. Identification | 3.73 | .67 | .04 | .05 | .08 | .08 | .14 | (.86) | | |
| 7. Interpersonal justice | 3.65 | .73 | .16 | -.17 | -.16 | .04 | .27** | -.30** | (.88) | |
| 8. Informational justice | 2.67 | .80 | -.20* | .26** | .26** | .03 | -.10 | -.23* | .39** | (.72) |

Note: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Hypothesis 1a predicted a direct effect of the situation on informational justice, such that managers having to implement and communicate a decisions which involved unfair procedures and an unfair outcome would use less informational justice. ANOVA analysis ($F=3.03, p<.05$) showed that informational justice was significantly different between condition 1

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($M = 2.97$) and the two other conditions (condition 2 ($M = 2.53$) and condition 3 ($M = 2.55$)). Subjects in the two conditions with the inequitable outcomes and differing degrees of procedural impropriety wrote rejection letters characterized by less detailed and less tailored explanations. See Table 3. A post-hoc test showed no significant mean differences between conditions 2 (inequitable outcomes and improper decision by mistake) and 3 (inequitable outcomes and improper decision on purpose). Also, there were no differences in interpersonal justice across the conditions.

TABLE 3:

Cell Means for Informational Justice Behaviors

| Variable | Condition 1 | | Condition 2 | | Condition 3 | | <i>F</i> |
|---------------------------------|-------------|-----------|-------------|-----------|-------------|-----------|----------|
| | <i>M</i> | <i>SD</i> | <i>M</i> | <i>SD</i> | <i>M</i> | <i>SD</i> | |
| Informational Justice Behaviors | 2.97 | .84 | 2.53 | .91 | 2.55 | .61 | 3.03* |

Note: * $p < .05$.

Hypothesis 1b predicted that the relationship proposed between situation and informational justice will be mediated by managers' perceptions of procedural justice. As shown in Table 4, full mediation was observed at $p = .063$. To demonstrate a mediated relationship, I used the regression procedures recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986). The

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situation affected managers' procedural justice judgments, $\beta = -.65$, $p < .001$, and informational justice behaviors, $\beta = -.20$, $p < .05$. Finally, when I regressed informational justice behaviors on both situation and managerial procedural justice perceptions, procedural justice perceptions remained significant at $p = .063$, $\beta = .25$, while situation became non-significant, $\beta = -.04$, n.s. Thus, Hypothesis 1b was only supported at $p = .063$ (which is below the conventional level of statistical significance).

| Variable | Procedural Justice | | Informational Justice Behaviors | | |
|--------------------------------|--------------------|----------|---------------------------------|--------|-------------------|
| | Step 1 | Step 2 | Step 1 | Step 2 | Step 3 |
| Control variable | | | | | |
| Gender | .21 | .05 | .05 | .00 | -.01 |
| Age | -.04 | -.08 | .07 | .06 | .08 |
| Independent variable | | | | | |
| Situation | | -.65*** | | -.20* | -.04 |
| Mediator | | | | | |
| Procedural justice perceptions | | | | | .25 [†] |
| R ² | .05 | .44 | .01 | .05 | .08 |
| F | 2.44 [†] | 24.77*** | .31 | 1.47 | 2.02 [†] |
| Change in R ² | | .39 | | .04 | .03 |

Note: [†] $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Hypothesis 2a predicted that managers' empathy relates positively to their interpersonal justice behaviors. As shown in Table 5, Hypothesis 2a was not supported, $\beta = .06$, n.s.. Hypothesis 2b, which predicted that managers' assertiveness relates positively to their interpersonal justice behaviors, was supported, $\beta = .23$, $p < .05$.

| TABLE 5: | | |
|--|-----------------------|--------|
| Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Interpersonal Justice | | |
| | Interpersonal Justice | |
| Variable | Step 1 | Step 2 |
| Control variable | | |
| Gender | .11 | .06 |
| Age | .06 | .06 |
| Independent variable | | |
| Empathy | | .06 |
| Assertiveness | | .23* |
| Identification with organization | | -.27* |
| R ² | .01 | .16 |
| F | .57 | 2.86* |
| Change in R ² | | .14 |

Note: * $p < .05$

Hypothesis 3a, which predicted that managers' identification with their organization relates negatively to their interpersonal justice behaviors, was supported, $\beta = -.27, p < .05$. See Table 5. As shown in Table 6, there was also support for Hypothesis 3b, which predicted that managers' identification with their organization relates negatively to their informational justice behaviors, $\beta = -.24, p < .05$.

| TABLE 6: | | |
|--|-----------------------|--------|
| Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Informational Justice | | |
| | Informational Justice | |
| Variable | Step 1 | Step 2 |
| Control variable | | |
| Gender | .05 | .03 |
| Age | .07 | .08 |
| Independent variable | | |
| Identification with Organization | | -.24* |
| R ² | .01 | .06 |
| F | .28 | 1.85 |
| Change in R ² | | .05 |

Note: * $p < .05$

Hypothesis 4a, which stated that the relationship between managers' procedural justice perceptions regarding the situation and their informational justice behaviors would be moderated by managers' identification with their organization, was supported, $\beta = -.29$, $p < .01$. See Table 7. As shown in Figure 1, managers' procedural justice perceptions regarding a situation only positively affected their informational justice behaviors when they were low (versus high) in organizational identification. Notice, however, that the shape of the interaction was not the one that I hypothesized. I proposed that high identifiers would behave more informationally unfairly than low identifiers when the procedure was unjust. Instead, I found that high identifiers behaved informationally unjustly regardless of the injustice of the procedure. As for low identifiers, they behaved informationally unfairly only in negative and unfair situations and informationally fairly in negative and fair situations.


| TABLE 7: | | | |
|--|-----------------------|--------|--------|
| Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Informational Justice for Interaction between Organizational Identification and Procedural Justice Perceptions | | | |
| | Informational Justice | | |
| Variable | Step 1 | Step 2 | Step 3 |
| Control variables | | | |
| Gender | .05 | -.04 | -.02 |
| Age | .07 | .10 | .10 |
| Independent variables | | | |
| Identification with organization | | -.27* | -.25* |
| Procedural justice perceptions | | .31** | .35** |
| Interaction | | | |
| Identification with organization x Procedural justice perceptions | | | -.29** |
| R ² | .01 | .15 | .23 |
| F | .26 | 3.34* | 4.51** |
| Change in R ² | | .14 | .08 |

Note: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$.

FIGURE 1:

Interaction of Managerial Organizational Identification and Procedural Justice Perceptions in

Predicting Managerial Informational Justice Behaviors



Hypothesis 4b stated that the relationship between managers' empathy and their interpersonal justice behaviors would be moderated by managers' identification with their organization. This hypothesis was not supported (see table 8).

TABLE 8:

Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Interpersonal Justice for Interaction between Organizational Identification and Empathy

| Variable | Interpersonal Justice | | |
|--|-----------------------|--------|--------|
| | Step 1 | Step 2 | Step 3 |
| Control variables | | | |
| Gender | .11 | .08 | .07 |
| Age | .06 | .09 | .08 |
| Independent variables | | | |
| Identification with organization | | -.30** | -.31** |
| Empathy | | -.07* | .07 |
| Interaction | | | |
| Identification with organization x Empathy | | | .05 |
| R ² | .01 | .09 | .10 |
| F | .57 | 2.32† | 1.89 |
| Change in R ² | | .14 | .04 |

Note: † $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Hypothesis 4c stated that the relationship between managers' assertiveness and their interpersonal justice behaviors would be moderated by managers' identification with their organization. There was support for Hypothesis 4b at $p = .069$, $\beta = -.23$. See Table 9. As shown in Figure 2, managers' low level of assertiveness related negatively to their interpersonal justice behaviors more strongly when they were high (versus low) in organizational identification, as hypothesized (however there was support for H4c only at $p = .069$, which is below the conventional level of statistical significance).

TABLE 9:


Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Interpersonal Justice for
Interaction between Organizational Identification and Assertiveness

| Variable | Interpersonal Justice | | |
|---|-----------------------|--------|-------------------|
| | Step 1 | Step 2 | Step 3 |
| Control variables | | | |
| Gender | .11 | .07 | -.02 |
| Age | .06 | .05 | .10 |
| Independent variables | | | |
| Identification with organization | | -.26* | -.39** |
| Assertiveness | | -.23* | -.19 [†] |
| Interaction | | | |
| Identification with organization x Assertiveness | | | -.23 [†] |
| R ² | .01 | .15 | .19 |
| F | .56 | 3.42* | 3.50** |
| Change in R ² | | .14 | .04 |

Note: [†] $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

FIGURE 2:

Interaction of Managerial Organizational Identification and Assertiveness in Predicting



1.5. DISCUSSION

In this study, I investigated predictors of interactional justice behaviors. This line of research is important, as organizations will be better able to encourage managerial justice behaviors in the workplace if one has a better understanding of factors predicting them.

I found that a situational antecedent predicted informational justice behaviors and an interindividual antecedent predicted interpersonal justice behaviors. Namely, situations characterized by an inequitable outcome and an improper procedure (whether by mistake or on purpose) resulted in managers behaving informationally unfairly whereas a lack of assertiveness managers behaving interpersonally unfairly. I also found that identification with the firm related negatively to managers' interpersonal and informational behaviors. Identification also moderated the relationship between the situation and the managers' informational justice behaviors.

However, the link between managers' procedural justice judgments and their informational justice behaviors did not vary with their level of organizational identification in the way I had expected. The effect of identification was, in fact, much stronger than I hypothesized, changing the nature of the predicted effect. I proposed that high identifiers would be more likely to behave informationally unfairly than low identifiers when the procedure was unjust. Instead, I found that high identifiers were likely to behave informationally unjustly regardless of the injustice of the procedure. This means that high identifiers tried to protect their organization as soon as the situation was unfavorable for the victims, whether the situation was fair or unfair. Only low identifiers made the hypothesized distinction between negative and unfair situations (in which they also behaved informationally unfairly) and negative and fair situations (in which they behaved informationally fairly). The above suggests that identification with the firm made the

Churchill effect so strong that it applied in an unfavorable situation whether it was fair or unfair. I made a theoretical distinction between the Churchill effect that I predicted to apply when the situation was unjust and the moral outrage repair that I predicted to apply when the situation was unfavorable but just (Hypothesis 1). This distinction that I showed to apply for my whole sample was in fact only true for managers who did not identify with their organization.

Notice that this result is consistent with hypotheses 3a and 3b in which I proposed and found that managers' identification with their organization would make them behave interpersonally and informationally unjustly whatever the (in)justice or the negative situation.

1.5.1. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

This research makes several contributions to organizational justice theory. First, my results help to better understand the mechanism by which the Churchill effect, an important cause of interactional injustice, operates (Folger, 1993, Folger & Pugh, 2002; Folger & Skarlicki, 1998; Folger & Skarlicki, 2001). This research sets boundary conditions on the Churchill effect, in terms of whether a decision is negative and just or negative and unjust. A situation leads to the Churchill effect and its corollary, managers' interactional unjust behaviors, only if the situation is unjust, and more precisely procedurally unjust. However, the mediating role of managers' procedural justice judgments (H1b) was not supported at the conventional level of statistical significance. This might be due to the fact that subjects knew they would not meet the victims, but only write a letter to them. Thus, they might have been less motivated to use their procedural justice judgment to shape their behavior in comparison to a condition in which they would have been involved in a real social interaction. Other dynamics could also have been at work. Subjects who behaved informationally unfairly may

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have wanted to play down to themselves how procedurally unfair the situation was. In any case, further studies using different research designs should test again this hypothesis.

Building on recent research (Patient & Skarlicki, in press), I also showed that interactional unjust behaviors can be predicted not only by the situation but also by interindividual managers' characteristics. My results shed a new light on managers' tendency to be interactionally unjust by showing that it is not only managers' desire to protect their social just self in unjust situations that is at stake but also their social ability to cope with unfavorable situations. Such abilities as precursors of justice behaviors have to date received little research attention although they can be what makes specific justice behaviors concretely possible (Ambrose & Schminke, 2007).

Second, this research advances our understanding of the dynamics of informational and interpersonal justice, which were shown to be, respectively, more sensitive to situational and individual difference factors. On the one hand, a negative and unjust situation prompted managers' unjust informational behaviors. On the other hand, a negative situation, whether just or unjust, lead to managers' interpersonal injustice behaviors for managers low (versus high) in assertiveness. These different antecedents for informational versus interpersonal justice behaviors provides further support for separating interactional justice into its informational and interpersonal components (Colquitt, 2001; Greenberg, 1993a; Masterson et al., 2005). In this respect, I did not find support for hypothesis H4c at the conventional level of statistical significance. This hypothesis predicted that managers' identification would interact with their assertiveness to predict their interpersonal justice behaviors. However, assertiveness might be a context-independent interindividual characteristic. In this case, identification would only be able to interact with contextual variables, like the justice of the situation. This would explain why assertiveness and identification did not interact at $p < .05$.

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My hypotheses involving empathy were not supported (H2a and H4b). No relationship was found between empathy and interpersonal justice behaviors (H2a) and identification did not interact with empathy to predict interpersonal justice behaviors (H4b). It is possible that a situation involving face-to-face communication (versus written communication) of negative news would be necessary to prompt the vicarious experiencing of another person's emotional state, and the feelings of warmth and concern for the victim that are characteristic of the empathic concern dimension I focused on. Future research should attempt to replicate my findings when the communication of the outcome is face-to-face.

Third, while other research shows that at least in some circumstances managers may try to correct injustices at work (see chapters 2, 3 and 4), this study, on the contrary, show that managers, when facing an injustice stemming from their organization and experienced by their subordinates, are more likely to make bad times worse by adding interactional injustice to the already unjust situation.

Fourth, I extend understanding of the deontic model of justice (Folger, 1998, 2001) and fairness theory (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998, 2001) by testing it in a proactive justice study. In terms of their distributive and procedural justice judgments, the subjects distinguished between the three experimental conditions. The right decision was seen as distributively fair. The wrong by mistake decision and wrong on purpose decisions were judged as equally distributively unfair. In contrast, the participants made clear and significant distinctions between the three conditions concerning their procedural justice judgments, the right decision was judged as the most fair and the wrong decision due to nepotism was judged as the least fair, with the wrong by mistake condition lying in between.

Participants appear to have distinguished between the three conditions on the basis of their "would", "could" and "should" counterfactuals. In the condition they judged distributively and procedurally fair (condition 1), only the "would" counterfactual was

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relevant: the situation “would” have been better for the candidate if he or she would have been better suited to the position. In the condition participants judged distributively unfair and procedurally slightly unfair (condition 2), the “would” and “could” counterfactuals applied in the following way: the situation “would” have been better for the candidate if the clerk “wouldn’t” have made a mistake and this clerk indeed “could” have acted otherwise. However, because the mistake was not on purpose, the moral dimension and “should” counterfactual were not very relevant here. In contrast, in the condition where the outcome was judged unfair and the procedure very unfair (condition 3), all three counterfactuals applied: the situation “would” have been better if the manager “would” have behaved differently and the manager “could” and “should” (morally) have behaved differently. It is because of the accountability invoked by the “could” and “should” counterfactuals, by characteristics of the procedure, that subjects reacted more strongly to the injustice of the process rather than to the injustice of the distribution.

A fifth contribution of this work lies in showing of the important role in justice behaviors of managers’ identification with the organization. Whereas usually organizational identification is seen as having primarily positive consequences for the organization and for employees (and other stakeholders, such as customers), I have shown that managers who identified more strongly with the organization can in some situations be more interactionally unjust. This means that managers who viewed their firm as an extended self, when having to react to an injustice produced by this firm, chose not to behave fairly toward the employee who experienced this injustice. These managers might have thought that they had to choose between their organization and the victim. Although they could have remained loyal to their organization while being at the same time interactionally fair toward the employees, they might have felt an emotional contradiction between these two attitudes. This is plausibly the reason why these high identifiers reacted more strongly to the Churchill effect and also to

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their lack of social skills. Participants high on organizational identification could also have been motivated to sustain a representation of a cohesive and legitimated in-group and might have thought that the unjustly treated victim could be represented a threat in this respect. By being interactionally unjust with the victim, they could have tried to maintain a positive organizational identity.

1.5.2. MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS

One of the strengths of my study is that it involved real experimented managers reacting to a situation they thought was real. In addition, many studies to date have assessed justice effects using cross-sectional data. My experimental design supports a causal argument - that differences in the way managers perceive the fairness of a situation impact their justice behaviors.

I propose that if firms want to encourage managers' interactional justice behaviors in difficult times, they should persuade the managers of the procedural justice relating to the outcome communicated. One way is to involve managers in the decisions they are going to implement and communicate about. This could help to foster fair decisions based on fair processes. First line managers are indeed sensitive to the justice of the decisions they have to implement and communicate to their subordinates (Greenberg, 1988; Greenberg, 1990b). Another possibility could be for upper managers in the case of ambiguous decisions that can be seen as unjust or just depending on their rationale (Lind & van den Bos, 2002), like in the case of a pay decrease (Greenberg, 1990a), to be interactionally just with their first-line managers. By giving sincere social accounts and showing respect to the managers themselves, upper managers can make them more likely to judge the decisions as procedurally just.

In addition, organizations should avoid selecting managers to communicate the negative outcome who lack assertiveness or who might identify too closely with the organization versus with the employee. Besides, studies have shown that assertiveness can be efficiently taught (Bouvard et al., 1999; Korsgaard et al., 1998; Lin, Shiah, Chang, Lai, Wang, & Chou, 2004; Nota, 2003; Sanz de Acedo Lizarraga et al., 2003).

On the other hand, it could be argued that interactional justice can be used manipulatively and to cloak procedural and/or distributive injustice, thereby mitigating antagonistic reactions from subordinates and, in effect, making them better accept what is unacceptable. However, I believe that interactional justice can not be used manipulatively in the long run because of a frustration effect (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Folger, 1977; Shapiro & Brett, 1993; Tyler, 1987). Second, interactional justice is only one of several cues used to assess the justice of a decision. Nonetheless, I acknowledge the need to be cautious about the way my results might be used in the field and about the ethical questions that can be raised.

A final implication of my results relates to the impact on justice behaviors of organizational identification and the “good soldier” syndrome. It is in part because they identified strongly with their in-group that some managers reacted unjustly toward victims of that in-group. So one should be cautious about the bad consequences of a too strong organizational identification, which is usually seen as having positive consequences.

1.5.3. LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH

Given the impact rejected candidates might have on the organization (Gilliland & Hale, 2005), the results of this study can be valuable for recruitment researchers and practitioners. Moreover, the Churchill effect having been proposed to apply to various

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situations (Folger & Skarlicki, 2001) and the theoretical mechanisms I have described being not specific to a kind of managerial decision, my results should also apply to a wide range of other managerial situations. It is possible, however, that recruiting managers consider candidates in a different way than already recruited employees. Thus, the conclusions I have drawn should be confirmed by future field studies, using real tasks, and actual managers with their current employees.

Another limit of the present work concerns the fact that I did not have real victims who communicated their real justice judgments. This question is common in proactive studies in which the focus is on justice behaviors, which leads the subjects play the role of managers or allocators and not the one of recipients. Just as in the other proactive studies (Korsgaard et al, 1998; Patient & Skarlicki, in press) I answered this question by having coders rating the justice behaviors of the subjects. It would be interesting for future studies to build up designs in which two kinds of subjects would participate at the same time: allocators and recipients, which would make it possible to link antecedents of allocators' justice behaviors with recipients' justice judgments.

More generally, further proactive research is called for on the antecedents of justice behaviors, whether distributive, procedural, or interactional. This body of research can provide valuable insights into how to produce fairer workplaces. Further, this research can help to bridge the domains of organizational justice and behavioral ethics (Cropanzano & Stein, in press). Whereas these two disciplines indeed have much in common, in particular because they often focus on similar behaviors and describe them with a concern for moral standards, the reactive focus of most organizational justice research to date has limited the potential rich connections between the two fields. Understanding the antecedents of justice behaviors could be an important step toward better understanding ethical behavior at work.

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Finally, notice that among the 118 participants, 78 had to announce an unjust decision to the victim (because of a mistake for 39 of them or because of nepotism for 39 of them). Virtually all of them accepted to complete this task, with only 6 of them refusing, and having asked for more information during the experiment before handling the task. This means that most of these managers, even those who tried to correct the injustice by being more interactionally fair, went along with administering an unjust decision.

However, many of the participants used in their letters some type of informal corrective justice strategy: they offered support (by encouraging the candidate to reapply), future help (they said that the candidates will be contacted if there is any other opportunity), an alternative positive outcome (for instance, free training) or even an alternative position (direct help to find another job). Unfortunately, it is not possible to know to what extent these proposals were sincere, as no concrete steps were taken by participants to make these offers really available. Perhaps some of participants offering alternatives thought that their proposal would engage or bind their organization. The extent to which managers use these kinds of informal corrective justice behaviors, distinct from interactional justice behaviors, should be further investigated. I conducted a second qualitative exploratory study in order to answer that question (see chapter 2).

CHAPTER 2: BEYOND THE CHURCHILL EFFECT, DISCOVERING THE INVISIBLE: THE MANAGERS' OTHER CORRECTIVE JUSTICE STRATEGIES.

2.0. ABSTRACT

The principal objective of the study presented in this chapter was to identify other corrective justice strategies that may be used by managers in addition to their interactional corrective justice strategies. An exploratory study with 35 managers led to the identification of a new strategy used by managers to correct injustice at work. Because this strategy consisted in allocating something extra, belonging to the company, not for its formal or intended use, to restore justice (for example, managers may distribute benefits such as free time, personal use of equipment, extra training or bonuses to victims of injustice) and because it occurred “under the radar” (without more senior managers’ or other employees’ knowledge), I name this strategy an *invisible remedies* strategy. The study presented here explored this strategy in comparison to the other managerial corrective justice strategies that emerged from the data. The results show that managers were more likely to use invisible remedies to compensate for organizational injustices due to the deficiencies of the formal reward system (i.e., lack of bonuses and pay increases, inappropriately low salaries, promotions that were refused...) rather than to correct other types of injustices. Managers were more likely to react in this way when injustices violated their sense of equity rather than other justice rules. As invisible remedies, managers usually diverted organizational allocations from their formal use. Thus, they allocated benefits like free days off or extra bonuses in order to compensate for the injustices experienced by their subordinates. Finally, their first motivation appeared to be the restoration of justice in the workplace even if they

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knew that these attempts mainly mitigated negative reactions in the short run, without fundamentally solving any real injustice in the long run.

2.1. INTRODUCTION

The first chapter showed that managers often fail to use interactional justice in situations where employees experience distributive or procedural injustices, despite the known corrective effects of interactional justice behaviors. Indeed, when having to communicate an unjust decision, managers failed to provide sufficient explanations – a behavior which has been described as “Churchill effect”. Besides, if they lacked social skills, they also distanced themselves interpersonally from the employees. Moreover, those who identified with their organization were even more likely to show these two distancing effects. However, because many managers tried to correct the injustice in other (informal) ways, it is important to investigate *which other corrective justice strategies managers are likely to use in the workplace*. This is the focus of this chapter. As explained in the previous chapter, this kind of research question is characteristic of a nascent theory (Edmonson & McManus, 2004) and is therefore better addressed through qualitative methods, and through semi-structured exploratory interviews in particular.

Thus, an exploratory study was conducted to investigate how managers react to and deal with their subordinates’ injustice experiences. This exploratory study led to the identification of invisible remedies and their situational and motivational antecedents. Furthermore, it also shed light on the way managers evaluate the consequences they have on their subordinates’ attitudes and behaviors. These results formed the foundation of a conceptual model (chapter 3), parts of which were consequently tested and confirmed (chapter 4).

2.2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODS

Thirty-five managers were interviewed in a French logistics firm between December 2006 and March 2007. Five hundred and fifty employees work in this firm, which is specialized in logistics of book publishing. Its aim is to stock, sell and carry books to booksellers for its parent company as well as for other publishers. The managers were invited by the president's assistant to participate in a study about injustice at work. All invited managers met individually with me, who acted as interviewer.

When meeting with me, each manager was welcomed, and was explained the study's objectives as: "to better understand employees' feelings of injustice at work" as part of a research program. They were informed that participation would consist of answering four questions and was entirely voluntary. Managers were also assured that their name would never be quoted in any document. No one declined to answer the questions.

All the managers and their deputy managers at team and department levels were asked to participate. Only 6 team and department managers could not participate for practical reasons. Thus my sample of managers represents 85.4% of the first and second line managers of the firm. 58.9% were male and 41.1% were female. 74% worked in the factory and 26% managed administrative functions. The subordinates, the five directors, the general manager and the president were not asked to participate in the study.

Managers were asked four main questions: 1) to recall one or several events that had been experienced by their subordinates and that the subordinates had found unjust, 2) how they (the managers) reacted to this injustice, 3) what was their motivation to react as they did and 4) how their subordinates reacted to their way of managing the injustice (see Appendix D.1.). Question 2 is central to the main objective of the study, which was the identification of

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managers' corrective justice behaviors. Question 1 was added in order to contextualize question 2 and to make managers give their answers in relation to a real recent situation experienced and not in a general way. Moreover, it allowed me to identify the kinds of injustices that could predict specific types of managers' corrective behaviors. The intent of question 3 was to take the opportunity of a qualitative exploratory design to get some insights about the motives that managers thought they had to correct injustices. The aim of question 4 was to get a feedback from the managers about their views on the effects of their reactions, which would also help me to better understand the overall process of corrective justice in the workplace and of the strategy of invisible remedies in particular.

The questions were open and did not ask specifically about interactional justice behaviors or any other kind of corrective strategy in order to avoid leading participants. Moreover, participants did not know when they answered the first question about the experience of an injustice by their subordinates that the further questions would concern the way they reacted to it as managers. This was done in order to prevent managers from choosing incidents that they felt they succeeded to manage well.

The interviews lasted from 15 minutes to 2 hours (50 minutes on average). After discussions with the firm's president and a number of employees, it was decided that the interviews would be conducted without an audio recorder in order to make participants more comfortable when recounting sensitive information. I prioritised honest replies over fully accurate transcripts, as the focus of this study was to explore which types of incidents and types of remedies occurred, rather than the way in which these instances were described. However, precise notes were taken, using the participants' own words wherever possible. Immediately after each interview, these notes were transferred into a word file with the help of a dictation software (the Dragon Naturally Speaking software®). The resulting scripts were

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checked again for accuracy before the analysis began. I also took notes of some important demographic data for each respondent, for example their position in the hierarchy.

2.3. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

All 35 managers' interviews were coded in a qualitative data analysis software (N'Vivo 7®). The 35 managers recounted 74 incidents of injustices. These incidents represent the unit of analysis. For each incident I coded 1) the types of injustice experienced, 2) the types of remedies chosen by the managers, 3) the motivation for choosing these remedies, 4) subsequent subordinates' reactions. These four themes represent the main categories or "nodes" in the coding tree structure (or coding scheme) I used (see appendix D.2.).

While the coding scheme was informed by my four interview questions and by preconceptions from the organisational justice literature, I also allowed the final coding scheme to emerge from the data. This process could be termed qualitative content analysis (Bryman & Bell, 2003), as categories are emerging out of the data and underlying themes are analysed. The processes through which the themes are extracted are left implicit (as opposed to quantitative content analysis where detailed coding schedules are provided). I constantly revised the themes that arose from the analyses.

This process was supported by N'Vivo 7®, which allows to create nodes in different ways. For example, the four types of injustices (distributive, procedural, interpersonal and informational aspects) that were used to code the incidents were directly derived from the literature (Colquitt, 2001) and were therefore created *a priori*. By contrast, the managers' corrective justice behaviors emerged from the engagement with the data. Sub-nodes representing the modalities of this main node of corrective justice behaviors were generated each time I coded a new incident. Each sub-node then served to guide the coding of the

remaining incidents. After a certain number of iterations, no new sub-nodes appeared, which meant that I had reached theoretical saturation (Huberman & Miles, 1994). As saturation was reached, I made sure that each document was coded with the final and complete coding scheme. Finally, I also linked so-called “attributes” to each incident (for example, the hierarchical position of the participant who described the incident).

The coding process that I followed is typical for qualitative exploratory research (see for example Bryman and Bell, 2003), and results in complex data structures. Specifically, the incidents that formed my main unit of analysis are not independent, as most managers recounted more than one incident. Furthermore, each incident may have been addressed through several corrective strategies, and a manager may have identified several motivations for choosing any one strategy. Thus, the behaviors coded here are also highly interdependent. While this means that statistical tests cannot be used⁸ to compare the resulting groups of behaviors, it does not represent a problem for the kind of analysis presented here, the aim of which was to gain in-depth insights into a phenomenon in its natural ecology. Therefore, quantifications are provided only for descriptive and illustrative purposes in the following.

2.3.1. IDENTIFICATION OF INVISIBLE REMEDIES

Importantly, the coding strategy outlined above allowed me to identify a corrective strategy that the justice literature had not previously identified. This strategy consisted in allocating invisible remedies to correct injustices. Because this strategy is both interesting and novel, it will be the main focus in the presentation of the results. I present the invisible remedies managers used, their event antecedents, their managerial antecedents, and their

⁸ Even non-parametric tests such as Chi-Square tests assume independent observations and cannot be used to test differences between the type of correlated data that result from the analyses used here.

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consequences on subordinates' attitudes and behaviors at work (as managers viewed them) in comparison with the other more traditional corrective strategies that emerged.

2.3.1.1. Invisible remedies as a form of corrective justice behavior

I identified eleven different strategies that managers use when they react to an injustice experienced by their subordinates. These strategies are listed in Table 10. Examples for each of these categories can be found in Table 11.

TABLE 10:

Managerial Corrective Justice Strategies

| Items representing managerial corrective justice strategies | N | % |
|--|----------|----------|
| Used informational justice | 46 | 28,4% |
| Tried to fix the problem, at the origin of the injustice | 24 | 14,8% |
| Engaged in invisible remedies | 17 | 10,5% |
| Appealed to a better future | 15 | 9,3% |
| Refused to react to the injustice | 12 | 7,4% |
| Used procedural justice | 11 | 6,8% |
| Asked for help to correct the injustice | 10 | 6,2% |
| Used authority to ask perpetrators to respect the rules | 8 | 4,9% |
| Used interpersonal justice | 8 | 4,9% |
| Managed the way people react to injustice | 8 | 4,9% |
| Criticized the decision by upper management | 3 | 1,9% |
| Total | 162 | 100,0% |

(n= number of incidents in which each strategy has been used, the total of 162 is superior to 74 as managers use different strategies to manage the same incidents)

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In more than 10 % of the cases (17 incidents), managers used invisible remedies to try to correct an injustice. This was the third most widespread strategy after “informational justice” and “trying to concretely fix the problem, which is at the origin of the injustice” and just before “appealing to a better future” and “refused to react to the injustice”. The informational justice strategy (which mainly consisted in justifying what happened) has already been studied by organizational researchers and was the theme of my first study (see chapter one). The strategy consisting in erasing the concrete source of the injustice has been studied by the managerial literature as a traditional managerial problem solving behavior, which can be used to deal with unjust or only unfavorable events (Yukl, 2006). The strategies that appeared at the fourth and fifth positions and that consisted respectively in telling that things should be better in the future or in refusing to react to the injustice are two modalities of a same more global strategy, which is well-known in the trust as well in the justice literatures and simply consists in doing nothing (Ferrin, Kim, Cooper, & Dirks, 2007; Mikula, 1986). The focus of this chapter, the use of invisible remedies, is a strategy that has not yet been identified by the organizational justice literature and that may be used precisely when managers do not have the power or the will to really erase the injustice at its source. Thus, I decided to focus on the analysis of this invisible corrective justice behavior rather than on the other forms of corrective strategies.

TABLE 11:

Examples of Managerial Corrective Justice Strategies

| <i>Items representing corrective justice strategies</i> | <i>Examples</i> |
|--|--|
| Used informational justice Tried to fix the problem, which was at the origin of the injustice | Justified the decision - Asked the employee who was at the origin of the injustice in order to then stop his behavior - Gave an easier task to a subordinate to replace a task this employee viewed as unjust because it was too difficult for him See items in table 12 and examples in table 15 |
| Engaged in invisible justice Appealed to a better future | - Waited for things to change because the upper manager would retire soon (in three years) - Stated the problem would be taken into account when the same kind of decision is taken in the future |
| Refused to react to the injustice | - Waited until employees forget about the problem - Stated that he had no power to do anything and that things had to be accepted as they were |
| Used procedural justice | - Collected information about the process to check if there was really an injustice - Implemented a precise schedule to improve the task allocation process |
| Asked for help to correct the injustice | - Asked upper management to react to the injustice - Was helped by a coach to behave less unjustly |
| Used authority to ask people to respect the rules | - Reminded employees of the rules and asked that people respect them - Punished people who committed injustices |
| Used interpersonal justice | - Comforted or reassured the subordinate - Apologized |
| Managed the way people reacted to injustice | - Asked the subordinate to stop complaining and to react more positively - Asked the subordinate to talk about the incident directly with the other manager who was the source of the injustice |
| Criticized the decision toward upper management | - Sent a letter to upper management to criticize the decision |

2.3.1.2. Invisible remedies: A list of eleven behaviors

In my data, I identified eleven different behaviors as part of the invisible remedies strategy. They are listed in table 12 below. These behaviors are classified as invisible remedies in that they are ways of compensating victims for an injustice by giving them

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something extra, which is not formally intended for this use, without telling it to upper management nor to other employees who do not benefit from it. Thus, these remedies are allocated “invisibly”, or “under the radar”.

TABLE 12:
Invisible Remedies

| <i>Invisibles remedies</i> | N | % |
|--|-----------|---------------|
| Allocated free days off or was more flexible in the allocation of time off | 6 | 26,1% |
| Allocated a higher bonus | 6 | 26,1% |
| Recruited temporary workers to help | 3 | 13,4% |
| Allocated a higher salary increase | 1 | 4,4% |
| Allocated small gifts (free lunches, chocolates, flowers) | 1 | 4,4% |
| Allocated more training | 1 | 4,4% |
| Helped subordinates be promoted | 1 | 4,4% |
| Improved the subordinates' status | 1 | 4,4% |
| Gave personal help to the subordinate to handle their job | 1 | 4,4% |
| Applied a formal allocation rule with flexibility for fringe benefits | 1 | 4,4% |
| Improved working conditions | 1 | 4,4% |
| Total | 23 | 100,0% |

(n= number of incidents in which this kind of remedy has been used, the total of 23 is superior to 17 as managers sometimes use several different invisible remedies to manage the same incidents)

However, the particular behaviors I have identified may be specific to the setting in which the study has been conducted. There may be other forms of invisible remedies in other contexts, depending on the type of firm and the kind of resources that managers have at hand. Typically, in a manufacturing firm material objects or finished products may be given to

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subordinates to compensate for an injustice. However, in this research setting, the firm provided a service (logistics) and did not produce any material objects. Managers in this setting appeared to mostly allocate benefits that were formally planned (days off, bonuses, recruitment of temporary workers...). What made their allocation an allocation of invisible remedies is that they did not allocate these benefits according to the formal rules of the firm but informally, in order to compensate for injustices without the agreement of upper management. For example, a bonus is typically intended to be allocated for excellent work performance, but I found that it may instead be given to someone who has suffered an injustice (other examples can be found in table 15). Thus, what makes these allocations “remedies” is the purpose intended by the allocating manager.

2.3.2. SITUATIONAL ANTECEDENTS OF INVISIBLE REMEDIES

As in chapter one, I was interested in identifying two kinds of antecedents of managers’ corrective justice behaviors, namely situational and individual antecedents. This section concerns situational antecedents linked to the characteristics of the injustices. The first interview question concerning the injustices experienced by participants’ subordinates allowed me to gain insights on four themes that are presented here: the kind of injustice, the type of antecedent event, the justice rule that was violated and the source of the injustice. In order to better understand the specificity of invisible remedies, I systematically compare this strategy to the other corrective justice strategies.

2.3.2.1. Invisible remedies and types of injustices

As a first step, I investigated which types of injustice experienced by a subordinate (distributive, procedural, interpersonal and informational) was linked to the use of invisible

justice remedies in my sample. Table 13 presents an overview of the frequencies of type of injustice remedied by invisible remedies versus other managerial corrective strategies.

TABLE 13:

Types of Injustices and Invisible Remedies Strategy

| | The strategy of invisible remedies | | Other managerial corrective strategies | |
|-------------------------|------------------------------------|--------|--|--------|
| | n | % | n | % |
| Distributive injustice | 17 | 100,0% | 108 | 71,1% |
| Interpersonal injustice | 0 | 0,0% | 21 | 13,8% |
| Procedural injustice | 0 | 0,0% | 13 | 8,6% |
| Informational injustice | 0 | 0,0% | 10 | 6,6% |
| Total | 17 | 100,0% | 152 | 100,0% |

The results show that invisible remedies in this study were always used to correct a distributive injustice rather than other types of injustices. In comparison, other types of managerial corrective strategies (excluding invisible remedies) addressed distributive injustice, but also interpersonal, procedural, and informational injustices.

2.3.2.2. Invisible remedies and types of antecedent events

In a second step, I focused on the specific types of events that constituted the *distributive injustices* that were addressed through corrective strategies. I identified the following ten categories.

TABLE 14:

Types of Distributive Antecedent Events and Invisible Remedies Strategy

| | The strategy of invisible remedies | | Other managerial corrective justice strategies | |
|---|------------------------------------|--------|--|--------|
| | N | % | n | % |
| Allocation of tasks | 3 | 17,6% | 36 | 33,3% |
| Allocation of bonus and pay increase | 6 | 35,3% | 25 | 23,1% |
| Allocation of cooperation in doing work | 0 | 0,0% | 15 | 13,8% |
| Allocation of time off and duration of work | 1 | 5,9% | 12 | 11,2% |
| Allocation of salary | 5 | 29,4% | 7 | 6,6% |
| Allocation of working means | 0 | 0,0% | 4 | 3,7% |
| Allocation of fringe benefits | 1 | 5,9% | 4 | 3,3% |
| Allocation of promotions | 1 | 5,9% | 2 | 1,9% |
| Allocation of offices | 0 | 0,0% | 2 | 1,9% |
| Allocation of sanctions | 0 | 0,0% | 1 | 1,3% |
| Total | 17 | 100,0% | 108 | 100,0% |

The allocation of tasks was the most frequent antecedent for distributive injustices overall (though not for distributive injustice addressed through invisible remedies). This may be due to the fact that in this firm, one of the core tasks of managers was to distribute the weekly workload among the production line workers. Regarding invisible remedies, they were used relatively more often to correct injustices linked to bonuses, pay increases, salaries and promotions in comparison to the use of other corrective justice strategies. Notice all these antecedents were rewards. This means that, at least in my sample, invisible remedies first served to compensate for poor rewards that were viewed as unjust.

Examples of event antecedents that constituted distributive injustices and the specific invisible remedies used to correct them are given in table 15.

TABLE 15:

Illustrations of Invisible Remedies and Event Antecedents

| <i>Invisible remedies</i> | <i>Examples of event antecedents</i> | <i>Illustrations</i> |
|--|--|---|
| Allocated free days off or was more flexible in the allocation of time off | - Bonus - Time off and duration of work - Salary | - Subordinates were given free days off to compensate for them having worked very hard during the strike without having been paid more. - Young mothers were given free days off on the ground they needed this flexibility more than other employees. - The manager thought his subordinates were not paid and appreciated enough in relation to the hard work they did. So he allocated time off to them flexibly in compensation. |
| Allocated higher bonus | - Pay increase | - Managers who could not allocate a salary increase despite subordinates deserving it allocated them bonuses from their own budget in compensation. - Employees felt unjustly treated because they had to work in more difficult conditions without receiving any pay increase. Thus the manager allocated them a special bonus for dust to compensate, even if they did not work in more dust. |
| Recruited more temporary workers | - Salary - Tasks | - The manager thought his subordinates were not paid and appreciated enough in relation to the hard work they did. So he hired temporary workers to alleviate their workload. - The manager could not rely equally on all subordinates in his team, and therefore gave much more work to do to only some of them. To compensate for this injustice in the allocation of tasks, he hired temporary workers to help the employees who got too much work. |
| Allocated a higher salary increase | Pay increase the year before | The employee had not received a salary increase despite her deserving it. This made her manager promise to allocate her a salary increase the year after. The year after, the manager allocated her a salary increase that was larger than deserved in order to compensate for the injustice of the former year. |
| Allocated small gifts (free lunches, chocolates, flowers) | Salary | The manager thought subordinates were not paid and appreciated enough in relation to the hard work they did. So she allocated them little gifts. |
| Allocated more training | Promotion | The subordinate did not get the promotion he applied for despite deserving it. His manager decided to allocate a very expensive and interesting training to him in compensation. |
| Helped subordinates be promoted | Salary | The manager thought her subordinates were not paid enough compared to the hard work they did. So she tried to help them to be promoted in compensation. |
| Improved the subordinates' status | Salary | The manager thought her subordinates were not paid enough compared to the hard work they did. So she tried to help them to get a higher symbolic status in compensation by changing the titles of their jobs. |
| Gave personal help to the subordinates to handle their jobs | Tasks | The manager could not rely equally on all subordinates in his team, and thus gave all the work to do to only some of them. To compensate for this injustice in the allocation of tasks, he gave personal help to the employees who got too much work. |
| Applied a formal allocation rule with flexibility for fringe benefits | Fringe benefits | People were informally given the right to get more free books than officially allowed to compensate for some restrictions they found unjust in the choice of the book titles. |
| Improved working conditions | Salary | - Created a new job and hired a new worker so that the workload would be lower for her subordinates who were not justly paid for the work they did |

2.3.2.3. Invisible remedies and types of justice criteria that were violated

The different types of justice judgments have been shown to be based on specific justice rules (Colquitt, 2001). For distributive justice, the main rule used in work settings is the equity rule, especially for rewards (Adams, 1965; Meindl, 1989). However, other rules like equality and need might be used as complementary rules depending on the kinds of outcomes that are allocated and the context in which the allocation takes place (Deutsch, 1985). Other researchers have even found that one can identify 17 distinct distributive justice rules (Reis, 1984).

I present here the kinds of rules that were violated in the distributive injustices described by the participants and their link to the corrective justice behaviors used. The comparison between the invisible remedies strategy and the other corrective justice strategies is provided in order to support the discussion of the specific function of this strategy.

Participants recounted distributive injustices that related to the norms of equity, need, equality, and some additional issues (mainly the respect of the firm's formal norms, which appeared to be a rule that if violated, produced a perception of injustice, especially in relation with each employees' job requirements). Equity was the distributive justice norm that was violated in most distributive injustices in my sample. Notice however that equality was quite often quoted as a violated rule, at least in comparison with its weak importance in the justice literature (Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997). This might be due to the specificity of this work setting in which the equal allocation of tasks was very important for workers. Thus, most corrective strategies refer to problems with equity rather than equality or need. However, an even higher percentage of invisible remedies appeared to be linked to injustices that violate the sense of equity in comparison to the use of other corrective justice strategies. As the equity rule is often linked to the allocation of rewards, this finding suggests that managers

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may view invisible remedies as an informal reward system with the aim to redress the official reward system when the latter doesn't work efficiently.

TABLE 16:

Types of Distributive Justice Criteria Violated and Invisible Remedies Strategy

| | The strategy of invisible remedies | | Other managerial corrective justice strategies | |
|----------|------------------------------------|--------|--|--------|
| | n | % | n | % |
| Equity | 14 | 82,4% | 39 | 36,1% |
| Equality | 2 | 11,8% | 38 | 35,2% |
| Need | 1 | 5,9% | 12 | 11,1% |
| Other | 0 | 0,0% | 19 | 17,6% |
| Total | 17 | 100,0% | 108 | 100,0% |

2.3.2.4. Invisible remedies and injustice sources

A further issue of interest is how the injustices emanating from different sources are corrected. In this study, participants identified three different sources of the injustices experienced by employees: the firm or upper management, the line manager, and the coworkers.

TABLE 17:
Injustice Sources and Invisible Remedies Strategy

| | The strategy of invisible remedies | | Other managerial corrective justice strategies | |
|--------------------------|------------------------------------|--------|--|--------|
| | n | % | n | % |
| Manager | 5 | 29,4% | 83 | 54,6% |
| Firm or upper management | 12 | 70,6% | 38 | 25,0% |
| Coworkers | 0 | 0,0% | 31 | 20,4% |
| Total | 17 | 100,0% | 152 | 100,0% |

Invisible remedies were more often used to correct injustices stemming from the firm or upper management rather than from other sources in comparison to the use of other corrective justice strategies. This is in line with the previously suggested functions of invisible remedies: Managers addressed an unjust outcome stemming from a formal reward system through an informal reward system.

2.3.3. MANAGERIAL ANTECEDENTS OF INVISIBLE REMEDIES

Apart from the situational antecedents linked to the kinds of injustices experienced, factors linked to each manager and his or her role in the organization are also important to consider. Knowledge on these antecedents might facilitate a better understanding of the underlying mechanism of the strategy of invisible remedies.

2.3.3.1. Managers' motivations

My third interview question referred to managers' motivation for their reaction (question 2) to the subordinates' injustice experience (question 1). Eight different types of motives for correcting an injustice emerged in this sample (see Table 18 below). Examples for each of these categories can be found in Table 19.

TABLE 18:

Invisible Remedies Strategy and Managers' Motives

| | The strategy of invisible remedies | | Other managerial corrective justice strategies | |
|---|------------------------------------|--------|--|--------|
| | N | % | n | % |
| Because it was the right thing to do | 10 | 28,6% | 70 | 23,5% |
| Relational motives | 8 | 22,9% | 65 | 21,8% |
| Work performance instrumental motives | 3 | 8,6% | 51 | 17,1% |
| To avoid problems | 5 | 14,3% | 46 | 15,4% |
| To help the subordinate | 4 | 11,4% | 32 | 10,7% |
| Thought there was no injustice | 0 | 0,0% | 13 | 4,4% |
| To make the subordinate accept the decision | 2 | 5,7% | 11 | 3,7% |
| To <i>appear</i> as being just | 3 | 8,6% | 10 | 3,4% |
| Total | 35 | 100,0% | 298 | 100,0% |

(n represents the number of incidents for which a particular motive was claimed. Notice that any one incident may be managed using several different strategies and each strategy may be used for different motives)

Managers first reacted to an injustice as they did because they thought it was the right thing to do, which may be viewed as a moral motive or a motive to restore justice. The two

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other most frequent motives were relational (i.e., linked to the fostering of a satisfying relationship) and instrumental (i.e., linked to work performance of the subordinates).

When comparing the motivation for using invisible remedies vs. other corrective justice remedies, I found that invisible remedies were more frequently used for moral reasons and less for instrumental reasons. Thus, using invisible remedies was seen not only as a way to motivate employees or to appear just, but also to re-establish justice in the workplace as an end in itself. However, it needs to be stressed that these are self-reported motives, and answers may of course have been affected by retrospective bias and social desirability bias.

TABLE 19:

Illustrations of Corrective Justice Motivations

| <i>Managers' motives</i> | <i>Examples</i> |
|---|---|
| Because it was the right thing to do | - To handle one's role as a manager, - To be just - Because respect is important in itself |
| Relational motives | - To have better relations with the subordinate - To show recognition - To maintain a good social climate |
| Work performance instrumental motives | - So that employees do not give up their task - To maintain motivation - Because injustice is inefficient |
| To avoid problems | - So that people stop complaining - To have peace |
| To help the subordinate | - So that the employee suffers less - To help the employee wait until the problem is fixed - To help the subordinate progress |
| Thought there was no injustice | - Things are just - People always like complaining |
| To make the subordinate accept the decision | - To make the subordinate understand the decision is justified - So that the person understands and accepts the situation |
| To appear as being just | - Showing the image of someone who is just - Showing that rules are respected |

2.3.3.2. Managers’ hierarchical position

Furthermore, I found that invisible remedies appeared to be used more often by managers at a departmental level rather than team level, and more often by managers rather than deputy managers. Thus, the position in the hierarchy may also determine whether invisible remedies are likely to be used (see table 20 below).

TABLE 20:

Invisible Remedies Strategy and Managers’ Hierarchical Position

| | The strategy of invisible remedies | | Other managerial corrective justice strategies | |
|--------------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------|--|--------------|
| | N | % | n | % |
| Department head | 8 | 47,1% | 29 | 19,1% |
| Deputy department head | 2 | 11,8% | 31 | 20,4% |
| <i>At the department level</i> | <i>10</i> | <i>58,8%</i> | <i>60</i> | <i>39,5%</i> |
| Team manager | 6 | 35,3% | 49 | 32,2% |
| Deputy team manager | 1 | 5,9% | 43 | 28,3% |
| <i>At the team's level</i> | <i>7</i> | <i>41,2%</i> | <i>92</i> | <i>60,5%</i> |
| Total | 17 | 100,0% | 152 | 100,0% |

This may be due to the fact that invisible remedies, at least in this sample, were benefits diverted from their formal use. Using these benefits necessitates the mastering of formal allocation procedures, which is usually not in the power of deputies and more likely to be in the power of managers at the department level.

2.3.3.3. Managers’ type of activity

On the other hand, both managers of administrative teams and managers of manual labour teams appeared to be equally likely to use invisible vs. other corrective justice strategies (see table 21). As both types of teams perform quite different duties, this finding suggests that the phenomenon of invisible remedies may be generalizable to different contexts.

TABLE 21:

Invisible Remedies Strategy and Managers’ Activity

| | The strategy of invisible remedies | | Other managerial corrective justice strategies | |
|-------------------------|------------------------------------|--------|--|--------|
| | n | % | n | % |
| Productive function | 12 | 70,6% | 107 | 70,4% |
| Administrative function | 5 | 29,4% | 45 | 29,6% |
| Total | 17 | 100,0% | 152 | 100,0% |

2.3.4. CONSEQUENCES OF INVISIBLE REMEDIES FROM THE MANAGERS’ POINT OF VIEW

The consequences of managerial corrective justice behaviors were not the main focus of this study (this question would have required another kind of methodology, using employees instead of managers as subjects). However, knowing the way the managers viewed the consequences of their corrective behaviors is of great interest in order to understand how managers evaluate their own efficiency, and to understand the managers’ interpretation of and motivation for invisible remedies better.

2.3.4.1. Invisible remedies and their general consequences on subordinates' attitudes and behaviors

The fourth and final interview question asked managers about the consequences that they believed their way of managing the injustices had on their subordinates' reactions. Seven different types of consequences emerged from the interviews. The consequences identified are listed in table 22 below, which also provides an overview of how frequently each of these reactions occurred as a consequence of invisible remedies vs. other corrective justice strategies. Examples for some of these categories can be found in Table 23.

TABLE 22:

Invisible Remedies and their Consequences (as Viewed by Managers)

| | The strategy of invisible remedies | | Other managerial corrective justice strategies | |
|---|------------------------------------|--------|--|--------|
| | n | % | N | % |
| Positive attitudes and behaviors from employees | 14 | 43,8% | 101 | 42,3% |
| Negative attitudes and behaviors from employees | 10 | 31,3% | 58 | 24,3% |
| No impact | 3 | 9,4% | 31 | 13,0% |
| Injustice was fixed | 0 | 0,0% | 16 | 6,7% |
| Ambiguous consequences | 3 | 9,4% | 14 | 5,9% |
| Employees learned to react differently to the injustice | 0 | 0,0% | 10 | 4,2% |
| In the long run, the injustice disappeared by itself | 2 | 6,3% | 9 | 3,8% |
| Total | 32 | 100,0% | 239 | 100,0% |

(n represents the number of incidents related to each consequence quoted for each strategy used. Notice that each incident may be managed using several different strategies and each strategy may be perceived as having different consequences)

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Overall, participants of this study found invisible remedies to be as effective as other strategies in producing positive attitudes and behaviors from employees. However, managers appear to have recognized that invisible remedies did not really fix injustices in a strict sense (“injustice was fixed”: 0%), contrary to the other strategies (“injustice was fixed”: 6,7%). Managers were conscious that invisible remedies were only a way to make people accept to live with the injustice they experienced because they had received something in compensation. For example, being unfairly passed over for a promotion cannot be rectified by receiving a training, but the training may make it easier for the employee to live with the unfairness. Moreover, invisible remedies appeared to have relatively more ambiguous consequences than the other strategies (9,4% versus 5,9%). And typically, invisible remedies did not help employees to learn how to react differently when they would experience an injustice (0%) which was sometimes the case with other corrective justice strategies (4,2%). Of course, the consequences recounted by the managers may be in sharp contrast to the consequences perceived by the employees themselves, which were not investigated in this study.

TABLE 23:

Examples of General Consequences of Invisible Remedies
(from the Managers’ Point of View)

| <i>Some general consequences of invisible remedies</i> | <i>Examples</i> |
|---|---|
| Negative attitudes and behaviors from employees | - Dissatisfaction - Fatalism - Decision refusal |
| Ambiguous consequences | - Difficulty to evaluate the consequences - The impact is not clear - Employees do not seem to give much importance to the problem |
| Employees learned to react differently to the injustice | - The subordinate recognizes he should have complained on another basis - The subordinate recognizes he should not have reacted so aggressively and apologizes |
| In long run, the injustice disappeared by itself | - The workload makes people forget about the problem |

2.3.4.2. Invisible remedies and their specific positive consequences on subordinates' attitudes and behaviors

When analysing the items that have emerged as composing “positive attitudes and behaviors from employees” more closely, invisible remedies in this study appeared to cause different consequences in comparison to other corrective justice strategies (in managers’ opinion). Positive consequences of corrective justice strategies included psychological comfort for the subordinates, less injustice and frustration felt, maintained quality of work and performance, satisfaction, and others (Table 24 below provides an overview of positive consequences and their frequencies).

TABLE 24:

Invisible Remedies and their Positive Consequences (as Viewed by Managers)

| | The strategy of invisible remedies | | Other managerial corrective justice strategies | |
|---|------------------------------------|--------|--|--------|
| | N | % | n | % |
| Psychological comfort for subordinates | 2 | 6,7% | 34 | 16,3% |
| Less injustice and frustration felt | 1 | 3,3% | 30 | 14,4% |
| Maintained quality of work and performance | 4 | 13,3% | 27 | 12,9% |
| Satisfaction | 5 | 16,7% | 27 | 12,9% |
| Decision acceptance | 3 | 10,0% | 25 | 12,0% |
| Maintained a good social climate | 1 | 3,3% | 19 | 9,1% |
| More motivation | 2 | 6,7% | 12 | 5,7% |
| People did not complain any more | 1 | 3,3% | 10 | 4,8% |
| Good relationship between the subordinate and the manager | 6 | 20,0% | 9 | 4,3% |
| Positive effects only in the short run | 4 | 13,3% | 8 | 3,8% |
| Motivated people to go on telling problems to their manager | 0 | 0,0% | 6 | 2,9% |
| Subordinates thanked the manager | 1 | 3,3% | 2 | 1,0% |
| Total | 30 | 100,0% | 209 | 100,0% |

(n represents the number of incidents concerned by each positive consequence quoted for each strategy used. Notice that each incident is usually managed using several different strategies and that each strategy has generally different positive consequences)

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Invisible remedies were seen by managers to be less able to maintain a good social climate, less able to improve people's overall justice perception, less able to diminish frustration, and also less able to produce psychological comfort in comparison to the other corrective justice behaviors. They were also seen as less able to motivate people to go on telling their managers about the problems they had. Last, their positive impact was found to be relatively short-lived.

However, invisible remedies were found to be more able to maintain a good relationship between the superior and the subordinate in comparison to the other corrective justice behaviors. This may be due to the fact that the invisible remedy is clearly attributed to the supervisor, and not to the organisation as a whole.

2.4. DISCUSSION

In summary, as shown in Tables 14 and 15, managers in this study were most likely to use invisible remedies to compensate for distributive organizational injustices that occurred due to the deficiencies of the formal reward system (i.e. lack of bonuses and pay increases, inappropriately low salaries, promotions that were refused...). Managers were more likely to react in this way when injustices violated their sense of equity rather than other justice norms (see Table 16). As invisible remedies, managers usually diverted organizational allocations from their formal use. Thus, they allocated benefits like free days off or extra bonuses in order to compensate for the injustices experienced by their subordinates. The principal motivation for the use of invisible remedies appeared to be the restoration of justice in the workplace (see Table 18) even if managers knew that these attempts only mitigated negative reactions in the short run without fundamentally solving the underlying injustice(s) (see Table 22).

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The present study takes a unique perspective – that of a manager who is reacting to an injustice experienced by a subordinate. This perspective has received little research attention to date in the organizational justice literature. The main theoretical contribution of this study is the discovery of the strategy consisting for managers in allocating invisible remedies to correct injustices and the identification of some tentative links between this concept and some of its antecedents and consequences.

The present study also has implications for organizational practice. The present study suggests that managers intuitively know how important it is to correct injustice at work. For organizational practice, corrective justice represents an important part of organizational reality. My work is a first attempt to answer to the need to acknowledge the central role of the manager as having the power to correct the impact of injustices. On a more general level, this study suggests that in organisational life, it may not always be the source of an injustice that is also involved in correcting it. Up to now, we know little about the effects of corrective practices at different levels, and with different degrees of formality.

Of course the findings presented here are derived from a small sample of 35 managers in only one organisation, and the effects found may be context sensitive. Future research is needed to establish whether the tentative relationships found here are generalizable to different contexts. The approach chosen here might also suffer from social desirability bias, and with respect to motivations and consequences, managers may have been reporting their own theories rather than true processes. Triangulation of the data is therefore necessary to gain more confidence in the validity of the results (for example, interviews with employees who experienced the injustice, and observation). However, the qualitative exploratory interview approach has enabled me to gain deep insights into the managers' perceptions and interpretations, and importantly has allowed me to identify a new phenomenon (invisible remedies).

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The exploratory study presented here suggests that managers might use invisible remedies to alleviate unfairness at work. Having gained preliminary insights into this specific corrective justice strategy, I went back to the literature to search for theories or empirical studies that would be close to this new concept and that could help me to better understand its dynamics. The results of this literature search will be presented in the following chapter. My goal was to develop theoretically founded propositions that could constitute a model of the use of invisible remedies (chapter three). Then, a preliminary empirical test could be applied to this model (chapter four).

CHAPTER 3: THE INVISIBLE HAND OF MANAGERS: ANTECEDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF MANAGERS USING INVISIBLE REMEDIES TO CORRECT WORKPLACE INJUSTICE

3.0. ABSTRACT

Research suggests that supervisors often have discretion to allocate to their subordinates benefits including free time, personal use of equipment, extra training or bonuses for uses other than those for which they were formally intended. Study 2 showed that the correction of injustices is one motivation for such managerial behavior. Thus, allowing the employees to take company-owned time or items or to benefit from extra training or bonuses can be an *invisible remedy endorsed by managers*. I name Robin Hoodism the strategy consisting for managers in allocating invisible remedies to correct injustices. In this chapter, I offer several research propositions concerning the different forms this corrective justice strategy might take in the workplace and the conditions under which managers are most likely to use it. I then describe the impact of such behaviors, and I define the *Robin Hood effect* as the impact that invisible remedies can have on employees' subsequent attitudes and behaviors. Finally, I propose that invisible remedies can reduce the negative reactions resulting from distributive, procedural and interactional injustices due to their ability to address employees' instrumental, relational and moral motives. I conclude with managerial and theoretical implications.

3.1. INTRODUCTION

The taking of resources from their firms by employees for their personal use is usually seen as being deviant workplace behavior (Robinson & Bennett, 1995). From a different

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perspective, Greenberg and Scott (1996, p. 120) suggested that organizations “may well be expected to be the victims of modern-day Robin Hoods”. The present chapter elaborates on this idea and suggests that managers can sometimes act as Robin Hoods, taking resources from their organizations and reallocating them to their subordinates, for the sake of justice.

People can react to injustice at work in at least three different ways (Conlon, Meyer, & Nowakowski, 2005). They can decrease their *good* behaviors (organizational citizenship behaviors, compliance, or performance), increase their *bad* reactions (absenteeism, turnover, or negligence), and even start to behave in *ugly* ways (by sabotage or organizational retaliatory behaviors). Given the negative impact these reactions can have on organizations, when an employee feels unjustly treated, it is a good policy for managers to try to correct the injustice. Actions taken to correct injustices are not only likely to mitigate negative consequences, but they also have the potential to result in other unintended consequences, making them important to study.

Employees’ perceptions of injustice are common in organization. For instance, they might concern a pay cut or a smoking ban that are experienced as unjust (Greenberg, 1990a; 1994) or a too great gap between high objectives and low means (Vermunt, 2002). For Frost (2006), emotional pain in general and injustice in particular are likely to be a normal by-product of organizational life. However, the organization doesn’t often try to correct these systemic injustices that remain and produce negative effects (Beugré & Baron, 2001; Sheppard, Lewicki & Minton, 1992).

How do front-line managers react to the perception that an employee has been mistreated? They are said to be in a dual position (Vermunt, 2002). They are expected to remain loyal to their firm and not blame the firm for injustices that it invokes for employees. At the same time, they have to foster their subordinates’ cooperation and try to behave fairly toward them. Under these conditions, managers might use their discretion and informal

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decision making power (Blader & Tyler, 2003) to correct injustices that were not caused by them but that could still have negative consequences on the work of their subordinates, without conflicting with their organization and its formal policies.

Recent research has begun to empirically investigate the actions taken to correct and mitigate perceived injustice at work labelled *remedial actions* (Reb, Goldman & Cropanzano, 2006). When these actions are implemented at the organizational level to correct injustices provoked by the manager, they are called *organizational remedies*. Correcting injustices by compensating the victim is referred to as *compensatory justice*, and correcting injustices by punishing the perpetrator is known as *retributive justice* (Darley & Pittman, 2003). *Restorative justice* has been widely used in reference to action aimed at restoring a sense of justice through renewed value consensus between the victim, the perpetrator and the whole community (Umbreit & Coates, 2006; Wenzel, Okimoto & Feather, 2006; Zehr, 2002). In this sense, restorative justice can be distinguished from retributive justice, which corresponds to the imposition of punishment, in the form of adjudication or revenge.

In the present chapter, I refer to the range of actions aimed at correcting injustices in the workplace as *corrective justice*. This label was introduced by French (1964) who used this term to describe a way of seeking “to remedy mistakes in the allocation of rewards and penalties” (p. 412) on the basis of Aristotle’s writings (see also French, 1964, p. 403).

The present chapter concerns a specific type of corrective justice strategy used by managers. As many writers have argued, managers often use special kinds of allocations to complement employees’ formal remuneration (Henry, 1981; Ditton 1977; Mars & Nicod, 1981; see chapter 2). These allocations can take the form of authorization to take items home (e.g., small tools, raw materials, finished small products), borrowing tools, personal use of machines, or granting employees time off (Greenberg & Scott, 1996). They can also consist of allocating formal benefits (e.g., bonuses, training) not for their intended formal purpose but


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for justice restoration motives. These allocations have been described as representing a significant part of an *invisible-wage system*, whose aim is usually to compensate for injustices, for instance due to too low wages (Ditton, 1977, p. 45). Higher level managers are usually outside of this reallocation system (Mars & Nicod, 1981).

I define *invisible remedies* as managers' allocations to their subordinates of something extra, belonging to the company, not for its formal or intended use, for the purpose of restoring justice (hence the term *remedy*), usually without more senior managers' or other employees' understanding of the motivation (hence the term *invisible*). I define Robin Hoodism as the strategy consisting for managers in allocating invisible remedies to correct workplace injustice. The allocation of invisible remedies is meant to have favorable and unfavorable effects on employees' attitudes and behaviors at work. I define the *Robin Hood effect* as the consequences of managers' allocations of invisible remedies on their subordinates' reactions, those who benefit from these remedies as well as their coworkers.

I provide a conceptual model to account for the antecedents and to a lesser extent for the consequences of managers' allocations of invisible remedies (see figure 3). First, I review empirical evidence about invisible remedies, which shows *how managers* allocate them. Second, I discuss *how employees* react to invisible remedies, and then show how these remedies can produce a favorable effect and other unintended negative consequences. Third, I explain *why managers* engage in this specific kind of corrective justice behavior. Last, I provide theory regarding *why* invisible remedies might be effective in correcting injustices for *employees*. By so doing, I provide a framework that takes into account both a reactive (how and why people react to corrective justice attempts) and a proactive view (how and why people produce corrective justice attempts) (Greenberg, 1987; Greenberg & Wiethoff).

FIGURE 3: The Model of Invisible Remedies



3.2. EVIDENCE OF THE EXISTENCE AND FORMS OF INVISIBLE REMEDIES

3.2.1. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

Numerous sociological studies (mostly ethnographic studies) report that managers use invisible remedies toward their subordinates (see Greenberg & Scott, 1996 for a review). Managers were found to often allow or even encourage employees to take free time, materials or products for their personal use. For example, textile workers (Sieh, 1987), cashiers in supermarkets (Altheide, Adler, Adler & Altheide, 1978) and workers in a gypsum factory (Gouldner, 1954) were allowed by their managers to take raw materials, small objects or finished products, or could borrow tools or access machines for personal use during their working time. In some cases, managers were even found to have organized an entire parallel distribution system. Post office workers (Bradford, 1976), employees of large chain stores (Altheide et al., 1978), workers in a bakery (Ditton, 1977), employees of chemical plants (Dalton, 1959) and toll-collectors (Zeitlin, 1971) were allocated free time, small products, small sums of money and even products specifically manufactured to be informally allocated to employees. Certain activities, such as longshoremen's jobs (Ditton, 1977) or even entire industries, such as the hotel and restaurant industry (Mars & Nicod, 1981) work on the basis of such an informal allocation system.

These works also show that invisible remedies can have an important organizational function. Ditton (1977) labelled this process as an invisible wage system. Henry (1981) and Zeitlin (1971) described this process as a way of allocating "hidden economic rewards" or a "controlled larceny system", respectively. However labelled, it allows a significant part of the reward system to be redistributed and, according to these authors, serves a corrective justice function of compensating, in these studies, for wages that are deemed as too low.

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I've also begun to explore this issue. In chapter 2, I investigated how managers (n = 35) reacted to and dealt with their subordinates' injustice experiences (74 incidents quoted). Their responses allowed me to identify different strategies that managers are likely to use when they react to an injustice felt by their subordinates. Allocating invisible remedies was the third most frequently used strategy after "using informational justice" and "trying to concretely fix the problem at the origin of the injustice". In this study, invisible remedies consisted of different behaviors consistent with the results that emerged from sociological studies, including: "allocating free days off", "allocating more bonuses", "allocating little gifts like free lunches", "allocating extra training", "helping subordinates being promoted". These behaviors were efforts to compensate a victim for an injustice by giving him or her something extra not for its intended purpose, and without revealing the real reason to upper management or coworkers (i.e., to offset a perceived injustice). In this study, managers appeared to allocate benefits that were formally planned (days off, bonuses, training, promotions) rather than material objects. What made their allocation *invisible* was that they diverted these benefits from the original organizational purpose they were designed for. For example, a bonus was formally intended to be allocated for excellent work performance, but was instead informally given to a subordinate who had previously suffered an injustice (e.g., he or she did not receive the promotion he or she expected) by the supervisor.

Proposition 1: Managers engage in invisible remedies to correct injustice at work.

Based solely on the existing studies, invisible remedies can take four different forms (Greenberg & Scott, 1996; see chapter 2). First, managers can allocate free time to employees, which is often under the managers' control. This remedy could be considered minor workplace deviant behavior (Robinson & Bennett, 1995) and likely to go unnoticed. Second,

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managers can allocate formal benefits (e.g., bonuses, training) that tend to have been initially derived for a different purpose. These benefits are also under managers' control and the real purpose behind the allocation is also unlikely to be noticed. A third form of remedy involves the borrowing of tools, or personal use of machines. This form appears to be relatively less used because they are more visible and under a more formal organizational control. Fourth managers can allow subordinates to take material objects home, which also tends to be less frequent, and usually for objects of small value. As discussed above, the choice of invisible remedies is likely to be a function of which are under the managers' control and least visible to higher level executives.

Proposition 2: Managers are more likely to use invisible remedies that are under their control and that are least visible to upper management and other employees.

3.2.2. INVISIBLE REMEDIES ARE MANAGERIAL REMEDIES

Of course, managers can reallocate resources for motives other than justice restoration. They might, for example, want to reward their subordinates for remaining silent about the manager's own indiscretions. Allocating invisible remedies can be a way of persuading the subordinate not to divulge inappropriate behaviors by the manager, making the subordinate an accomplice, an effect known as "parallel deviance" (Kemper, 1966). In the present chapter, however, I only focus on invisible remedies that are intended to correct injustices. There are also cases in which employees might deliberately take free time or help themselves to objects belonging to the firm for their personal use to correct injustices they experience without informing their managers. This behavior is a widespread and well-known reaction to injustice (Greenberg, 1993; 1996), and is more generally viewed as theft. However, the present chapter

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focuses on the invisible remedies consciously allocated by managers to correct injustice and the impact of these remedies on their subordinates (the Robin Hood effect). Besides, researchers who have conducted qualitative studies on this phenomenon conclude that it should be clearly distinguished from theft because of the motive behind it, its organizational usefulness and its limits (only certain categories of goods are concerned) that are maintained by strong informal norms (Dalton, 1959, Ditton, 1977, Horning, 1970). For Ditton, a manager would not likely be prosecuted for allocating an invisible remedy because he or she can justify it. However, this behavior is likely to violate organizational rules and as such is likely to represent a risk to be reprimanded for a manager who implements it (Ditton, 1977, pp. 47, 48 and 53).

Invisible remedies allocated by managers to correct injustices represent a form of organizational justice remedy that has not yet received empirical quantitative study. Research on organizational justice remedies generally concern situations in which a manager decides how to correct an injustice caused by an individual, usually a lower level manager (Reb et al., 2006). My perspective, in contrast, considers the opposite situation: How can lower level managers correct an injustice caused by the organization or upper managers? From this point of view, the following question becomes relevant: What can managers do when their subordinates experience an organizational injustice?

On the one hand, numerous injustices at work are beyond the control of the managers. Some injustices can occur at the systemic level of the global organization (Beugré & Baron, 2001; Sheppard, Lewicki & Minton, 1992). For instance, employees might experience injustice by learning of a pay cut or a smoking ban from their company president (Greenberg, 1990a; 1994). On the other hand, in addition to the task of treating their subordinates interactionally well, managers also have an important function of informal decision making (Blader & Tyler, 2003). Thus, front-line managers may want to react to the organizational

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injustices that were not caused by them, but which can have negative consequences on the work of their subordinates, by using their informal decision making power.

Could managers use regular organizational remedies? For example, can they decide by themselves to allocate formal material compensation? They rarely have the power to use monetary distributions without being officially accountable for them (Bies, Shapiro, & Cummings, 1988). Can they offer an apology in the name of their company or top executives? Although this may have a positive effect, it is likely to be insufficient if the harmdoers themselves do not apologize and if this kind of remedy is not appropriate to the context. Can they punish the harmdoers? Clearly they cannot, at least officially, since they have less hierarchical power than the perpetrators. As a consequence, managers may have to find another managerial remedy.

Voicing their subordinates' concerns to upper managerial levels might facilitate a solution (Bourguignon & Chiapello, 2005), but it is rarely done due to the loyalty that the manager is duty bound to show to formal organizational policies (Vermunt, 2002). According to the empirical findings presented here, another possible answer to this dilemma is for managers to correct injustices by allocating invisible benefits to their subordinates. However, as invisible remedies are invisible, managers are also likely to under-report their allocation for fear of reprimand, or to keep them invisible. This might explain why only deep qualitative interviews and ethnographic sociological studies have been able, so far, to identify such a phenomenon.

Proposition 3: Managers are likely to under-report their use of invisible remedies.

3.3. THE ROBIN HOOD EFFECT: HOW DO EMPLOYEES REACT TO INVISIBLE REMEDIES?

Considering the possibility that invisible remedies occur, an important question becomes: What is the impact of the Robin Hood effect on the organization, its managers and its employees?

3.3.1. THE JUSTICE LITERATURE AND THE IMPACT OF MANAGERS' CORRECTIVE JUSTICE ATTEMPTS

3.3.1.1. The corrective role of the manager's interactional justice behavior

Skarlicki and Folger (1997) hypothesized that employees reacted the most negatively when both distributive fairness (the fairness of the outcomes received, Adams, 1963) and the process fairness were at a low level. They also proposed that interactional justice (the justice of the interpersonal treatment and the justifications given, Bies & Moag, 1986; Colquitt, 2001) provoked by the manager could be a substitute for organizational procedural justice (the fairness of the procedures used to make the decision and implement it, Leventhal, 1980; Leventhal, Karuza & Fry, 1980). Indeed, they found that a manager behaving interactionally fairly could compensate for unjust formal procedural rules. More precisely, when experiencing low levels of distributive and procedural justice, employees engaged in retaliatory behaviors at work only if interactional justice was also at a low level. In other words, the results showed that managers could correct distributive and procedural injustices by being interactionally fair and thus reducing retaliatory behaviors by their subordinates.

Further studies provide evidence that managers' interactional justice behaviors can compensate for low distributive and procedural injustice (Cropanzano, Slaughter & Bachiochi, 2005; Goldman, 2003). Research has even shown that managers who were trained

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to be interactionally fair helped their subordinates to better react to a distributive injustice and experience less insomnia (Greenberg, 2006).

Although this stream of research shows how a manager can be effective in correcting injustice, it only focuses on interpersonally and informationally fairness. Being interpersonally fair is also a corrective strategy identified by Frost (2006): being compassionate toward their subordinates is a successful way for managers to handle the “toxic emotions” produced by organizational stress and injustices. Robin Hoodism however, provides another way for managers to correct injustices, one that is not included in the concept of interactional justice.

3.3.1.2. Invisible remedies used in services recovery settings

In one study that took place in a services recovery setting, Sparks and McColl-Kennedy (2001) found that invisible remedies can have a positive effect on recipients' satisfaction with service recovery. The context involved a hotel customer complaining because of a service failure with respect to distributive (the client was charged for things he or she did not use) and procedural (the slowness of the service) injustice. When the service employee proposed a token amount of compensation to rectify these injustices (offering a couple of drinks vouchers) by saying “I’m not supposed to do this, but I’m doing a special favor for you” and by emphasizing that his or her supervisor wouldn’t agree with it (Sparks & McColl-Kennedy, 2001, p. 217), high levels of customer satisfaction with the service resulted. However, this positive effect only occurred when the employee offered a remedy of small value. In contrast, when monetary compensation offered was judged to be excessive, consumers expressed lower satisfaction unless the allocation was in compliance with a formal policy. In the later case, recipients might have considered that the remedy’s value was too high compared to the level of injustice they had experienced.

The results suggest that by correcting injustices stemming from the organization by discretionally allocating something extra belonging to the company to the victim of the injustice, (i.e., by allocating an invisible remedy), a manager could produce a favorable attitude by the recipient.

3.3.2. MULTIFOCI JUSTICE AND RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS

In order to derive propositions concerning the way employees react to invisible remedies, it may be beneficial to consider two streams of research. First, different types of (in)justice sources have been distinguished: in particular, the direct supervisor and the organization (Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel & Rupp, 2001). Second, social exchange theory proposes that employees can be in an exchange relationship with their employer where the contributions of the two parties remain largely unspecified and the exchanges are mutual but not simultaneous (Blau, 1964; Cropanzano & Rupp, this volume). Over time, each party develops an obligation to reciprocate. Interestingly, the agent-system model has integrated these two streams of research. More precisely, this model states that employees are involved in two distinct patterns of social exchange relationships: one with their immediate supervisor and another with their organization (Bies & Moag, 1986; Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001; Cropanzano, Prehar, & Chen, 2002; Masterson, Lewis, Goldman, & Taylor, 2000). This model derives that employees will tend to reciprocate the (un)fair treatment they receive toward the source from which it comes (see also Homans, 1961). Thus, the fairness of the relationship with the manager is more likely to impact supervisor-referenced outcomes while the justice of the relation with the organization is more likely to impact organization-referenced outcomes. Empirical research has supported the model, showing that interactional justice is more likely to be seen as coming from one's supervisor and is therefore more closely linked to attitudes and behaviors directed at one's supervisor, such as supervisory

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citizenship behaviors, whereas procedural justice is perceived as coming from the organization, and is therefore more closely linked to attitudes and behaviors directed at the organization, such as organizational citizenship (Cropanzano et al., 2002; Masterson et al., 2000).

The multifoci model of justice has built on this model to propose that each source of justice can produce all the different types of justice judgments (Byrne, 1999; Rupp & Cropanzano, 2002). Interactional justice was shown to exist at the supervisor level as well as at the organization level. Similar effects were observed, for procedural justice, which appeared to be either supervisor-focused or organization-focused. Again, supervisor-focused procedural and interactional justice predicted supervisory citizenship and organization-focused procedural and interactional justice predicted organizational citizenship. One conclusion of this research is that the source of justice has more explanatory power than the type of justice on employees' attitudinal and behavioral outcomes (Rupp & Cropanzano, 2002).

Building on this line of reasoning, since Robin Hoodism represents a means implemented by managers to correct injustices, managers are more likely than the organization to benefit from subordinates' positive reactions to it. In contrast, the organization is likely to be seen not only as the transgressor but also as the source that did not attempt to correct the injustice it created. The fact that managers react by allocating invisible remedies may even emphasize the absence of remedy coming from the organizational level and make the injustice even more salient. As a consequence, the overall organization may suffer from employees' reactions to invisible remedies.

Proposition 4: Invisible remedies positively impact employees' attitudes and behaviors toward their managers, supervisory citizenship in particular.

Proposition 5: Invisible remedies have a negative impact on employees' attitudes and behaviors toward their company, organizational citizenship in particular.

3.3.3. HOW DO OTHER EMPLOYEES REACT TO INVISIBLE REMEDIES?

Invisible remedies can also negatively impact the employees who do not receive them in case these remedies become visible for them, i.e. if they are told or understand by themselves the real remedial motive that is under their allocation. It is plausible that invisible remedies directed toward some employees create feelings of unfairness among the co-workers who discover them. On the one hand, according to Mars and Nicod (1981), members of minority groups may be discriminated against through the allocation of invisible remedies. Indeed, because these remedies are invisible, they are not allocated through a formal procedure. Thus, privileged groups may receive more invisible remedies than discriminated groups, who would not have the opportunity through any formal mechanism to complain. Therefore, they might feel unjustly treated. On the other hand, Rousseau, Ho, and Greenberg (2006) proposed that official idiosyncratic arrangements (named I-deals) between an employee and the manager might be seen as unjust by co-workers who do not benefit from the arrangement and who do learn about it but not about the exact terms of the agreement in a complete and precise manner. As far as invisible remedies are concerned, they are usually not clearly explained to every co-worker (Greenberg & Scott, 1996, p. 127) as this might make them too visible. The paradox is then that invisible remedies, whose purpose is to restore justice, can create new feelings of injustice among coworkers in case they become visible to them.

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Proposition 6: Coworkers who do not benefit from invisible remedies and learn about them are likely to deem that these remedies are unfair.

3.4. WHEN ARE MANAGERS MOST LIKELY TO ENGAGE IN INVISIBLE REMEDIES?

As noted above, managers in firms typically stand in a dual position (Vermunt, 2002). They have to simultaneously manage their firm's demands and their subordinates' needs. When an organizational injustice occurs, it might be because of incompatibility between what the firm asks and what the subordinates want. For instance, managers may receive tough assignments and lack the means to complete them. Regarding their relationship to their firm, managers are duty bound do their best and not complain about these kinds of injustices. Regarding their relationship to their subordinates, managers are expected to be fair. Robin Hoodism appears as a way to respond to this paradox: managers try to correct injustices experienced by their subordinates stemming from the organization without openly criticizing formal organizational policies. In these conditions, managers' willingness to allocate invisible remedies depends on the distance between the two ends of their dual position.

Proposition 7: The more the managers view the organization as unfair, the more they are motivated to use invisible remedies.

3.4.1. THE FIRM'S ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND ROBIN HOODISM

Proposition 7 contends that it is to the extent that invisible remedies have a justice restoration function, that they are expected to be more important in situations considered to be less just. Notably, they should occur more in firms whose structure is considered as being

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more unjust. Larger firms are generally considered as being less fair, at least interactionally (Schminke, Ambrose, & Cropanzano, 2000). Indeed, as an organization grows, it becomes more difficult to treat individuals with dignity and respect and to demonstrate that they are valuable to the group as a whole. Moreover, as size increases, the use of political sources of power is likely to become more widespread and detrimental to interactional fairness. Higher centralization is also associated with lower procedural fairness (Schminke et al., 2000), with larger and more centralized organizations deemed as highly rule-driven and bureaucratic. In these organizations, rather than trying to change the system, managers are likely to work “under the radar”. In small firms, on the other hand, fewer things are invisible to upper management, and this may deter managers from using invisible remedies.

Research also suggests that employees are more willing to take objects from large organizations than from small ones (Greenberg & Scott, 1996). A questionnaire-based study showed that while 50% of respondents did not agree with pilfering from small firms, only 34% disapproved of pilfering from large ones (Smigel, 1970). Of course, these results concern employee theft, which is clearly different from Robin Hoodism. These results may still give some insights into the conditions in which a manager may be more likely to take objects or benefits from the company in order to divert them from their formal use and allocate them to their subordinates as invisible remedies.

Proposition 8: The larger the company, the more likely its managers will use invisible remedies.

Proposition 9: The more centralized the company, the more likely its managers will use invisible remedies.

3.4.2. MANAGERS' INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES AND ROBIN HOODISM

In addition to situational differences, managers' individual differences can also impact their tendency to allocate invisible remedies. The more the managers are motivated to act justly, the more they tend to correct injustices, and the more they are likely to allocate invisible remedies. Justice research has identified three main motivations for managers to behave in a fair way: instrumental (Greenberg & Cohen, 1982), socio-emotional (Patient & Skarlicki, 2005), and moral motives (Folger, Cropanzano, & Goldman, 2005, Turillo, Folger, Lavelle, Umphress, & Gee, 2002). Individual differences may be associated with each of these motives.

3.4.2.1. Managers' material instrumental orientation

Managers may be instrumentally motivated to behave fairly in the workplace. Because they believe that "justice works" (Greenberg & Cohen, 1982, p. 457), managers are motivated by the rewards associated with appearing to be fair to their employees and thus generally "manage impressions of organizational justice" (Greenberg, 1990b). Fairness can be a means for managers to improve their subordinates' performance at work and to improve the realization of their own objectives. Thus, correcting injustice by allocating invisible remedies may be for managers a strategy to show their fairness in order to achieve their own objectives of work performance. According to Barrick and Mount (1991) and Salgado (1997), managerial work performance can be operationalized by the construct of conscientiousness. Indeed, conscientiousness was shown as being a strong predictor of performance across all job criteria and across all occupational groups (Barrick & Mount, 1991). More precisely, conscientiousness was shown to be composed of two separate factors: achievement striving and duty (Jackson, Paunonen, Fraboni, & Goffin, 1996; Jackson, Ashton, & Tomes, 1996). Achievement striving is linked to a more self-centered commitment, for instance, an

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individual's concern for the advancement of his or her career. It characterizes "good actors". In contrast, duty is linked to a more other-oriented commitment, for example an individual's concern for the welfare of the organization. It characterizes "good soldiers" (Moon, 2001, p. 534). Achievement striving has been shown to be correlated with escalation of commitment, which is a decision making process in which people's self-interest is pursued even to the detriment of the organization (Moon, 2001). To the extent that allocating invisible remedies may help managers to maintain their subordinates' cooperation, which enables them to achieve their personal performance goals, I make the following proposition:

Proposition 10: Managers' level of achievement striving is positively related to their use of invisible remedies.

Because "good soldiers" may be willing to help their subordinates and at the same time be reluctant to impose invisible costs on their organization, no proposition is made concerning the link between managers' level of duty and their use of invisible remedies.

3.4.2.2. Managers' socio-emotional motivations

When a manager wants to correct an injustice, he or she can apply different techniques. The organizational justice literature has identified one of them: behaving interactionally fairly, which mitigates negative reactions to distributive and procedural injustices (Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). However, this technique can be difficult to implement. It consists of showing respect to the subordinates, adapting to their needs when communicating and being honest with them when giving thorough justification of the decision that they view as unjust, all behaviors that managers find difficult to implement when they

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have to communicate about an injustice: “tough times [tend to] make tough bosses”, at least as far as interactional justice is concerned (Folger & Skarlicki, 1998).

Patient and Skarlicki (2005) proposed that lower self-esteem relates to more unjust interactional behaviors. Having to announce and justify unfair news to one’s subordinates threatens the communicator’s self-esteem and relates to fears of social rejection. Low self-esteem individuals, because their self-evaluation is negative, anticipate equally negative social evaluation and are more likely to expect failure. In these conditions, they tend to protect themselves rather than behave interactionally fairly. In contrast, high self-esteem managers are likely to be more confident that they will succeed, they are less affected by negative feedback, and tend to respond to it by trying harder. They do not fear being associated with the unfair decision itself, and this makes them tend to behave interactionally fairly when announcing an unjust decision.

As a consequence, when trying to correct an injustice, low self-esteem managers are more likely to use invisible remedies compared to high self-esteem managers. In this way, they can correct an injustice and protect their social image in the eyes of their subordinates without taking the risks involved in trying to justify a decision that is viewed as unfair.

Proposition 11: The lower the managers’ self-esteem, the more likely they are to use invisible remedies.

3.4.2.3. Managers’ moral motivations

In contrast to the former motives, managers may also be intrinsically motivated by justice. This means that their efforts are intended to satisfy internalized moral standards (Tetlock, 1985). According to the moral perspective of justice, people for whom morality matters will be more likely to deal with justice issues in social situations and, accordingly, to

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strongly react to injustices (Folger, 1998, 2001; Folger et al., 2005). Morality has indeed been shown to influence managers' justice behaviors (Patient & Skarlicki, in press) and to moderate the relationship between workplace fairness and performance (Colquitt, Scott, Judge & Shaw, 2006). Research also shows that people's usual reaction is to retaliate against the source of an injustice (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986; Turillo et al., 2002). In particular, moral identity, defined as the importance people attach to morality as a component of their self-concept has been shown to be an important determinant of the congruence between moral judgment and moral conduct (Aquino & Reed, 2002).

Aquino, Reed, Lim, Felps, and Freeman (2006) found that employees' moral identity positively relates to the taking of resources from the organization in an unjust situation. The authors found that higher moral self-identifiers were more prone to act in a way that was likely to impose invisible costs on the organization after an injustice had occurred. More precisely, employees who self-identified themselves as high on moral identity were more likely to react to organizational injustices by taking property from work without permission or by falsifying receipts or time sheets to obtain more money for business expenses or overtime. Interestingly, when no injustice was at stake, lower moral identifiers were in fact more prone than higher moral identifiers to behave in such a way. Skarlicki, van Jaarsveld and Walker (2007) also found that moral identity moderated the relationship between unfair treatment by customers and employee's retaliation. This positive relationship was more pronounced for employees high versus low on moral identity. Reynolds and Ceranic (2007) also showed that moral identity interacted with moral judgment to predict when managers would be likely to invisibly give free time off to an excellent worker to avoid an injustice. High moral identifiers were shown to be more likely to use this invisible remedy, but only if they tended to use consequentialist (versus formalist) moral reasoning. Consequentialists were defined as more likely to make ends-based decisions, whereas formalists tended to give more importance to

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formal standards of moral behavior. In contrast, formalist high moral identifiers were less prone to use this kind of remedy to correct an injustice. These different results are not inconsistent with the results found with another operationalization of the concept of morality, namely the level of moral development. Provided there are no strict and salient ethical rules prohibiting theft in their firm, workers who scored higher on their level of moral development were as likely as workers who scored lower on their moral development level to steal in order to correct a distributive injustice (Greenberg, 2002).

As a consequence, managers for whom morality is more important may be morally outraged by the injustice experienced by their employees and may want to punish their employer. In other words, they may use Robin Hoodism as a means of restoring justice for moral reasons. In contrast, managers for whom morality is less important may be more likely to use invisible remedies when an injustice is at stake and less likely to engage in deviant behaviors when there is no injustice to correct compared to managers for whom morality is less important. Stated differently, because the motive underlying invisible justice entails correcting justice violations, managers for whom moral concerns are higher (versus lower) are more likely to be motivated to correct injustices.

Proposition 12: The more important morality is for a manager, the more likely he or she is to use invisible remedies to correct a work injustice.

3.5. THE MOTIVATIONAL MECHANISM OF THE ROBIN HOOD EFFECT: WHY DO EMPLOYEES REACT FAVORABLY TO INVISIBLE REMEDIES?

The same three motives used to understand why managers want to behave fairly have also been used to identify why subordinates react to injustice. Thus, current justice research has identified instrumental, relational and moral motives to explain why victims value justice. First, employees have an interest in receiving favorable outcomes. Because they generally think that their contributions are valuable, they see distributive justice as ensuring the receipt of favorable outcomes. Likewise, according to the instrumental model of justice (Thibault & Walker, 1975, 1978), procedural justice is a sign that, at least in the long run, individuals will be allocated valued resources. In this respect, being unjustly treated means that they will not get what they think they deserve.

A second motive pertains to people's socio-emotional needs. The relational model of justice (Tyler & Lind, 1992) proposes that employees value being considered as full-fledged members of their work groups. In particular, being unfairly treated may question their identity and importance as group members. Finally, people are motivated by morality. The moral perspective of justice contends that people give importance to fairness as an end in itself (Cropanzano, Rupp, Mohler, & Schminke, 2001; Cropanzano, Goldman, & Folger, 2003; Folger, 1998; Folger, 2001; Folger, et al., 2005). People do not like injustice simply because they think it is wrong to be unjust.

3.5.1. THE SYMBOLIC MEANING OF ORGANIZATIONAL REMEDIES

On the basis of the above taxonomy, Reb, Goldman and Cropanzano (2006) explained why organizational remedies have a favorable impact on employees. They defined an organizational remedy as “an action carried out by an organization with the intention of

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creating in the mind of an aggrieved worker the judgment that the perceived injustice has been atoned for.” (Reb et al., 2006, p. 34). They distinguished three types of remedies and showed that each of them corresponds to one of the three motives of justice because they respond to three fundamental human needs. “Instrumental remedies” may take the concrete form of monetary payoffs. These remedies address the need for control, which the authors associate to an instrumental motive. They are particularly adapted to restore distributive injustices (employees’ subjective judgments of the fairness of the outcomes they receive at work; Adams, 1965), and, to a lesser extent, procedural injustices (employees’ subjective judgments of the fairness of the procedures that lead to these outcomes; Thibaut & Walker, 1975, 1978; Leventhal, 1980; Leventhal, Karuza & Fry, 1980). Thus, instrumental remedies are a form of compensatory justice.

“Socio-emotional remedies” consist of a symbolic affirmation of social standing and take the concrete form of public apology or an explanation. They address the need to belong, a relational motive. They are suitable responses to procedural and interactional injustices (employees’ subjective judgments of the fairness of the interpersonal and informational interactions that can occur when outcomes are allocated; Bies & Moag, 1986; Colquitt, 2001; Greenberg, 1993; Shapiro, Buttner & Barry, 1994).

Last, “punitive remedies” consist of making harmdoers suffer to atone for the injustice they have caused, and may take the concrete form of some monetary penalty or other disciplinary actions. Punitive remedies address the need for meaning; that is, the moral need, and are especially appropriate when an interactional injustice has occurred. These are often referred to as retributive justice. Okimoto (in press, b) presented a similar taxonomy. He identified material compensation, apologies and punishments as the main means of justice restoration.

This taxonomy has been partially tested. In a field study, as well as in a laboratory experiment, people preferred an “instrumental remedy” to a “punitive remedy” when a procedural injustice had occurred, and a “punitive remedy” to an “instrumental remedy” when an interactional injustice had occurred (Reb et al., 2006). Other research suggests that the substantive benefit from a remedy has less importance than its symbolic meaning.⁹ For instance, a socio-emotional remedy, such as an apology (admitting responsibility and expressing remorse) is able to atone for a perceived distributive injustice and to decrease negative reactions toward the harmdoer (Ohbuchi, Kameda & Agarie, 1989; O’Malley & Greenberg, 1983). For Ohbuchi and colleagues (1989, p. 220), an apology can be instrumental in promising “a full restitution of harm”, speak to relational motives in “restoring self-esteem and social identity”, and have a moral function by “punishing the harmdoer”. Similarly, Okimoto (in press, b) found that monetary compensation can be an effective way of addressing relational concerns resulting from procedural and interactional injustices. In five experiments, he showed that giving monetary compensation with a benevolent intent could reaffirm victims’ perception of membership value and protect their group identity. Thus, this material remedy resulted in positive reactions toward the organization because of its relational benefits. The same results were found for unjustly treated customers (Okimoto, 2006).

More complex patterns among the variables have also been found. Consumers’ reactions to service recovery strategies showed an interactive effect of material and socio-emotional remedies: consumers experienced more fairness and satisfaction when they were provided with both monetary compensation and an apology in comparison to when they received only an apology (Goodwin & Ross, 1992). In summary, organizational remedies have the potential to alleviate employees’ negative reactions caused by distributive, procedural and interactional injustices. Remedies are effective because they address victim’s

⁹ To more clearly disentangle the concrete form and the symbolic meaning of a remedy, I refer to instrumental remedies as material remedies and use the term instrumental only to account for a type of motive.

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instrumental, relational and moral motives. Even though certain remedies are more linked to certain types of motives, usually their symbolic meaning makes them able to respond to all the three types of a victim's motives.

3.5.2. WHY DO INVISIBLE REMEDIES WORK?

Invisible remedies are a special form of organizational remedies at a managerial level. Invisible remedies take a material form. In this way, they correspond to Reb et al.'s (2006) definition of instrumental remedies. Referring to Okimoto's analysis (in press, b), invisible remedies can have an instrumental, as well as a relational and a moral function, which consequently enables them to atone for distributive, procedural as well as interactional injustices. Invisible remedies can be viewed by victims as compensation for an injustice (an instrumental function), as a way of restoring their self-esteem and their social identity (a relational function) or as a way of punishing their organization (a moral function).

First, empirical research has indeed shown that taking resources from the workplace is as a way for victims of making up for injustices because it addresses instrumental as well as moral motives. Underpaid employees may want to find ways of increasing their outcomes in order to make up for the imbalance between what they take from and what they give to their employer, which pertains to an instrumental motive. Taking resources allows feelings of inequity to be reduced and distributive justice to be re-established (Greenberg, 1990a).

Taking resources can also serve as an act of retaliation by disgruntled employees who also feel interactionally mistreated, and respond by punishing their employer by means that are available to them. In a study by Greenberg (1996), these two motives were clearly disentangled, and both explained why people engage in taking resources from their companies.

Second, taking resources is also likely to be a response to a relational motive. Little justice research has investigated how employees can build strong relational links with other groups in an attempt to compensate for their lack of recognition by their firm. However, informal work groups are powerful sources of identity (Roethlisberger & Dickson, 1939). To receive the social rewards provided by fellow group members, one has to conform to strong group norms (Etzioni, 1975). These norms may contradict the norms of the firm's dominant coalition (Cyert & March, 1963). In particular, group norms often condone taking resources (Greenberg, 1997; Greenberg & Scott, 1996). It has been argued that "in many jobs, it is considered abnormal *not* to steal" (Greenberg & Scott, 1996, p. 128) and that stealing is a way of "enhancing one's status within one's work group" (Greenberg, 1997, p. 93). As a consequence, even if theft is different from the allocation of invisible remedies, one can view taking resources as a reaction to injustice with a view to finding a compensating source of valued membership in informal peer work groups especially if it is endorsed by their manager. Similarly, by using Robin Hoodism, managers might succeed in reaffirming employees' membership value that has been harmed by the organization. Interestingly, in so doing, they replace the sense of belonging to the organization by the sense of belonging to the managers' work team.

In summary, invisible remedies are proposed to have a positive impact on employees because the invisible remedies can correct justice violations by addressing fundamental needs of the employees that were harmed by the injustice. Saying that invisible remedies can correct injustices is consistent with my definition of corrective justice as a way of seeking to "remedy mistakes in the allocation of rewards and allocations" (French, 1964, p. 412). This is not to say that invisible remedies can completely restore perceptions of justice, especially toward the organization. Even after receiving an invisible remedy, an employee can still deem the

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organization unfair. Instead, invisible remedies function as a kind of compensation allocated by the manager of the unjustly treated employee.

Proposition 13: Invisible remedies correct injustice perceptions because they respond to employees' instrumental, relational, and moral employees' motives.

Proposition 14: Invisible remedies are able to correct distributive, procedural and interactional injustices.

3.6. DISCUSSION

According to Adams (1965, 1963), employees assess the equity of the exchange with their firm by taking into account not only their salary, but also a host of other outcomes. In particular, as “positively valent outcomes”, he identified “fringe benefits” and “a variety of formally and informally sanctioned perquisites” (Adams, 1965, p. 278). This chapter proposes that when the exchange with the organization is viewed as distributively, procedurally or interactionally unjust, the manager may restore justice by allocating specific kinds of outcomes referred to as invisible remedies. However, it is more the exchange with the manager that benefits from this strategy that I named Robin Hoodism rather than the exchange with the firm as a whole.

3.6.1. THE ROBIN HOOD EFFECT AND THE FAIR PROCESS EFFECT

Building on earlier writings on the motives of justice (Cropanzano, Byrne et al., 2001), I have proposed that invisible remedies have the potential to address employees' material, relational as well as moral needs that are violated by an injustice. I have also offered

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propositions concerning the antecedents of the manager engaging in Robin Hoodism, including individual differences and situational factors, Another group of propositions regards the consequences of invisible remedies: How do employees react to them? On the basis of social exchange theory (Blau, 1964), the agent-system model (Bies and Moag, 1986; Masterson et al., 2000; Colquitt et al., 2001) and the multifoci model of justice (Byrne, 1999; Rupp & Cropanzano, 2002), I propose that invisible remedies are likely to encourage employees to react favorably toward their managers but their reactions toward their organization can result in negative consequences. Besides, invisible remedies can create feelings of injustice among co-workers who do not benefit from them (Mars & Nicod, 1981). These consequences of invisible remedies on employees' behaviors have been named the Robin Hood effect. This means that the Robin Hood effect refers at the same time to good feelings about the manager and bad feelings toward the company (and bad feelings among the coworkers). Finally, some of the forms of invisible remedies, which were identified at the beginning of the chapter, are likely to be a function of what activities are under managers' control.

As with the well-known fair process effect (Van den Bos, 2005), the Robin Hood effect may foster perceived justice in the workplace. However, the two mechanisms are different in the way they operate and in their consequences. The fair process effect corresponds to the *positive* impact *fair procedures* can have on employees' reactions. In contrast, the Robin Hood effect refers to the positive *and* negative impact *invisible remedies* have on subordinates' subsequent behaviors. Indeed, negative consequences are likely to result as well for the organization. To cite an interesting analogy, according to the legend, those who benefited from Robin Hood were likely to have increased antagonism toward the heads of state that oppressed them.

3.6.2. MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS

Invisible remedies may have some advantages: they provide the manager with increased flexibility to repair injustice without bureaucracy (Dalton, 1959), they are likely to be faster to implement, and more convenient than formal rewards (Altheide et al., 1978) and not as costly as a formal system (Zeitlin, 1971). This may explain why, even if upper managers are normally out of this invisible reallocation system, in certain industries, they seem to be aware of “much of what goes on” without reacting in any way to it, which “helps to institutionalize its practice” (Mars & Nicod, 1981, p. 67). Interestingly, because Zeitlin not only described an example of this system but also tried to defend it, his article was rejected for publication in the *Harvard Business Review* for moral and ethical reasons (Zeitlin, 1971). In addition to this moral problem, invisible remedies also imply the drawbacks that have been described in this chapter, a factor that might discourage organizational authorities from using them. An important point here is that invisible remedies are likely to benefit the individual manager more than the firm as a whole. Indeed, even if adverse reactions from employees are mitigated, their negative fairness judgments toward the source of the injustice – the company or upper management – remain unchanged, or perhaps are greater and this is expected to have a negative effect on their citizenship behaviors toward the firm. This is why usually firms are unlikely to encourage the use of invisible remedies and are likely to reprimand the managers who use them. This means that managers allocating invisible remedies do it at their personal risk. Another drawback is that invisible remedies can create more new injustices than the ones they purport to solve.

Thus, managing invisible remedies can be paradoxical. Can the invisible be managed? To some extent, this could be possible through making the invisible more visible. Empowering front-line managers and visibly allocating them discretionary budgets for

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invisible actions may be a way of recognizing and utilizing the power of invisible remedies not only for the managers' but also for the company's benefit. This could be a fast and powerful remedy for unjust events. In this respect, the mechanism of invisible remedies may be analogous to the "invisible hand" (Smith, 1776/1994; p. 485). Like a market, a formal organization might better work itself out without an overabundance of rules. However, as far as systemic injustices are concerned, there is a contradiction in imagining a systemically unfair firm using invisible remedies as a systemically fair practice. Moreover, fair organizations are more likely to use visible organizational remedies such as official monetary compensation, public apologies or disciplinary action. Thus, invisible remedies may be viewed for low-rank managers as a way of reacting when "the visible hand of [upper-] managers" (Chandler, 1960) produces too many dysfunctional injustices. By reintroducing into the organization the kind of flexibility typical of the "invisible hand" of the market, these low-rank managers may want to correct organizational injustices with a view to achieving greater efficiency. However, the question of whether the "invisible hand of managers" is globally more favorable or unfavorable remains unknown.

3.6.3. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

The theoretical implications of this work are threefold. First, whereas most organizational research tends to focus on the employees' (the victims of injustice) or third party perspectives, the Robin Hood effect considers the actors' (the manager's) perspective. This perspective is not intended to be prescriptive work. Rather, it simply aims to describe and explain a phenomenon that occurs in work settings, thus enabling researchers to expand understanding of how people address justice concerns in the workplace. Second, this work proposes new links between organizational justice research and important sociological works,

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which have often been categorized as works about employee theft. In particular, this perspective uses the concept of corrective justice to propose that managers' allocations of benefits taken from their firm can be an attempt to restore justice by allocating the only remedy over which they have some control. The framework presented here draws on the typology of justice motives to account for the power of this invisible remedy. This provides a theory to understand why taking resources from a firm can restore not only distributive but also procedural and interactional justice, even if empirical findings are so far limited to distributive injustices. Third, this chapter defines some boundary conditions to this phenomenon using situational as well as managers' individual differences antecedents, and it attempts to predict which forms invisible remedies may take. This might help to clearly distinguish Robin Hoodism from other phenomena such as the "parallel deviance" mechanism (Kemper, 1966).

Research is needed to empirically test propositions offered in this conceptual model and to investigate the ultimate effect of invisible remedies on the organization overall. It would also be of interest to distinguish between the relative explanatory power of the instrumental, relational and moral motives that can account for employees' reactions to invisible remedies as well as for the managerial propensity to use them. In addition, future studies could identify and investigate the effects on fairness perceptions of managers publicly criticizing their unfair organizations. Future research could also aim to delineate more precisely the importance of justice restoration as a reason for managers allocating invisible remedies in the workplace.

Some anecdotes about life in organizations (Villette, 1999) suggest that invisible remedies are common. However, organizational theory has so far under-researched this phenomenon which can have a significant impact on employees' attitudes and behaviors in

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the workplace. I hope, by this chapter, to begin a discussion to better understand the importance of, and mechanisms for, invisible remedies.

The next chapter presents a study whose objective was to empirically test aspects of the model of invisible remedies.

**CHAPTER 4: WHO ARE THE MODERN ORGANIZATIONAL ROBIN HOODS?
SITUATIONAL AND INTERINDIVIDUAL FACTORS PREDICTING MANAGERS'
ALLOCATIONS OF INVISIBLE REMEDIES.**

4.0. ABSTRACT

Managers often make efforts to restore workplace unfairness by using “invisible remedies” under the radar of senior executives’ awareness, including providing mistreated employees with special favors, giving them time off, or other benefits under the manager’s control (see chapter 2). These corrective justice behaviors have been termed Robin Hoodism (see chapter 3). The research presented here investigated when Robin Hoodism was more likely to be chosen by managers, and whether managers’ morality could predict these actions. An experimental scenario study with 187 managers tested firstly whether an interaction between distributive and interpersonal injustice experienced by a subordinate predicted managers’ Robin Hoodism, and secondly whether the moral identity of managers moderated the combined impact of distributive and interpersonal injustice. Results showed that managers who were low moral identifiers did behave as modern organizational Robin Hoods to correct either distributive or interpersonal injustices experienced by their subordinates. However, only managers who were high moral identifiers corrected interpersonal injustices in this way even at a high level of distributive justice. Theoretical and managerial implications conclude the chapter.

4.1. INTRODUCTION

Organizational justice research shows that employees can react to injustice at work in at least three different ways (Conlon, Meyer, & Nowakowski, 2005). They can decrease their *good* behaviors (organizational citizenship behaviors, compliance, or performance), increase their *bad* reactions (absenteeism, turnover, or negligence), and even start to behave in *ugly* ways (by sabotage or organizational retaliatory behaviors).

Noticeably, there is an interaction between the justice of the outcomes received and the justice of the process on employees' attitudes and behaviors at work so that they react most negatively toward their organization when both the outcome and the process are unfair (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996). This interactive effect is especially strong for the interpersonal justice component of the fairness of the process (the respect, politeness, dignity and emotional support shown by the managers, Bies & Moag, 1986; Greenberg, 2006) as this is the most likely to raise moral concerns (Folger, 2001).

Given the negative impact employees' reactions to unfair treatment can have on organizations, it is a good practice for managers to try to correct injustices experienced by their subordinates. Chapter 2 has found that managers engaged in different corrective justice behaviors, including the use of "invisible remedies" under the radar of senior executives' awareness, such as providing mistreated employees with special favors, giving them time off, or other benefits under the manager's control. These hidden corrective justice behaviors that seem to be common have been termed Robin Hoodism (see chapter 3).

However, only scarce research has investigated the factors that predict managers' just behaviors in general, including their corrective justice behaviors and their Robin Hoodism in particular. Knowing when and why managers engage in this kind of corrective justice behaviors would be useful not only to understand and predict but also to improve the way

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leaders manage the relationship with their subordinates. I argue that corrective justice behaviors are likely to be predicted both by situational factors -- including the type(s) of injustice experienced by the subordinate -- and also by the managers' individual differences. As suggested in chapters 2 and 3, the extent to which managers see themselves as being moral human beings seems to be one of the individual variables that could have a strong explanatory power on managers' reactions to unfairness (Patient & Skarlicki, 2005, in press; Masterson, Byrne & Mao, 2005).

Propelled by these concerns, I investigated when managers used the specific managerial corrective justice strategy of Robin Hoodism. Specifically, I simultaneously investigated both individual differences in managers' sense of morality and the variability of the situation regarding the distributive and interpersonal injustices experienced by the subordinates as predictors of Robin Hoodism. I am therefore following the interactionist model, which asserts that behavior is affected by the interplay between person and situation (Cervone & Shoda, 1999a; 1999b; Mischel, 1968), particularly concerning moral behaviors (Murphy, 1993; Treviño, 1986, Greenberg, 2002).

I begin by reviewing the work on the interaction effect between the justice of the distribution and the justice of the process; I then describe the concepts of Robin Hoodism and moral identity in more detail. Moral identity is chosen here as a construct able to operationalize morality and to predict managers' corrective behaviors. The construct of moral identity has indeed emerged as a viable construct in social and developmental psychology for explaining moral functioning (Aquino & Reed, 2002). I then present an experimental scenario study that investigated whether managers, when they correct injustices, show the same kind of interactive relationship that the literature has identified so far between the justice of the distribution and the justice of the process, and the extent to which their moral identity moderates this interactive relationship.

4.2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

4.2.1. THE INTERACTIVE EFFECT BETWEEN DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND INTERPERSONAL JUSTICE

Organizational justice researchers have identified different aspects of perceived justice at work. Employees' justice perceptions encompass their subjective judgments of the fairness of the outcomes they receive at work (Adams, 1965) and of the justice of the decision procedures that lead to these outcomes (Leventhal, 1980; Leventhal, Karuza & Fry, 1980; Thibaut & Walker, 1975, 1978). The justice of the process is often seen as being composed of the fairness of the formal procedures and of the interpersonal treatment and information that employees receive (Bies & Moag, 1986; Colquitt, 2001; Greenberg, 1993; 2006; Shapiro, Buttner & Barry, 1994). Each of these two broad types of judgments is made based on distinctive rules and has been labelled distributive and procedural justice respectively. The concept of procedural justice is often used in this broad sense to encompass the three subcomponents of formal procedural justice, interpersonal justice and informational justice (Blader & Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Lind, 1992).

Individuals feel unjustly treated when they perceive specific justice rules to be violated. The main rule of distributive justice in the workplace is the equity rule, which makes people feel justly treated if the outcomes they receive are seen to correspond to their contributions, and if their perceived ratio of contributions and outcomes is similar to the ratio received by comparison others (Adams, 1963). For instance, American and Chinese employees perceived a bonus to be distributively unjust because it didn't measure up to what employees thought was the level of their contributions (Chen, 1995). Each of the different aspects of procedural justice is also based on specific rules. Concerning formal procedural justice for example, a decision procedure might be seen as unfair when it is not designed to


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give the opportunity for input or “voice”. As an illustration, appraised employees felt unjustly treated when they were not granted bidirectional communication with their manager during the appraisal process (Greenberg, 1986). Regarding informational justice, people tend to perceive injustice on that dimension for example if they are not given appropriate excuses or justifications for unfavorable outcomes (Shaw, Wild, & Colquitt, 2003). Finally, employees experience interpersonal injustice when a decision maker makes derogatory statements or more generally when they perceive a lack of respect, politeness, or dignity (Bies & Moag, 1986). Intimidating or manipulating subordinates or not giving them emotional support also has been proposed to lead to interpersonal injustice judgments (Greenberg, 2006).

The justice of the outcomes received and the justice of the process have main effects on employees’ reactions. Interestingly, these two dimensions also interact to predict significant attitudes and behaviors at work. The interaction between the justice of the distribution and the justice of the process is an important, robust and well-grounded finding (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996). This interaction takes a specific shape (see figure 1). There are three ways of describing this interaction. First, when outcomes are unfair, a fair process significantly mitigates unfavorable reactions. Second, when outcomes are fair, an unfair process is not given much importance and is not a strong predictor of employee’s reactions. Third and last, it is when outcomes and the process are both unfair that employees show the strongest unfavorable reactions.

FIGURE 4:

The Interactive Effects of Distributive and Interpersonal Justice on Employees' Reactions toward the Firm



Three theoretical explanations have been proposed to account for the interactive effect between the fairness of a distribution and the fairness of a process (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 2005). The first explanation relates to the relational models of justice (De Cremer & Blader, 2006). Employees control fewer resources than their managers and are likely to feel dependent on them. This makes them concerned with determining if their managers and more generally the organization in which they work may be trusted. One indicator of a party's trustworthiness is their procedural fairness. Thus, when authorities are procedurally just, employees give less importance to the fairness of their short term outcomes and remain confident that in the long run, their interests will be fairly taken into account by their managers.

The second explanation is given by Fairness Theory (Folger & Cropanzano, 2001). According to this theory, the effect of outcome fairness on employees' reactions depends on

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the degree to which they hold the decision maker accountable for the decision. A fair process means that the manager is not responsible for the bad outcomes. In this case, unfavorable and unfair distributions are seen as caused by back luck due to unexpected environmental or market changes; For example an external factor, such as loss of customers, can mean employees earn less despite having worked as hard as usual (Greenberg, 1990a). People view their manager to be more responsible for the bad outcomes of the exchange when he or she exhibits lower procedural fairness.

The third explanation might have the power to subsume the two others (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 2005). For Uncertainty Management Theory, employees give importance to procedural fairness to make sense of the events that affect them in situations that have a high degree of uncertainty, which is the case in numerous work situations (Lind & van den Bos, 2002). This means that a high level of procedural fairness may make employees think that even if their current outcome seems distributively unfair, in fact procedural fairness either makes them change their mind and think the outcome is fair or at least may give them a sense of global control and reassurance concerning the general rules and functioning of their firm.

Each of these three explanations can be drawn on when explaining the role of the interpersonal component of procedural justice. First, when supervisors show consideration (which heightens the subordinates' interpersonal justice judgment), this makes employees think their manager is trustworthy. Second, when employees see their managers trying to appear fair by communicating with respect and compassion about a negative decision, this can make people think that their manager is not responsible for their negative outcome, and they may attribute it to circumstances or other sources instead. Third, a manager behaving interactionally fairly provides also emotional support to his or her subordinates, which helps them to find the psychological resources to cope with the injustice and overcome uncertainty (Greenberg, 2006).

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Moreover, from the moral perspective of justice (Folger, 2001; Folger & Cropanzano, 1998, 2001), interpersonal justice raises moral concerns more strongly than other aspects of justice because it constitutes a lack of dignified treatment from a clearly identified source. Although negative or unfair outcomes are an inevitable part of organizational life, all individuals consider being due by virtue of their humanity to the right to be treated with dignity and respect. Therefore, when interpersonal and distributive injustices coincide, employees tend to be particularly willing to retaliate against their managers (Skarlicki & Folger, 1997).

Empirical work has shown that interactive effects between distributive and interpersonal justice are common. For example, in a firm in which the employees had their salaries reduced by 15%, a fair interaction with the President showing respect and explaining the reasons for the situation made employees less willing to steal the firm. In contrast, employees who were unfairly treated by their vice-President were more prone to steal their company as a consequence of their pay loss (Greenberg, 1990a). In the same way, nurses whose salaries were reduced by 10% were less likely to experience insomnia when their managers behaved interpersonally fairly towards them (Greenberg, 2006).

Whether this effect occurs among managers, however, has received limited research attention. The perspective of a manager is especially interesting to study. Managers are in a unique position because (a) they can observe occasions of employee mistreatment, and (b) they often have the opportunity to restore unfairness. To my knowledge, no empirical study has so far tried to answer how managers react to the distributive and interpersonal injustices experienced by their subordinates from the organization.


However, some studies have tried to identify which kind of interactive pattern managers show when they personally feel distributively and interpersonally unjustly treated by their own subordinates or by lower status parties (Chen, Brockner & Greenberg, 2003).

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Even if this is far from being the same question, the results could provide some insights useful for my current research. Indeed, as I am interested in identifying how managers correct distributive and interpersonal injustices experienced by their subordinates, knowing how they react to these two kinds of injustices when they experience them by themselves might give some preliminary elements on which to build my hypotheses. A pilot study and two full studies showed that in cases in which lower status parties like subordinates had the power to shape the allocations of higher status parties like managers (in a real negotiation as well as in a lab in which managers were said it is their subordinates who would allocate them rewards) managers showed a contrary interaction between outcome and interpersonal fairness (Chen et al., 2003). High interpersonal fairness *heightened* instead of reduced the influence of outcome favorability on desire for future interaction with the lower status party (see figure 2). Managers had positive reactions only toward subordinates who were interpersonally just *and* allocated them favorable outcomes. When subordinates allocated unfavorable outcomes by being interpersonally just, this did not reduce their managers' negative reactions. The authors explained that managers' motivation was to maintain their social status and power. Thus, they were only likely to favor interactions that did not threaten their social self. In the case their subordinates were at the same time interpersonally fair and distributively unfair this made them think that the subordinates were not responsible for the outcomes and this could have threaten their own self-esteem. Thus, managers gave more importance to outcome fairness rather than to process fairness. Even if this explanation holds well, it also might be the case that managers simply tend to be more outcome oriented.

FIGURE 5:

The Interactive Effects of Distributive and Interpersonal Justice on Managers' Reactions toward their Subordinates



In short, it appears that interpersonal justice is most likely to interact with distributive justice in predicting reactions to injustice, because interpersonal justice is the most central to moral concerns. It also appears that managers are likely to show a different interactive relationship compared to their subordinates. It remains to be tested whether corrective justice behaviors of managers are also predicted by an interaction of interpersonal and distributive justice. If an interaction occurs, what would be its specific shape? Do managers take corrective actions only when both types of injustice are experienced by their subordinates? This would be the case if managers are fully aware of the interactive pattern their subordinates show. They would indeed try to restore justice only when their subordinates react negatively. Do managers attempt to correct the injustice only when distributive injustices arise? This would be the case if they give more importance to outcomes rather than to interpersonal interactions. Do they take corrective actions when interpersonal justice is at stake whatever

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the fairness of the outcome? This would be the case if they are particularly sensitive to moral concerns. I investigated these issues with respect to one particular type of corrective action, namely Robin Hoodism.

4.2.2. ROBIN HOODISM

How do front-line managers react to the perception that an employee has experienced an injustice stemming from the organization itself (Beugré & Baron, 2001; Sheppard, Lewicki & Minton, 1992) or from upper management (Greenberg, 1994). In chapter 2, I investigated how managers (n = 35) reacted to and dealt with their subordinates' injustice experiences (74 incidents were quoted). I found that direct managers used their discretion and informal decision making power to correct these kinds of injustices that -- while not caused by the managers -- could have a negative impact on the work of their subordinates.

Different terms have been used to label general remedial actions taken to restore justice at work. One common label is restorative justice. However, restorative justice has also been widely used in specific reference to action aimed at restoring a sense of justice through renewed value consensus between the victim, the perpetrator and the whole community (Umbreit & Coates, 2006; Wenzel, Okimoto & Feather, 2006). Thus, I prefer to use the more general and neutral term of "corrective justice" coined by French (1964) and defined in the introduction to account for behaviors aimed at correcting for the consequences that a victim of injustice suffers.

In study 2 (see chapter 2), managers used different strategies to correct work injustice. A specific strategy, which was the third most frequently used strategy after "giving explanations" (which refers to an informational justice behavior) and "trying to fix the problem at the origin of the injustice" consisted in "allocating invisible remedies". I defined

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this strategy as “managers’ allocations to their subordinates of something extra, belonging to the company, not for its formal or intended use, for the purpose of restoring justice (hence the term *remedy*), usually without more senior managers’ or other employees’ understanding of the motivation (hence the term *invisible*)”. This phenomenon was named “Robin Hoodism” in chapter 3 because it reminds of the actions of the folk hero Robin Hood, who tried to remedy injustices perpetrated against citizens by an unjust authority in non-sanctioned ways.

Concretely, Robin Hoodism can take the form of authorization for subordinates to take items home (e.g., small tools, raw materials, finished small products), borrowing tools, personal use of machines, or granting employees time off (Greenberg & Scott, 1996). It can also consist of allocating formal benefits (e.g., bonuses, training) not for their intended formal purpose but for justice restoration motives.

Many illustrations of invisible remedies were given in chapter 3 involving textile workers (Sieh, 1987), cashiers in supermarkets (Altheide, Adler, Adler & Altheide, 1978) workers in a gypsum factory (Gouldner, 1954), Post office workers (Bradford, 1976), employees of large chain stores (Altheide et al., 1978), workers in a bakery (Ditton, 1977), employees of chemical plants (Dalton, 1959) and toll-collectors (Zeitlin, 1971). These allocations have been described as representing a significant part of an *invisible-wage system*, the aim of which is usually to compensate for injustices, for instance unfairly low wages (Henry, 1981; Ditton 1977; Mars & Nicod, 1981, see also chapters 2 and 3).

Managers might have different motives to act as modern organizational Robin Hoods. They might be motivated to avoid the negative effects produced by the injustice to maintain their subordinates’ work performance. In this respect, corrective fairness can be a means for them to improve their subordinates’ performance at work and as a consequence, to improve the realization of their own objectives. Thus, correcting injustice by allocating invisible remedies might be a strategy that managers employ to demonstrate their fairness in order to

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achieve their performance targets. This motive pertains to the instrumental motive, which is said to be one strong justice motive (Thibaut & Walker, 1975, 1978).

In contrast, managers may also be intrinsically motivated to correct injustice just because they think it's the right thing to do (see chapter 2 and chapter 3). According to the moral perspective of justice, people for whom morality matters will be more likely to deal with justice issues in social situations and, accordingly, to strongly react to injustices (Folger, 1998, 2001; Folger, Cropanzano & Goldman, 2005, Rupp, 2003). Morality has been shown to influence managers' justice behaviors (Patient & Skarlicki, in press) and to moderate the relationship between workplace fairness and performance (Colquitt, Scott, Judge & Shaw, 2006). Research also shows that people's usual reaction is to be willing to punish the source of an injustice (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986; Turillo, Folger, Lavelle, Umphress, & Gee, 2002). Interpersonal injustice in particular has been shown to be perceived as a moral transgression, much more than distributive or procedural injustices. Indeed, it more clearly shows that the moral transgression is made on purpose and allows to identify the perpetrator without ambiguity (Folger, 2001). In line with this, interpersonal justice has been found to be a strong antecedent to third parties' punishing behaviors (Turillo et al., 2002).

Thus, managers for whom morality matters less might correct injustices for instrumental reasons, while managers for whom morality matters more might correct injustices for intrinsic reasons. This means that managers might show a different interactive pattern between the justice of the distribution and the justice of the process on their Robin Hood behaviors depending on the importance they put on morality. In particular, managers who put more importance on morality are likely to react more strongly to interpersonal injustices, which are considered as stronger moral transgressions. In my research, I used moral identity to operationalize managers' morality.

4.2.3. MORAL IDENTITY

Moral identity is a personality variable that is intended to explain moral behavior. Moral behavior can be defined as behavior that is subject to generally accepted moral norms of behavior (Treviño, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006). These norms usually consist in acting in the service of human welfare (Aquino & Reed, 2002), which sometimes implies to act at odds with one's material and relational self-interest (Folger, 2001).

For the cognitive-developmental model, it is competent moral reasoning that explains moral behavior (Piaget, 1932, Kohlberg, 1971, Rest, 1979). However, people's behavior is not always consistent with their moral cognitions. This is why researchers have called for complementary approaches considering social-psychological motivators of moral conduct like self-regulatory mechanisms (Blasi, 1984). Moral identity has been found to be able to propose such a complementary approach. It is a social identity, which refers to a mental representation that a person holds about his or her moral character. (Aquino & Reed, 2002).

According to this perspective, the extent to which a person views certain moral traits as being central to his or her self-concept makes moral behavior consistent with moral judgment. This consistency is based on the need for the individual to be true to himself or herself (Erickson, 1964). Without moral identity, even a competent moral reasoning doesn't necessarily lead to moral action, especially when costs are attached to this action. People may have identical views about what is moral or immoral but act in very different ways because they vary in the priority they attach to their moral self relative to other aspects of their identity.

Aquino and Reed (2002) define moral identity as a self-conception organized around a set of moral traits. Each person has a unique moral identity consisting of specific traits, but some of these traits are usually shared by most people as a central set shaping their moral self-

definition. These common traits form an associative network with the more specific traits of a particular person. Thus, only a subset of these common traits has to be activated in order to invoke a person's moral identity, which is the method that Aquino and Reed (2002) used to build the scale of moral identity that I used in this study.

On the basis of the dual nature of identity as "rooted in the very core of one's being" and meaning being true to oneself in action (Erickson, 1964), Aquino and Reed (2002) have proposed that moral identity is composed of two subcomponents: a private and a public dimension. The private dimension is named internalization and corresponds to the degree to which moral traits are central to the self-concept. The public dimension taps the degree to which these traits are expressed publicly through a person's actions in the world and is named symbolization. However, internalization has been shown to have more significant effects than symbolization. Internalization indeed refers to the individual's self-conception, and, as such, it seems much more representative of moral motivation than does symbolization (Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007) in accordance with Rest's view that the strength to act morally originates from within (Rest, 1986)

Aquino and Reed built a scale of moral identity (2002) that they showed to be internally consistent, stable in its underlying factor structure, construct valid and nomologically valid, predicting psychological and moral behaviors (self-reported volunteering and actual donation behavior). Further studies that have used this scale have shown that moral identity indeed predicts moral behaviors like help given to out-group members even when these were responsible for transgressions against in-group (Reed & Aquino, 2003).

Closer to the concept of Robin Hoodism, Aquino, Reed, Lim, Felps and Freeman (2006) found that employees' moral identity positively related to the taking of resources from the organization in an unjust situation. Higher moral self-identifiers were *more prone* to react to organizational injustices by taking property from work without permission or by falsifying

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receipts or time sheets to obtain more money for business expenses or overtime. Notice that, when no injustice was at stake, high moral identifiers were *less likely* than low moral identifiers to behave in such a way. Skarlicki, van Jaarsveld and Walker (2007) also found that employees who were high moral identifiers were more likely than low moral identifiers to retaliate after having experienced unfair treatment by customer.

These results showed that what is considered moral in a given situation might depend on the interpretation of the event. Along the same lines, Reynolds and Ceranic (2007) showed that moral identity interacted with moral judgment to predict when managers would be likely to invisibly give free time off (which is an invisible remedy) to a very efficient worker to avoid an injustice. High moral identifiers were shown to be more likely to use this invisible remedy (but only if they also tended to use consequentialist versus formalist moral reasoning).

What is the impact of moral identity on the way managers correct injustices experienced by their subordinates? What is particularly interesting to find out is whether high and low moral identifiers show different interactive patterns relative to distributive and interpersonal injustices suffered by their subordinates. Do low moral managers try to correct injustices by behaving as modern organizational Robin Hoods? In which case, are they more likely to be concerned by outcomes and thus tend to correct mainly distributive injustices? For managers high on moral identity, does any transgression appear as important, which would mean that a high level of distributive justice may not be able to compensate for a low level of interpersonal justice? Thus do managers who are high moral identifiers correct interpersonal injustices even at a high level of distributive justice?

4.2.4. SUMMARY AND HYPOTHESES

Based on my review of the interactive effect between distributive and interpersonal justice, and of the concepts of Robin Hoodism and moral identity, I propose that distributive

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justice and interpersonal justice experienced by a subordinate will interact in a specific way to predict managers' corrective justice behaviors. Furthermore, I predict that this interactive effect will depend on managers' level of moral self-identity.

As reviewed, managers as victims of injustice showed a specific interactive pattern in which they placed more importance on the outcome they receive than on the process (Chen et al., 2003). It is not clear whether managers are aware of the different patterns of justice focus among their employees. More specifically, managers might not be aware of the importance of behaving interactionally fairly and they might not know that a fair interaction can reduce the negative impact of unfair outcomes on their subordinates' behaviors. Empirical studies have indeed shown that managers commonly do *not* behave in interactionally just ways when communicating unfair news to their subordinates (see chapter 1). When communicating unfair or negative news, managers are even likely to behave less fairly than when communicating fair or positive news. This reaction has been explained with self-protective motives as it is less threatening to distance oneself from subordinates who experience an injustice. An alternative explanation is simply a lack of awareness on the part of managers of the importance of interpersonal fairness.

Based on the arguments and findings described above, I proposed that usually managers do not give much importance to interpersonal injustices when trying to correct distributive injustices experienced by their subordinates. Therefore, I did not expect that a fair interpersonal interaction experienced by subordinates would reduce their managers' tendency to correct a distributive injustice. In other words, I proposed that managers would try to correct distributive injustices whatever the level of interpersonal justice experienced by their subordinates. I expected this effect to hold independently of whether a manager was a high or a low moral identifier.

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Low moral identifiers, who are likely to correct injustices for instrumental reasons and who tend to give more importance to outcomes should correct distributive injustices even at a high level of interpersonal injustice. For high moral identifiers, I predicted the same result but the reason might be somewhat different. Managers who are high moral identifiers should give importance to any injustice and might not be likely to think that one can really compensate the other. For instance, research on moral mandates (Skitka, 2002) shows that when an outcome is judged to be unjust, people whose moral values are strong in relation with that outcome do not think that a fair process is able to legitimate an unfair outcome. Thus, they tend to react negatively even if the process is fair. This means that managers are likely to want to correct distributive injustices even at a high level of interpersonal justice, but for moral reasons rather than due to a lack of awareness of the fact that victims do react less unfavorably when interpersonal justice interacts with distributive injustice.

Regarding the way managers react to interpersonal justice, I predicted the same kind of effect for high moral identifiers. Managers who are high moral identifiers are more sensitive to moral transgressions, and therefore are also likely to want to correct interpersonal injustices even at a high level of distributive justice. This effect may not hold for low moral identity managers who may not give importance to interpersonal injustices and who may think that if the outcome is just, then there is no need for corrective action.

I therefore formulated the following hypotheses regarding Robin Hoodism as a specific form of managerial corrective justice:

Hypothesis 1: A three-way interaction between outcome fairness, interpersonal justice, and moral identity predicts managers' tendency to engage in Robin Hoodism.

Hypothesis 1a: For individuals low on moral identity, high distributive justice results in low levels of Robin Hoodism at both high and low levels of interpersonal justice and low distributive justice results in high levels of Robin Hoodism at both low and high levels of interpersonal justice.

Hypothesis 1b: For individuals high on moral identity, high distributive justice combined with low interpersonal justice results in high levels of Robin Hoodism, and low distributive justice results in high levels of Robin Hoodism at both low and high levels of interpersonal justice.

4.3. METHOD

In the present study, I provided managers with a scenario describing an employee mistreatment and I asked them to report how they would respond to the situation. In the scenario, I manipulated both outcome fairness (high versus low) and the interpersonal fairness (high versus low) of the treatment by a senior officer of the company toward one of the manager's subordinates.

4.3.1. PARTICIPANTS

Participants consisted of 187 managers enrolled in an MBA program in Paris, France. Their average age was 29.8 (SD = 8.1) years and they had an average 5.8 (SD = 4.9) years of managerial experience. Of the total participants, 33% were female and 67% were male. Three participants declined to participate in the research, bringing the final total to 184.

This study consisted of a 2 x 2 factorial design with participants randomly assigned to either outcome fairness (high versus low) or interpersonal treatment fairness from upper

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management (high versus low) conditions. Participants were asked to read a scenario in which I manipulated the outcome and interpersonal fairness experienced by a fictitious employee, whose name was Marc. Participants were asked to assume the role of Marc's manager. To provide participants with a variety of situations where an employee might be mistreated, I randomly assigned participants to read one of three different scenarios: Marc was not selected as team lead for a major project (Scenario 1), Marc was denied a promotion (Scenario 2), and Marc did not receive a bonus (Scenario 3). The three scenarios are presented in full in Appendix E.2..

4.3.2. MEASURES

4.3.2.1. Manipulation checks

In order to test whether my manipulations were effective, I assessed participants' perceptions of the mistreatment. I measured participants' perception of distributive justice using one item, with a response set ranging from (1) – (3): “Compared to his coworker(s) in the scenario, Marc was (1) more qualified, (2) equal to, (3) less qualified than his coworker(s) (check one).” I measured the interpersonal justice manipulation using one item: “The President treated Marc with sensitivity and respect”. Participants responded to this item using a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). See appendix E.3.1..

4.3.2.2. Moral Identity

I measured Internalization using the scale developed by Aquino and Reed (2002). The subjects moral traits were invoked by the presentation of the nine moral traits that have been shown to have the ability to invoke most people's moral identities (caring, compassionate,

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fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind). Five items like “being someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who I am” or “I would be ashamed to be a person who has these characteristics” (reversed) tapped the degree to which the person’s moral traits were central to the self-concept. The items used a 5-point Likert-type scale, with the response set ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The items were summed to form the measure (see appendix E.1.).

4.3.2.3. Justice Restoration by Robin Hoodism

Robin Hoodism was measured by a five item-scale developed on the basis of study 2 (see chapter 2). Participants were asked to respond to the following questions: “How likely is it that in response to this situation you would...” (a) “Provide the employee some alternative form of compensation”; (b) “Give the employee a small bonus from your own budget”; (c) “Think of a fringe benefit to make up for the employee’s loss”; (d) “Give the employee some unofficial time off”; and (e) “Try to improve the employee’s working conditions.” The response scale ranged from 1 (very unlikely) to 5 (very likely). The items were summed to form the measure such that higher numbers signify high levels of justice restoration by Robin Hoodism (allocation of invisible remedies to correct workplace injustice). Notice that subjects could also choose among 32 other behaviors so that not to bias their choice in favor of Robin Hoodism (see appendix E.4.). These 32 items were also developed on the basis of study 2 (see chapter 2).

4.3.2.4. Control Variables

I proposed to control for age and gender in my analysis because these variables have been shown to be related to moral identity (Reed & Aquino, 2003). Age and gender were self-reported, with gender coded 0, and 1 for males and females, respectively.

4.4. RESULTS

I first tested whether there was a difference in response between the three different scenarios. I dummy coded the scenarios into three groups (1, 2, and 3) and conducted a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with group as the independent variable and my measured variables as the dependent variables. The results revealed no differences with regard to any of the measured variables: internalization $F(2, 146) = .62$, ns, gender $F(2, 146) = .01$, ns, age $F(2, 146) = .25$, ns, justice restoration $F(2, 146) = .27$, ns. Therefore, I aggregated the data into one group, and conducted the analysis on the entire sample.

I then tested whether my manipulations were effective. Participants in the low interpersonal justice condition rated the manipulation check significantly lower ($M = 5.00$, $SD = 2.18$) than the participants in the high interpersonal justice condition ($M = 7.12$, $SD = 3.30$), $F(1, 183) = 33.24$, $p < .01$. Participants in the low distributive justice condition rated the distributive justice manipulation check significantly lower ($M = 1.79$, $SD = .61$) than the participants in the high distributive justice condition ($M = 2.35$, $SD = .57$), $F(1, 183) = 51.85$, $p < .01$). I concluded that the manipulations produced their intended effects.

The means, standard deviations, correlations, and Cronbach's alphas are given in Table 1. My hypothesis stated that a three-way interaction among distributive justice, interpersonal justice, and moral identity predicted manager's Robin Hoodism tendencies. Following Aiken and West (1991), I centered the moral identity predictor, and used hierarchical regression analysis to test for a significant interaction. Gender was found not to be significant in the regression equation and was therefore not included in the subsequent analysis. I entered age and the main effects in Step 1, the two-way interactions in Step 2, and the three-way in Step 3. As shown on Table 2, the three-way interaction among outcome

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fairness, interpersonal fairness and internalization was significant ($\beta = -.64, p < .05$). The shape of the interaction is shown on Figure 3. Further tests showed that the two-way interaction between distributive justice and interpersonal justice was significant at a high level of managers' moral identity ($\beta = -.42, p < .05$) and not significant at a low level of managers' moral identity ($\beta = .091, n.s.$). Thus my hypothesis was supported.

TABLE 25:

Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations

| | Mean | SD | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
|--------------------------|-------|------|-------|-------|------|------|-------|-------|
| 1. Distributive Justice | – | – | | | | | | |
| 2. Interpersonal Justice | – | – | .06 | | | | | |
| 3. Gender | .66 | .47 | .07 | .01 | | | | |
| 4. Age | 29.86 | 3.64 | -.06 | -.12 | .17* | | | |
| 5. Internalization | 29.89 | 4.01 | -.04 | .01 | .04 | -.00 | (.74) | |
| 6. Robin Hoodism | 11.88 | 4.90 | -.21* | -.22* | -.03 | -.06 | .19* | (.83) |

Note: N = 184; Gender is coded female (0), male (1); Reliabilities are given in parentheses along the diagonal

TABLE 26:


Hierarchical Regression Results Predicting Managers' Tendency to Engage in Robin Hoodism

| Variable | Step 1 | 95% CI | Step 2 | 95% CI | Step 3 | 95% CI |
|----------------------------|---------|--------------|---------|--------------|---------|---------------|
| Age | -.19* | -.39, -.07 | -.17 | -.37, -.01 | -.16 | -.35, .03 |
| Distributive Justice (DJ) | -2.39** | -3.73, -1.04 | -8.32 | -18.62, 1.97 | -18.18* | -32.56, -3.81 |
| Interpersonal Justice (IJ) | -3.27** | -4.64, -1.91 | -6.97 | -17.20, 3.24 | -16.30* | -30.27, -2.36 |
| Internalization (I) | .20** | -.04, .37 | .02 | -.24, .28 | -.10 | -.40, .18 |
| DJ x IJ | | | -3.29** | -5.95, -.64 | 16.00 | -3.94, 35.94 |
| DJ x I | | | .25 | -.08, .58 | .57** | .10, 1.05 |
| IJ x I | | | .17 | -.15, .50 | .48* | .02, .93 |
| DJ x IJ x I | | | | | -.64* | -1.30, -.01 |
| F | 11.05** | | 8.11* | | 8.01* | |
| Partial F | | | 3.58* | | 3.70* | |
| Df | 4 | | 7 | | 8 | |
| R square | .19** | | .23** | | .26** | |
| Adjusted R | .17** | | .21** | | .23** | |
| Change in R^2 | .19** | | .04* | | .03* | |

Note: $N = 184$; * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

FIGURE 6:

The Interactive Effects of Distributive and Interpersonal Justice on Managers' Robin Hoodism at Low and High Levels of Moral Identity



4.5. DISCUSSION

The first contribution of the present study was that I explored the effects of employee mistreatment from the perspective of the manager. Managers are in a unique position because (a) they can observe occasions of employee mistreatment, and (b) they have the opportunity to restore unfairness, and (c) they often do so in a covert way named Robin Hoodism.

My second contribution was to assess whether the two-way interaction between distributive and interpersonal elements on reactions to injustice can also be found with respect to the corrective actions of managers of injustice victims.

A third contribution consisted in exploring whether moral identity moderated the effect of the two-way interaction between outcome and interpersonal fairness on Robin Hoodism tendencies. Said differently, I tested whether a three-way interaction among outcome fairness, interpersonal treatment, and moral identity predicted managers' corrective actions.

My hypotheses were supported. The results showed that moral identity qualified the two-way interaction between distributive and interpersonal justice that had been observed in previous justice research. For managers low on moral identity, Robin Hoodism tendencies increased as both interpersonal and distributive justice went up (i.e., two main effects). This suggests that it is not only for a moral motive but also for performance motives that managers might use Robin Hoodism. This also shows that managers were not likely to take into account the mitigating effect that interpersonal justice can have on distributive injustice and tended to correct distributive injustices whatever the level of interpersonal fairness experienced by their employees.

For managers who were high on moral identity, however, the shape of the interaction was different. They reacted more strongly to interpersonal injustices: Low interpersonal

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justice resulted in high justice restoration by Robin Hoodism at both high and low levels of distributive justice. Consistent with the moral perspective of justice, these results suggest that violations of interpersonal justice violate moral and social norms in a way that are not offset by improvements in distributive justice.

This study has several strengths. First, I studied a unique perspective – that of a manager who was observing an employee (a subordinate) being mistreated by a senior officer of the company. The manager’s perspective has received little research attention to date in the organizational justice literature. Second, this is among the first empirical studies to explore the tendency for managers to demonstrate behaviors akin to modern day organizational Robin Hoods, attempting to restore justice using “invisible remedies” that are often under the radar of the senior executives. Third, the results showed that managers were likely to use invisible remedies to correct distributive injustices (as also shown in chapter 2) but also to correct interpersonal injustices (as proposed in chapter 3). Fourth, I provided three different situations for the managers to consider, and the results were consistent across all three scenarios. This provides greater confidence in the study’s findings. Fifth, most research to date has assessed justice effects using cross-sectional data. My scenario experiment design supports a causal argument - that differences in fairness impacts justice restoration.

For organizational practice, management of injustices in general and corrective justice in particular represent an important part of organizational reality. My work is a first attempt to answer to the need to acknowledge the central role of the manager not only as perpetrator and as victim of injustice, but also as third party that often has the power to correct the impact of injustices. Besides, as a corrective justice strategy, Robin Hoodism is a common managerial phenomenon. It is worth to be better understood as it is likely to have a significant impact on organizations, which is not always a positive one. By acting as Robin Hoods, managers can

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indeed mitigate employees' negative reactions towards themselves, but probably not the negative reactions towards the organization itself (as proposed in chapter 3).

Although a scenario study permits me to draw conclusions regarding how managers react to fairness violations as a function of moral identity, quantitative field research is necessary next step to assess whether there are situational factors that might enhance or reduce managers' reactions, and to ensure the external validity of my findings. Future research would also need to study other third parties. Will there be the same interaction pattern for other types of third party reactions, like customers, or suppliers? Finally, I appeal for research that would investigate the effect of Robin Hoodism in different types of situations on the employees' reactions rather than on the factors that predict whether Robin Hoodism occurs, which was my focus in this research.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

G.D.1. FOUR MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS TO ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE RESEARCH

The present work makes four main contributions to organizational justice research. First, I chose a *proactive* instead of a reactive perspective. I focused on the managers' justice behaviors and their antecedents instead of studying employees' justice judgments and their consequences. The proactive view complements well the reactive view in the sense that it can give clear directions regarding how to foster the delivering of justice in the workplace.

Second, I analysed what managers did *after* their subordinates had experienced injustice instead of studying how they shaped their employees' justice judgments at the origin. Injustice is pervasive at work and often independent of managers' own behaviors. Thus, managers have to react to injustices that they have not produced. Given the negative impact injustice can have on organizations, when an employee feels unjustly treated, it is a good policy for managers to try to correct the injustice. For instance injustice leads to a lower level of organizational citizenship behaviors and managers can reverse this trend. Two important follow-up questions become: What factors predict when managers try to correct the injustices experienced by their subordinates? What are the concrete strategies that managers use to correct these injustices? The important role managers have at work is already well recognized by the leadership literature (Yukl, 2006). By attempting to answer these two questions, my objective was to better understand the importance of, and mechanisms for, the managers' role in *correcting injustice* that is currently under-researched.

The third main contribution concerns the way managers' action is conceptualized in the organizational justice field. Most often distributive and procedural justice are seen as stemming from the organization while only interactional justice is linked to the manager's behavior (see Blader & Tyler, 2003 and Rupp & Cropanzano, 2002 for exceptions). My results showed that managers were not only fair because they showed respect and justified their decisions (they even showed in fact the opposite tendency) but also because they used their informal and discretionary decision-making power as a powerful source of justice and of corrective justice in particular.

Fourth, while most organizational justice research is quantitative, I used different methodologies to better address the specific research questions I posed. In particular, in chapter 2, I used a qualitative study to explore the corrective justice strategies that managers might use in the workplace in addition to their traditional interactional justice behaviors. I followed Tripp and Bies' advice (2007) to conduct qualitative research in order to discover new principles linked to the justice phenomena. In this way, I strove to expand the literature's conceptual grasp of proactive justice.

G.D.2. FROM THE CHURCHILL EFFECT TO ROBIN HOODISM

The four chapters that are presented in this dissertation give four complementary insights into the research question of how and why managers correct workplace injustice.

The first study presented in chapter 1 concerns the managers' ability to interactionally correct injustice. According to the reactive literature on organizational justice, interactional justice is an efficient way for managers to correct injustice at work (Skarlicki & Folger,

1997). However, according to the proactive literature on organizational justice, interactional justice is unlikely to be used by managers to correct injustice because of the existence of the Churchill effect (Folger, 1993). My results confirmed this effect and showed that when managers had to implement and communicate a decision that didn't respect the equity rule and that was procedurally improper, they were more likely to behave *informationally* unjustly rather than informationally fairly. The distributively and procedurally unjust a decision, the less informationally fairly the managers behaved. The results also showed that managers tended to behave *interpersonally* unfairly especially when they were low on the social skill of assertiveness, whatever the injustice of the situation.

Further, I found that identification with the firm related negatively to managers' interpersonal and informational behaviors. Moreover, identification moderated the relationship between the inequity and the procedural impropriety of the situation and the managers' informational (in)justice behaviors. Low identifiers behaved informationally unfairly in negative and unfair situations and behaved informationally fairly in negative and fair situations. However, high identifiers were likely to behave informationally unjustly regardless of the injustice of the procedure. This suggests that low identifiers acted in a unjust manner to protect their self image, but high identifiers tried to protect their organization in a situation that was unfavorable to the victims, whether the situation was fair or unfair.

These results suggest that managers are unlikely to correct injustice at work. However, there is another possibility. In the experimental situation I used, participants did not have any concrete means to react to the injustice at their disposal, except their pens to write a letter. In spite of this limitation, in unjust cases, many participants tended to push their organization to correct the injustice by promising to the victims that the injustice they experienced would be compensated or even fixed. They used some type of informal corrective justice strategies: they offered support (by encouraging the candidate to reapply), future help (they said that the

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candidates will be contacted if there is any other opportunity), an alternative positive outcome (for instance, free training) or even an alternative position (direct help to find another job).

These behaviors suggest that managers might use other means to correct injustice than only their interactional justice behaviors. These results sparked a second study to investigate what other means managers might use to correct injustice at work. This study was presented in chapter 2. I asked 35 managers in one firm to describe an event that they found unjust and that was experienced by their subordinates. Then, they had to describe how they reacted to this injustice. This study made it possible to identify an under-researched corrective justice strategy that I named *Robin Hoodism* and that consisted in allocating invisible remedies. Thus, even if managers may not *visibly* correct injustice by being interactionally fair, they might correct the injustice *invisibly*.

In study 2, three other main corrective strategies emerged that were not investigated further as they were already well known in the literature. The *informational justice* strategy mainly consisted in justifying what happened and was the first strategy quoted by managers. This was in contradiction with my findings in study 1 about the Churchill effect. I elaborate on this seeming inconsistency below. The strategy consisting in *fixing the injustice at its source* appeared to be the second most frequently used strategy. *Robin Hoodism* was the third most common corrective behavior. Notice that *interpersonal justice* was one of the strategies used least often by managers.

Results also showed that managers were more likely to use invisible remedies to compensate for organizational distributive injustices due to the deficiencies of the formal reward system rather than to correct other types of injustices. They were more likely to react in that way when injustices violated their sense of equity rather than other justice rules. As invisible remedies, managers often diverted organizational allocations from their formal use. Their first motivation was the desire to behave fairly even if they knew that these attempts

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mainly mitigated negative reactions in the short run, without fundamentally solving any real problem at its source in the long run. Finally, one of the important favorable consequences of this strategy was that it fostered a favorable relationship between the manager and the subordinate.

These results formed the foundation of a conceptual model to explain the strategy of invisible remedies. This model was presented in chapter 3. I theoretically explored which forms invisible remedies would take in the workplace. I proposed that managers can allocate free time and formal benefits (e.g., bonuses, training) that tend to have been initially derived for a different purpose. Another form of remedies involves the borrowing of tools, or personal use of machines. Managers can also allow subordinates to take material objects home. I proposed that the choice of invisible remedies is likely to be a function of which means are under the managers' control and least visible to higher-level executives.

I also investigated in chapter 3 which situational and interindividual antecedents would characterize the use of this corrective justice strategy that the literature had not identified before. I proposed that the more the managers view the organization as unfair, the more they are motivated to use invisible remedies. As more centralized and larger companies are likely to be seen as more unjust, this led me to propose that those features would make managers more likely to appeal to Robin Hoodism. I also proposed that managers' orientation towards performance, their motivation to protect their social self, and the importance they give to morality would positively impact their tendency to allocate invisible remedies.

Further, I explored what I called the *Robin Hood effect*, which consists of the positive consequences of the use of invisible remedies towards the manager, and its negative consequences towards the organization and from the coworkers who do not benefit from them. At the end of chapter 3, I identified the psychological mechanisms that could explain

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why invisible remedies work by emphasizing how they address employees' material, relational and ethical motives.

The fourth chapter consisted in a last scenario study testing some important aspects of the model of invisible remedies. I first studied which kind of injustices would predict Robin Hoodism. Specifically, I tested whether the well known interactive effect between the justice of the distribution and the justice of the process applied to managers' allocation of invisible remedies. Second, I explored the three-way interaction between managers' moral identity and these two types of injustices on their invisible corrective behaviors.

I found that managers used invisible remedies to correct distributive as well as interpersonal injustices. Moreover, these two kinds of injustices interacted to predict Robin Hoodism. I also found that this interaction took a different shape depending on managers' moral identity. Low moral identifiers mainly attempted to correct distributive injustices and to a certain extent interpersonal injustices. High moral identifiers also corrected distributive injustices. Moreover, they were much more likely to correct interpersonal injustices at a high level of distributive justice than low moral identifiers.

G.D.3. AN ANALYSIS OF MY RESULTS

A close comparison between the results and the propositions of these different studies and conceptual works shows some interesting findings. First, in the exploratory study presented in chapter 2, in contradiction with the experimental study of chapter 1, managers

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were likely to use informational justice as a corrective justice strategy. Second, only managers who had a high level of assertiveness and a low level of identification with their organization behaved interpersonally fairly in study 1 (chapter 1) when reacting to a negative situation, whatever its injustice. In the same way, in study 2 (chapter 2) in which the participants reacted to an injustice experienced by their subordinates, they were very unlikely to use interpersonal justice. Third, managers used invisible remedies to correct distributive injustices in study 2 (chapter 2). They also appealed to this strategy to correct interpersonal injustices in study 3 (chapter 4). Notice that in chapter 3, I proposed that invisible remedies are able to correct any type of injustice. Even some participants of the study presented in chapter 1 tried to correct the injustice using means close to an invisible remedy. Fourth, moral motives were shown to be important in predicting Robin Hoodism in study 2 (chapter 2) and moral identity indeed impacted the use of this corrective justice strategy in study 3 (chapter 4). This was consistent with the proposition made in chapter 3 that the more important morality for managers, the more likely they are to use this strategy. Fifth, managers were likely to use a corrective justice strategy, consisting in trying to fix the problem at its roots in study 2 (chapter 2). Some participants also tried to use this strategy in study 1 (chapter 1). Sixth and last, in study 2 (chapter 2), many managers did nothing instead of correcting the injustice experienced by their subordinates, which was also the case of most participants involved in the study presented in chapter 1. I will return to these results after a reminder of the characteristics of the different studies.

G.D. 3.1. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STUDIES

Each of the three empirical studies involved managers who had to react to an injustice experienced by their subordinates. The conceptual model proposed in chapter 3 took also this perspective. However, each situation had specific characteristics and was studied using specific methods.

In the first study, managers had to communicate a decision that was either unfavorable or unjust. Thus, even if they were not at the origin of the injustice, they were closely associated with it. Besides, participants in this study could only react to the injustice by writing a letter to the victim. This did not leave them many choices in the case they wanted to correct that injustice. The design was experimental and the large number of subjects ($n = 118$) allowed me to analyse the results using statistical inference.

In the second study, managers described events that had been experienced by their subordinates and that they found unjust. Each of the interviewed managers described an injustice that had really happened at work, most of which originating at the organizational level. Thus, they were usually not directly at the source of the injustice and could react to it using all the possibilities of the real world. However, contrary to study 1, I could not observe the *real* behaviors of the participants. The stories they told could have been biased for multiple reasons, including a social desirability motive. Moreover, the design was explorative with open-ended questions that were asked to a small number of participants ($n=35$) in only one firm. Thus, the results should be taken only as facilitating the discovery of characteristics of new phenomena and new links between constructs rather than as robust results that could be compared to other studies in order to check if they are generalizable.

The third chapter provided a conceptual model and therefore propositions based on previous research and respecting an internal theoretical consistency. As such, they have to be empirically tested in order to be confirmed.

In the third empirical study presented in chapter 4, managers had to face a hypothetical injustice experienced by one of their subordinates and produced by their own manager, the President of the firm. In this case also, they were not directly associated with the injustice. In the scenario, their subordinate asked them, in a face-to-face encounter, to react to this injustice. The scenario study gave them the possibility to choose among 37 behaviors those that they would have implemented if the situation were real, five of them corresponding to the concept of Robin Hoodism. The large number of participants (n=187) makes me confident about the robustness of the statistical analyses. However, because of the scenario design, quantitative field research is necessary next step to ensure the external validity of my findings.

G.D.3.2. DISCUSSION OF CONSISTENCIES AND INCONSISTENCIES IN MY RESULTS

G.D.3.2.1. Consistent results

Despite differences in the kinds of unjust situations faced, in the ways managers could react to them, and in the methodologies used, some results appear to be consistent through the different empirical studies and the conceptual model.

First, managers were unlikely to use *interpersonal justice* to correct an injustice experienced by their subordinates. In study 1, interpersonal justice was not related to unfairness. Managers were equally interpersonally fair in the unfavorable and in the unjust situations. In other words, managers did not use interpersonal justice to correct the injustice of the situation. In study 2, interpersonal justice was one of the less often used corrective justice strategies.

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Second, managers were likely to use *invisible remedies* to correct an injustice experienced by their subordinates. In study 1, the setting did not include the possibility to use this kind of behavior. However, even in this case, many participants tried to use informal remedies to correct the injustice. Some participants even clearly used invisible remedies to correct for the injustice (by proposing to the candidate to offer him some compensation for the injustice, for example a free training¹⁰). In study 2, managers used invisible remedies as the third most widespread corrective strategy. The conceptual model presented in chapter 3 proposed that invisible remedies are able to correct every kind of injustice. Along the same lines, study 3 (chapter 4) showed that managers commonly used invisible remedies to correct distributive and interpersonal injustices.

Third, managers sometimes tried to really *correct the injustice at its source*. In study 1, the setting did not formally include the possibility to use this kind of behavior. However, in unjust situations, some participants tried to fix the problem (for instance, they proposed to the candidate that the organization would offer him/her another internship to replace the one that he/she could not get because of the injustice). In study 2, the strategy consisting in fixing the problem, which was at the origin of the injustice, was the second most widespread strategy.

Fourth, the importance given to morality by managers appeared as an important factor to explain their Robin Hoodism. Study 2 showed that one of the most salient motives of managers to use this strategy was the desire to do the right thing. In chapter 3, the conceptual model also proposed that the more managers are sensitive to morality the more they are going to use invisible remedies. Finally in study 3 (chapter 4), managers' moral identity interacted with distributive and interpersonal justice to predict this corrective strategy.

Finally, some managers were also likely to do nothing about the injustice. In study 1, the candidates were not aware of the injustice. Only the managers knew that the situation was

¹⁰ However, this remedy is not strictly an invisible remedy according to my definition. Indeed, in the case the candidate asked for this promise to be implemented, he would have asked it to the management of the Internship Program. Thus, this remedy could not remain invisible to the hierarchy.

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unjust. Therefore, they could simply behave as if the situation were just, which almost all of them did. Only six of them refused to participate to the experiment when the situation was unjust. In study 2, “appealed to a better future”, and “refused to react to the injustice” were the most common strategies chosen after allocating invisible remedies. Both simply consisted in doing nothing.

These results were consistent through the different studies despite the use of different designs and methodologies. This strengthens their potential to generalizability.

G.D.3.2.2. Inconsistent results

Only results concerning informational justice were not consistent across study 1 and study 2. This might be due to the characteristics of the kinds of injustices that the participants had to deal with, but also to the different kinds of settings and methodologies used.

In study 1, managers behaved less informationally fairly in unfavorable and unjust situations than in unfavorable but just situations, which corresponds to the Churchill effect. Thus, in study 1, informational justice behaviors did not appear as a usual corrective justice strategy. By contrast, in study 2, managers used informational justice as the first most widespread corrective strategy to react to an injustice experienced by their subordinates.

One explanation might be linked to the different levels of managers’ involvement in the injustice across the two studies. In study 1, they were closely associated with the injustice, whereas in study 2, they usually described situations in which the organization was concerned. Thus, it might be the case that the less the managers are associated with an unjust decision, the more likely they are to use informational justice.

Another explanation might be related to the fact that in the second study, I collected data on the basis of managers’ declarations. In contrast, in study 1, managers’ behaviors were directly observed through the analysis of the letters they really wrote. It might be the case that

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either managers really think they clearly justified and gave information about a decision while the victim or an observer would have a different opinion, or that managers just wanted to appear as able to justify injustices in the eyes of the interviewer.

This difference deserves future research. However, it should be noted that study 1 and study 2 responded to different research objectives and were conducted using different methods.

G.D.3.3. A PRELIMINARY TYPOLOGY OF MANAGERIAL CORRECTIVE JUSTICE STRATEGIES

The strategies that I studied in the present dissertation can be organized according to the two criteria that I used in my definition of managerial corrective justice strategies (see the introduction). The first one refers to the kind of behavioral action: Do managers act to achieve real tangible change (by giving a real material compensation or by really trying to fix the problem) or do they only react in a symbolic way (by justifying the incident or trying to show compassion and respect at this occasion)? The second criterion refers to the focus of the managers' reaction. Does the reaction target the root cause of the injustice (in which case managers either justified what the perpetrator did or tried to fix the injustice) or is it focused on the final consequence of the injustice (in this case managers either helped the employee to cope with what he or she experienced or gave an invisible remedy to compensate for it)? Thus, the four strategies can be organised in a two by two matrix:

TABLE 27:

Preliminary Typology of Managers' Corrective Justice Strategies

| <i>Managers' type of behavior</i> | Real | Symbolic |
|------------------------------------|---|--|
| <i>Focus of managers' behavior</i> | | |
| Cause | 1. <i>Fixing</i> <i>(problem solving)</i> | 3. <i>Justifying</i> <i>(informational justice)</i> |
| Consequence | 2. <i>Compensating</i> <i>(invisible remedies)</i> | 4. <i>Accompanying</i> <i>(interpersonal justice)</i> |

I mainly studied the corrective justice strategies corresponding to quadrants 3 and 4 in chapter 1 and to quadrant 2 in chapters 2, 3 and 4. Most strategies appeared to some extent in most of the chapters. In particular, in chapter 2, strategies corresponding to quadrants 1, 2 and 3 appeared most frequently.

I was interested in the present work to study the forms and antecedents of managerial corrective justice strategies. The different strategies investigated are likely to have distinct consequences on subordinates' attitudes and behaviors. For example invisible remedies probably have more favorable consequences on the quality of the relationship with the manager than informational justice. Fixing the problem might have a positive impact on employees' attitudes toward the company, which seems not to be the case of invisible remedies (see chapter 3). Interpersonal justice is more likely than the other remedies to help subordinates to find means to correct the injustice by themselves, by helping them to better cope with the situation (see Greenberg's 2006 study in which managers helped their subordinates not to experience insomnia). These distinct consequences should be studied by further studies in the more traditional reactive research paradigm.

G.D.4. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

My work extended the burgeoning field of the proactive perspective on organizational justice. Managers tried to correct injustices experienced by their subordinates. I have attempted to better understand the way they behaved and the factors that could explain these corrective reactions.

The first chapter made several contributions to organizational justice theory. First, the results help to better understand the mechanism by which the Churchill effect, an important cause of interactional injustice, operates. A situation leads to the Churchill effect only if the situation is distributively and procedurally unjust. I also showed that interactional unjust behaviors can be predicted not only by the situation but also by interindividual managers' characteristics. It is not only managers' desire to protect their social just self in unjust situations that was at stake but also their social ability to cope with unfavorable situations.

Second, this research advances our understanding of the dynamics of informational and interpersonal justice, which were shown to be, respectively, more sensitive to situational (the injustice of the decision) and individual (assertiveness) difference factors. These different antecedents for informational versus interpersonal justice behaviors provide further support for separating interactional justice into its informational and interpersonal components.

Third, I extended understanding of the deontic model of justice and fairness theory by testing them in a proactive justice study. Participants appear to have distinguished between the three experimental conditions on the basis of their "would", "could" and "should" counterfactuals.

A fourth contribution of this first study lies in showing of the important role in managers' justice behaviors of their identification with the organization. Whereas usually

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organizational identification is seen as having primarily positive consequences for the organization and for employees, I showed that managers who identified more strongly with the organization can in some situations be more interactionally unjust. This means that managers who viewed their firm as an extended self, when having to react to an injustice produced by this firm, chose not to behave fairly toward the employee who experienced this injustice.

Finally, in this first study many of the participants used some type of informal corrective justice strategies. This phenomenon provided the rationale for investigating the other kinds of corrective justice behaviors, distinct from interactional justice behaviors, used by managers.

In the second chapter, I identified the corrective justice strategies used by managers, among which the specific strategy of Robin Hoodism consisting in allocating invisible remedies. The comparison between Robin Hoodism and the other corrective justice strategies allowed me to build some tentative links between this concept and some of its antecedents and consequences. As a consequence, this made me able to propose a global conceptual model in chapter 3 attempting to better understand the importance of, and mechanisms for, invisible remedies.

The theoretical implications of chapter 3 were threefold. First, this work proposed new links between organizational justice research and important sociological works, which have often been categorized as works about employee theft. In particular, this perspective proposed that managers' allocations of benefits taken from their firm can be an attempt to restore justice by allocating the only remedies over which they have some control.

Second, the framework presented built on the typology of justice motives to account for the power of invisible remedies. This provided a theory to understand why taking

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resources from a firm can restore not only distributive but also procedural and interactional justice.

Third, this chapter defined some boundary conditions to this phenomenon using situational as well as managers' individual differences antecedents, and it attempted to predict which forms invisible remedies might take. This might help to clearly distinguish invisible remedies from other phenomena in which informal allocations are not based on justice restoration motives.

As for chapter 4, its first contribution was to test some aspects of the conceptual model presented in chapter 3. This was among the first empirical studies to explore the tendency for managers to demonstrate behaviors akin to modern day organizational Robin Hoods, attempting to restore justice using invisible remedies that are often under the radar of the senior executives.

Specifically, this study showed that the two-way interaction between distributive and interpersonal elements on reactions to injustice can also be found with respect to the corrective actions of managers of injustice victims. By this way, I confirmed that, as proposed in chapter 3, invisible remedies can be used to correct different forms of injustices, namely distributive and interpersonal injustices.

A third contribution consisted in showing that moral identity moderated the effect of the two-way interaction between distributive and interpersonal fairness on Robin Hoodism tendencies. This confirmed the proposition of chapter 3 according which the importance managers give to moral identity predicts their invisible corrective justice behaviors.

More generally, the present dissertation has applied the organizational behavior perspective to management, which is still a new way to analyse organizational phenomena in France (Robbins, Judge, & Gabilliet, 2006). To date, organizational justice theory has only begun to been investigated in France (El Akremi, Nasr, Camerman, 2006; Steiner, 1999), and

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it has only recently been applied to strategy (Kim & Mauborgne, 1996; Monin, Ben Fathallah & Vaara, 2005), and human resources management (Allouche, 2003; Manville, in press; Tremblay & Roussel, 2001).

G.D.5. MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS

My work shows that managers do correct injustice at work. Knowing how and why can help managers to improve the performance of their attempts, thus producing favorable consequences on their subordinates' attitudes and behaviors at work. In addition to this instrumental consideration, the study of this phenomenon at work is also a matter of adding knowledge to the understanding of organizational ethics. In this perspective, morality can also be viewed as an end in itself.

Studies 1 and 2 showed that managers were unlikely to spontaneously use interpersonal justice. Paradoxically, reactive organizational justice studies have shown that interpersonal justice has a positive impact on subordinates on account of its power to correct distributive and procedural injustices. According to study 1, managers' low level of interpersonal justice behaviors was due to a lack of social competencies or to a strong identification to the firm. One implication is that organizations should avoid selecting managers to communicate the negative outcome who lack assertiveness or who might identify too closely with the organization versus with the employee. However, studies have shown that assertiveness can be efficiently taught. This constitutes a second managerial implication. Fostering managers' interpersonal justice behaviors seems to be a very promising avenue to improve managers' competencies to correct injustice in the workplace.

Another managerial implication of study 1 is that managers should not be asked to communicate about decisions that they think are unjust. Indeed, unjust decisions are likely to

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produce the Churchill effect. I therefore propose that if firms want to encourage managers' informational justice behaviors in difficult times, they should persuade the managers of the procedural justice relating to the outcome communicated. One way is to involve managers in the decisions they are going to implement and communicate about. Another possibility could be for upper managers in the case of ambiguous decisions that can be seen as unjust or just to be interactionally fair with their first-line managers. By giving sincere social accounts and showing respect to the managers themselves, upper managers can make them more likely to judge the decisions as procedurally just. However, these implications should be taken with caution, given the manipulative possibilities they can involve.

A last implication of study 1 is that one should be cautious about the "good soldier" syndrome. It is in part because they identified strongly with their in-group that some managers reacted unjustly toward victims of that in-group. A too strong organizational identification, which is usually seen as having positive consequences is also likely to have bad consequences.

In studies 2 and 3 (chapters 2 and 4), managers who did not justify or fix an injustice at its source often decided to correct it by using invisible remedies. This means that they intuitively knew how important it is to correct injustice at work. It is plausible that if they had formal means available to them, they would have used them. Instead, they decided to engage in a less overt strategy, probably at the expense of their own firm.

In chapter 3, I proposed that invisible remedies can have some advantages: they provide the manager with increased flexibility to repair injustice without bureaucracy, they are likely to be faster to implement, more convenient than formal rewards, and not as costly as a formal system. Invisible remedies also imply the drawbacks that have been described in this chapter, a factor that might discourage organizational authorities from using them. An important point here is that invisible remedies are likely to benefit the individual manager

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more than the firm as a whole. This is why usually firms are unlikely to encourage the use of invisible remedies and are likely to reprimand the managers who use them. Another drawback is that invisible remedies can create more new injustices than the ones they purport to solve.

Invisible remedies can be seen as a form of *organizational slack* (Cyert & March, 1963). If managers are not allocated enough formal means and if they need them in their day-to-day management, they discretionally create the informal means they need and use them. Therefore, empowering front-line managers and allocating them discretionary budgets for invisible actions may be a way of recognizing and utilizing the power of invisible remedies to help them correct systemic injustices that an organization cannot be aware of. However, there is a contradiction in imagining a systemically unfair firm using invisible remedies as a systemically fair practice. Moreover, fair organizations are more likely to use visible organizational remedies such as official monetary compensation, public apologies or disciplinary action. Thus, invisible remedies should rather simply be viewed as an emergent way for low-rank managers of reacting when the upper management produces too many injustices that prevent the usual job to get done.

One important finding of study 3 is that managers used invisible remedies to correct interpersonal injustices stemming at the upper management level. This result, which is in line with the propositions of chapter 3, extends the qualitative results of chapter 2. This might seem counterintuitive that managers were willing to compensate for an injustice experienced by their subordinates due to a lack of respect of their upper manager by giving them some unofficial time off or a fringe benefit. However, it is the way they chose to react. Thus, organizations should be aware of the negative impact that interactional justice stemming from the highest level of the hierarchy can have, not only on the base-rank employees' attitudes and behaviors but also on their low-rank managers' ways of reacting.

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A further interesting implication is that managers were not likely to take into account the mitigating effect that interpersonal justice can have on distributive injustice. This interaction between the justice of the distribution and the justice of the process is well known by justice researchers. For instance, in study 3 (chapter 4), the negative reactions of an employee who was the victim of distributive injustice probably were mitigated by the interpersonal justice showed by the president. However, managers seemed to be not aware of this effect. This is consistent with studies 1 and 2 in which I found that managers were unlikely to use interpersonal justice. Obviously, managers were far from understanding the favorable impact interpersonal fair behaviors can have in the workplace. As a result, in study 3 (chapter 4) they tended to correct distributive injustices whatever the level of interpersonal fairness experienced by their employees.

Interestingly, this shows that managers were aware of the negative effects of interpersonal injustice (they attempted to correct it), but not of the positive effects of interpersonal justice (they still tried to correct distributive injustice when interpersonal justice was at a high level).

A last managerial implication of study 3 (chapter 4) is the importance of moral identity. One might think that managers who self-identified as highly moral would have been reluctant to take materials or to not obey formal allocation rules. This seems true as long as no injustice is at stake. However, as soon as their subordinates faced an injustice, higher moral self-identifiers were more likely to react in ways that imposed invisible costs on their organization because this could help to correct the injustice. Thus, firms might be wrong in emphasizing morality as a trait of their culture in order to improve compliance. Or, at least, they should not depend on exploiting the morality of their employees if the organization itself is unable to practice just and fair processes. In fact, if future studies show that my results are generalizable, then the more salient the moral issues, the less likely the managers obey rules

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when an injustice is experienced. Thus, giving more importance to morality in a firm should go hand in hand with organizing formal means to correct the systemic injustices that might happen. Another solution, which might however be paradoxical (as discussed above), consists in formally giving more slack to managers so that they can correct organizational injustices informally at their level without having to invisibly disobey to formal rules.

G.D.6. LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH

G.D.6.1. LIMITATIONS

One of the strengths of study 1 is that it involved real experienced managers reacting to a situation they thought was real. In addition, many studies to date have assessed justice effects using cross-sectional data. My experimental design supported a causal argument - that differences in the way managers perceived the fairness of a situation impacted their justice behaviors. However, the conclusions I have drawn should be confirmed by future field studies, using real tasks, and actual managers with their current employees.

Another limit of study 1 concerns the fact that I did not have real victims who communicated their real justice judgments. This question is common in proactive studies in which the focus is on justice behaviors, which leads the subjects play the role of managers or allocators instead of the one of recipients. Just as in the other proactive studies I answered this question by having coders rate the justice behaviors of the subjects.

As far as study 2 is concerned, all the relations found between variables remain tentative because the study involved only 35 managers. This is the usual limit of a qualitative

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exploratory study, which is designed to allow identifying new phenomena and relationships but cannot at the same time promise generalizability.

Chapter 3 consists of a conceptual model. This means that all the proposed relationships between variables remain to be tested in the real world.

Study 3 (chapter 4) had tested some aspects of the conceptual model of invisible remedies. Although this scenario study permitted me to draw conclusions regarding how managers reacted to fairness violations as a function of moral identity, quantitative field research is necessary next step to assess whether there are situational factors that might enhance or reduce managers' reactions, and to ensure the external validity of my findings.

Finally, a general limit when applying the findings of the present studies is that one should be cautious that corrective justice is not used manipulatively in the field. Interactional justice in particular could cloak procedural and/or distributive injustice, thereby mitigating antagonistic reactions from subordinates and, in effect, making them better accept what is unacceptable.

G.D.6.2. COMING FULL CIRCLE

The present dissertation has made me go through a cycle. First, I used the literature on organizational justice, and the several proactive studies that have been conducted so far in particular, to develop a model of the antecedents of managers' interactional (in)justice behaviors. I empirically tested this model using an experimental design. This allowed me to show that even if interactional justice has the power to be an efficient corrective justice strategy it was unlikely to be used by managers.

Then, I delved into the results of this first study by using an explorative qualitative study. I analysed the results of this study using N'Vivo® and this helped me to identify the corrective justice strategy of Robin Hoodism.

This led me back to theory to see to what extent this new phenomenon could be understood by crossing the literature about organizational justice with the one that concerns theft at work. This made me build a theoretical model accounting for this strategy.

Then, I partially tested this model using a quantitative scenario study and found that types of injustices and the moral identity of managers interacted to predict Robin Hoodism.

In sum, theory helped me to build a first model, which I tested using an experimental design. Then, a qualitative design allowed me to have new insights concerning the research question I investigated. I again used theory in complement to my qualitative results to elaborate a second model accounting for the identified phenomenon and finally I tested it partially using an experimental scenario design. Thus, I followed a complete cycle going through all the four steps of literature review, theory building, and qualitative and quantitative inquiries in an order created by my findings.

G.D.6.3. FURTHER STUDIES

Future research should investigate the relationships between the different corrective justice strategies that this work has identified. One intriguing question is for example the extent to which some strategies are used in combination or as alternatives. Managers who are more likely to use invisible remedies might also be less likely to use interpersonal justice. A related point consists in understanding the dynamics of the choice of a corrective justice

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strategy. Do managers first try to solve the problem at its origin and only if they do not succeed appeal to invisible remedies?

My studies always involved managers who either confidentially knew that the situation was unjust (in study 1, chapter 1) or agreed with their subordinates about the injustice of the situation (in studies 2 and 3, respectively in chapters 2 and 4). An interesting question that could help to better understand managers' reactions could consist in studying situations in which managers and subordinates do not agree on the injustice of the situation.

Methodologically, it would be interesting for future studies to use designs in which two kinds of subjects would participate at the same time: allocators and recipients. That would make it possible to link antecedents of allocators' justice behaviors with recipients' justice judgments.

More generally, further research using the proactive perspective of justice is called for on the antecedents of corrective justice behaviors, whether visible or invisible. This body of research can provide valuable insights into how to produce fairer workplaces. Further, this research can help to bridge the domains of organizational justice and behavioral ethics. Whereas these two disciplines indeed have much in common, in particular because they often focus on similar behaviors and describe them with a concern for moral standards, the reactive focus of most organizational justice research to date has limited the potential rich connections between the two fields. Understanding the antecedents of corrective justice behaviors could be an important step toward better understanding ethical behavior at work for justice researchers and the importance of organizational justice for ethical researchers.

Finally, reactive studies are common in justice research. However, no studies to date have investigated how employees react to managers' use of corrective justice strategies other than interactional justice behaviors. To what extent is the Robin Hood effect negative towards the firm and positive toward the manager? Is the favorable impact of Robin Hoodism on the

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relationship between the manager and the subordinate only a short-term effect? Does the strategy of “fixing the problem at its roots” produce more favorable effects in the long run? Future research would need to study these questions. The cycle from reactive to proactive research would then go again toward its reactive end.

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APPENDIX B: CONFERENCES PRESENTATIONS AND PUBLICATIONS OF THE WORKS PRESENTED IN THIS DISSERTATION

APPENDIX B.1.: GENERAL INTRODUCTION

- 1) The review of organizational justice research made in the general introduction was the basis of a new conceptualization of the justice motives that was presented at a French-speaking international conference and published as a Working Paper by HEC.
 - Nadisic, T. (2006, November). *Pourquoi les salariés accordent-ils de l'importance à la justice organisationnelle ? 17^{ème} congrès annuel de l'Association francophone de Gestion des Ressources Humaines*, Reims, France.
 - Nadisic, T. (2006), Thierry Nadisic. The motives of organizational justice. *Cahier de recherche HEC CR835/2006*.
- 2) This work has been improved and presented at an international organizational justice conference. It is going to be submitted in order to be published as a chapter in a book specialized in organizational justice.
 - Nadisic, T. (2008, June). *Motives and meta-motives of organizational justice*. Presented at the **5th International Round Table on Innovations in Organizational Justice: Beyond Doing the Things Right, Doing the Right Things**, Lisbon, Portugal.
 - Nadisic, T. (to be submitted). *The integrative model of justice: Are the justice motives hierarchically integrated?* In S. W. Gilliland, D. D. Steiner, & D. P. Skarlicki (Eds.), *Innovations in Organizational Justice: Beyond Doing the Things Right, Doing the Right Things*. Greenwich: IAP.

APPENDIX B.2.: CHAPTER 1

- 1) The conceptual model of study 1 was presented in a Ph. D. workshop at the University of Arizona, and, after having been improved it was presented at an international conference specialized in social justice.
 - Nadisic, T. (2006, May). *Antecedents of managers' interactional justice behaviors: literature review and theoretical propositions*. Presented at the 9th **Summit del Sol**, Tucson, Arizona; USA.
 - Nadisic, T. (2006, August). *Antecedents of managers' interactional justice behaviors: a conceptual model*. Presented at the 11th **International Social Justice Conference**, Berlin, Germany.
- 2) The experiment operationalizing the conceptual model was designed and its preliminary results analyzed under the guidance of David Patient, Assistant Professor at the Universidade Catolica Portuguesa, Portugal and with the assistance of Angelo Fanelli, Assistant Professor at HEC Paris. These preliminary results were presented in an international OB workshop and at a French-speaking international management conference.

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- Nadisic, T, Fanelli, A. & Patient, D. (2007, May). *An experiment about the antecedents of managers' interactional justice behaviors: Preliminary results*. Presented at the **3rd International Workshop on Organizational Behavior, HRM and Corporate Social Responsibility**, Toulouse, France.
 - Nadisic, T, Fanelli, A. & Patient, D. (2007, June). *Les antécédents des comportements de justice interactionnelle des managers*. Presented at the **16^{ème} conférence de l'Association Internationale de Management Stratégique**, Montréal, Canada.
- 3) The final results of the experiment were analyzed under the guidance of David Patient, Assistant Professor at the Universidade Catolica Portuguesa, Portugal and presented at an international management conference.
- Nadisic, T. (2008). *Situational and interpersonal antecedents of the Churchill effect*. Presented at the **European Academy of Management**, Ljubljana, Slovenia.
- 4) The conceptual model was published in a French management journal.
- Nadisic, T. (2008). Pourquoi les managers ajoutent-ils de l'injustice à l'injustice ? Les antécédents de l'effet Churchill. *Revue Française de Gestion*, 183 :221-250. (Ranking: 4 CNRS, γ HEC, 2 ESSEC).
- 5) The empirical paper will be submitted to an international management journal.
- Nadisic, T, Patient, D. & Fanelli, A. (to be sent for review). Unfair managerial interactional behaviors. *Journal of Management*. (Ranking: 2 CNRS, β HEC, 1 ESSEC).

APPENDIX B.3.: CHAPTER 2

- 1) I presented the design and preliminary findings of the exploratory study presented in the second chapter in the Ph. D. program of the University of Graz as an invited speaker. After I redesigned and conducted the study, I wrote a paper presenting the preliminary results in English with the assistance of Marion Fortin, Assistant Professor at Durham University, UK, and under the guidance of Daniel Skarlicki, Professor, Edgar Kaiser Chair of Organizational Behavior at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada. These results were presented at an international management conference.
- Nadisic, T. (2005, November). *Invisible justice*. Presented at the Ph. D. Program of the Institut für Psychologie, Sozialpsychologie, Karl-Franzens-Universität, Graz, Austria.
 - Nadisic, T., Skarlicki, D. & Fortin, M. (2007, August). *Corrective and Invisible Justice: An exploratory study*. **Academy of Management meetings**, Philadelphia, USA.
- 2) An empirical paper adding to the results used in chapter 2 additional results involving the subordinates' point of view and comparing managers' and subordinates' point of view will be finished with Marion Fortin, Assistant Professor at Durham University, UK, under the guidance of Daniel Skarlicki, Professor, Edgar Kaiser Chair of Organizational Behavior at the University of British Columbia, and will be submitted to an international journal of human resource management.
- Nadisic, T., Skarlicki, D. & Fortin, M. (to be finished). Corrective and Invisible Justice: Do managers and subordinates live in two different worlds? *Human Resource Management*. (Ranking: 2 CNRS, α HEC, 2 ESSEC).

APPENDIX B.4.: CHAPTER 3

- 1) The conceptual model presented in chapter 3 was presented in a Ph. D. workshop. A revised version was presented at a French-speaking international management conference. A final version was presented at an international organizational justice conference.
 - Nadisic, T. (2005, April). *Invisible justice*. Presented at the 6th HEC-INSEAD Forum, Fontainebleau, France
 - Nadisic, T. (2005, September). *La justice organisationnelle invisible et le management de l'injustice par l'encadrement intermédiaire*. 16^{ème} congrès annuel de l'Association francophone de Gestion des Ressources Humaines, Paris, France.
 - Nadisic, T. (2006, November). *Invisible Organizational Justice: A conceptual model*. Presented at the 4th International Round Table on Innovations in Organizational Justice: Justice, Ethics, and Social Responsibility, Tucson, Arizona, USA.
- 2) The conceptual model was then published as a chapter in a book specialized in organizational justice.
 - Nadisic, T. (2008). *The invisible hand of managers and the Robin Hood Effect: Antecedents and Consequences of Managers Using Invisible Remedies to Correct Workplace Injustice*. In S. W. Gilliland, D. D. Steiner, & D. P. Skarlicki (Eds.), *Innovations in Organizational Justice: Justice, Ethics and Responsibility*. Greenwich: IAP.

APPENDIX B.5.: CHAPTER 4

- 1) The scenario study operationalizing the conceptual model was designed with the assistance of Marion Fortin, Assistant Professor at Durham University, UK, and under the guidance of Daniel Skarlicki, Professor, Edgar Kaiser Chair of Organizational Behavior at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada. I presented it at the University of British Columbia as an invited speaker and in an international management conference.
 - Nadisic, T. (2008, May). *Robin Hoodism and moral identity*. Presented in the UBC Speaker series of the Sauder School of Business of the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada.
 - Nadisic, T, Skarlicki, D. & Fortin, M. (2008, July). *The moral hand of managers: situational and individual antecedents of managers' use of invisible corrective justice strategies*. Presented at the European Group for Organisational Studies, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
- 2) The scenario study was integrated as a fourth study in a four studies paper focused on the link between moral identity and reactions to injustice and is currently under review in an international journal specialized in organizational behavior.
 - Aquino, K., Skarlicki, D., Freeman, D., Nadisic, T. & Fortin M. (under review). *The Lives of Others: How Moral Identity Influences Third-Parties' Emotional, Cognitive, and Behavioral Reactions to Injustice*. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*. (Ranking: 2 CNRS, α HEC, 1 ESSEC).

APPENDIX B.6.: GENERAL DISCUSSION AND SYNTHESIS IN FRENCH

- 1) I presented a paper based on the general discussion and on the French document synthesizing the present dissertation as an invited speaker at the Paris 12 University. This paper will be submitted to a French journal in human resource management.
 - Nadisic (2008, June). *How and why do managers correct injustice at work ?* Presented at IAE Gustave Eiffel, Université Paris 12 Créteil.
 - Nadisic, T, (to be submitted). *L'effet Robin des Bois: Une stratégie managériale de correction des injustices au travail. Revue de Gestion des Ressources Humaines.* (Ranking: 3 CNRS, 1 ESSEC).

APPENDIX B.7.: SYNTHESIS

The different works included in the present dissertation have been:

- a. Presented at 2 Ph. D. workshops,
- b. Presented at 3 Universities as an invited speaker,
- c. Presented at 10 international conferences,
- d. Published as 1 Working Paper (as single author),
- e. Published as 1 bookchapter (as single author),
- f. Published in 1 journal (as single author), (Ranking: 4 CNRS, γ HEC, 2 ESSEC),
- g. Under review in 1 journal (as fourth author), (Ranking: 2 CNRS, α HEC, 1 ESSEC),
- h. To be submitted to 1 journal (as single author), (Ranking: 3 CNRS, 1 ESSEC),
- i. To be submitted to 1 journal (as first author), (Ranking: 2 CNRS, β HEC, 1 ESSEC),
- j. To be submitted as a bookchapter (as single author),
- k. To be finished and sent to 1 journal (as first author), (Ranking: 2 CNRS, α HEC, 2 ESSEC).

APPENDIX C: MATERIALS USED FOR THE EXPERIMENT

APPENDIX C.1.: SCALES USED BEFORE THE EXPERIMENT

C.1.1. Scale for empathy (empathic concern)

The following questions ask how you feel when you see another person in a difficult situation.

| | Strongly disagree | | | Strongly agree | |
|--|--------------------------|---|---|-----------------------|---|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 1 When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 2 When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for them. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 3 I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 4 I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 5 Sometimes I feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 6 Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 7 I am often quite touched by things I see happen. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

Notice that items 2 and 6 are reverse-scored.

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C.1.2. Scale for assertiveness (initiating assertiveness and positive assertion)

In a social situation, many people find it difficult to react in the way they really want to. For instance, they may find it hard to refuse a request, to ask for help, or to show approval or disapproval.

Below you will find a list of some such situations, all of which involve social interactions.

We should like you to work through all the questions. On each occasion, we should like you to record the first response that comes to mind. Please do not skip any questions, and complete the questionnaire as quickly as you can.

We would like you to indicate in the columns **preceding** each of the situations (items) how nervous or tense you would feel if you behaved in the way described. It is possible to answer in any one of the following ways:

| | | | | |
|-------------------|-----------------|---------------|-------------|------------------|
| <i>1</i> | <i>2</i> | <i>3</i> | <i>4</i> | <i>5</i> |
| <i>not at all</i> | <i>somewhat</i> | <i>rather</i> | <i>very</i> | <i>extremely</i> |

For instance, if you feel *rather* tense when you start a conversation with a stranger, indicate this by putting a mark in the *third* column in the following way:

| | | | | |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| <i>1</i> | <i>2</i> | <i>3</i> | <i>4</i> | <i>5</i> |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |

1. Starting a conversation with a stranger.

QUESTIONNAIRE

| <i>not at all</i> | <i>somewhat</i> | <i>rather</i> | <i>very</i> | <i>extremely</i> | | |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|-----|--|
| <i>1</i> | <i>2</i> | <i>3</i> | <i>4</i> | <i>5</i> | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | 1. | Starting a conversation with a stranger. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | 2. | Telling a group of people about something you have experienced. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | 3. | Offering an opinion that differs from that of the person you are talking to. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | 4. | Acknowledging a compliment about your personal appearance. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | 5. | Telling someone that you like him/her. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | 6. | Telling someone that you are fond of him/her. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | 7. | Acknowledging a compliment on something you have done. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | 8. | Starting a conversation with a man/woman you find attractive. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | 9. | Saying that you enjoy the experience of being told that you are liked. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | 10. | Putting forward your opinion during a conversation with strangers. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | 11. | Joining in the conversation of a group of people. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | 12. | Maintaining your own opinion against a person who has a very pronounced opinion. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | 13. | Saying that you enjoy people telling you that they are very fond of you. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | 14. | Giving your opinion to a person in authority. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | 15. | Telling someone that you are very pleased with something you have done. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | 16. | Explaining your philosophy of life. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | 17. | Going up to someone in order to make their acquaintance. |

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C.1.3. Scale for identification with the organization

QUESTIONNAIRE

The following questions ask about your opinions regarding HEC.

Rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements.

| | Strongly Disagree | | | | | | Strongly Agree |
|---|------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|---------------------------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| I talk about HEC as a good university to be in. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| The values of HEC are similar to mine. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| I am proud to tell people I am a member of HEC. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| I would recommend HEC to a friend. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| When someone praises HEC I feel proud. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Being a student in HEC is a large part of who I am. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

APPENDIX C.2.: TABLE OF THE CASES FOR THE EXPERIMENT

Three cases were submitted to 118 MBA students. Case A was given to 1/3 of the students, Case B to 1/3 and Case C to 1/3.

So that they did not see that all of them have received the same cases, two different files were given to them. 1/2 had to work on file 1 and 1/2 on file 2.

| | Case A : <i>Just</i> | Case B: <i>Unjust by mistake</i> | Case C: <i>Unjust on purpose</i> |
|--------------------------|--|--|--|
| File 1 Offer AEA23 | Case 1: Offer AEA23 - Alexandre Masala (115) is chosen - Marthe Boisvert (119) is not chosen | Case 2: Offer AEA23 - Alexandre Masala (115) is not chosen - Marthe Boisvert (119) is chosen | Case 3: Offer AEA23 - Alexandre Masala (115) is not chosen - Marthe Boisvert (119) is chosen |
| Ass numbers: | 1 to 20 and 201,00 213,00 219,00 225,00 231,00 307,00 | 21 to 40 and 205,00 211,00 217,00 229,00 232,00 | 41 to 60 and 203,00 209,00 221,00 227,00 |
| Color: | Pink | Yellow | Red |
| File 2 Offer PPU11 | Case 4: Offer PPU11 - Claire Coueffe (377) is chosen - Yannick Ternal (221) is not chosen | Case 5: Offer PPU11 - Claire Coueffe (377) is not chosen - Yannick Ternal (221) is chosen | Case 6: Offer PPU11 - Claire Coueffe (377) is not chosen - Yannick Ternal (221) is chosen |
| Ass numbers: | 61 to 80 and 204,00 216,00 228,00 311,00 | 81 to 100 and 202,00 208,00 220,00 226,00 302,00 308,00 | 101 to 120 and 121,00 206,00 212,00 218,00 224,00 233,00 306,00 |
| Color: | Green | Blue | Orange |

APPENDIX C.3.: FILES GIVEN TO THE CANDIDATES AT FOR THE EXPERIMENT

C.3.1. Confidentiality agreement

CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT For Managerial Communication Study

In order to participate in this study, you will be shown confidential information that will allow you to complete your task: writing two letters to applicants for internship positions. The confidential information includes: requirements of specific internship positions, personal details regarding applicants for internship positions, and, in some cases, details regarding administrative and other internal processes at HEC Paris.

It is essential that details regarding the above remain confidential. HEC Paris takes the privacy of our students and employees very seriously. The trust that our students and employees place in us would be seriously violated if you were to share, with anyone, any personal information regarding other students, or information regarding HEC employees or internal processes.

Of course, we also guarantee the confidentiality of your own responses. The results of the study will only be seen and analysed by the principal investigator, Dr. Angelo Fanelli, Dr. David Patient, and as part of the doctoral dissertation research of Thierry Nadisic.

Thank you for helping to maintain these high standards of confidentiality. Please complete the form below **BEFORE OPENING** the folder with the materials.

I, _____, **AGREE THAT**

I WILL KEEP CONFIDENTIAL ANY PERSONAL INFORMATION REGARDING STUDENT APPLICANTS FOR INTERNSHIP POSITIONS WHICH COMES TO ME AS A RESULT OF PARTICIPATING IN THIS RESEARCH.

I WILL NOT DISCUSS WITH ANYONE THE NAMES, PERSONAL DETAILS, OR ANY OTHER ATTRIBUTES OF CANDIDATES APPLYING FOR INTERNSHIP POSITIONS AT HEC, NOR WILL I, IN ANY WAY, DIVULGE DETAILS OF INTERNAL PROCEDURES REGARDING THE INTERNSHIP PROGRAM, OR ANY OTHER PROGRAM, AT HEC.

Name (printed)

Signature

Date

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C.3.2. Letter from the Professor teaching the OB class

Paris, June 7

Subject: Your participation in managerial communication study.

Dear Ting-Yu HUANG,

As your professor of Organizational Behavior, I'm asking you to participate in a study on managerial communication and leadership styles. Your participation in this exercise is completely voluntary and is equivalent to 4% extra credit towards the final grade. You are also free to withdraw from participating in this exercise at any time. Your participation in the study is appreciated as it brings several benefits:

- It helps us generate scientific results to use in class in order to illustrate the topics of management styles and management communication;
- We'll be able to give you individual and confidential feedback about your managerial and communication style;
- It is part of a real task contributing to HEC's **Master Internship Program**;
- Finally, this study will also provide important research insights into managerial communication.

This project is conducted by Thierry Nadisic, Professor in Management at *Paris 13 University* and PhD student at *HEC*, together with the collaboration of Angelo Fanelli, Professor at *HEC*, and Professor David Patient from the *Faculdade de Ciências Económicas e Empresariais, Universidade Católica Portuguesa, Lisbon, Portugal*. Professors Nadisic and Fanelli will be both present at the debriefing session we'll have on June 26th.

Please notice that all the results will be completely anonymous and your name will never be quoted in any document.

In order for the results of this study to be meaningful, it is important for participants to engage in a real task and to take it seriously. In your case, this will involve writing two letters, which can convey either good news or bad news. It is very important that you write the letters by hand and as naturally and spontaneously as possible.

Your task will consist of acting as a temporary assistant recruiter for a **new Master Internship Program** (see the enclosed letter by Hervé Crès) launched by *HEC* in 2006. You will be asked to write two letters to two students who have applied for internships, and to tell them if their application was successful or not. It is possible that a few of you will work on the same files, in which case only one of the letters written will be selected to be sent. By participating in this experiment, you accept that your letter may be sent to the receiver applicant (of course, your name will not be quoted). More information will be given to you in a letter from Valérie Leroy, the manager of the program, and in a letter from Prof. Thierry Nadisic.

Thank you for your participation in this study.

Kathryn Clutz
MBA HEC
kathryn_clutz@yahoo.fr

C.3.3. Letter from the responsible of the Master Internship Program

Paris, June, Friday 8th

Subject: Details regarding your recruitment assistant job

Dear HEC MBA Student,

First, I would like to warmly thank you for participating today in the role of a temporary recruitment assistant at HEC. A recruitment assistant plays an important role. We have now one part-time recruitment assistant who manages all the operations relating to training, securing internships for Master students from HEC and from 3 other partner schools and universities, the relations with firms, and the relations with the candidates. Unfortunately, we do not have sufficient manpower to send personalized letters to all the candidates. Thus, we used to send form letters to them. However, we would prefer to send more personalized letters, especially to rejected candidates that are not successful in getting internships and who are already likely to be disappointed. So your Professor, **Kathryn Clutz** and one Professor of one of our partner universities, Thierry Nadisic, from Paris 13 University, suggested that we contact you to see if you can help us prepare personalized letters for the candidates, and that this work might also be useful in the course that you're currently taking.

Here is some more detailed information about our operations. HEC and the other partner universities and business schools receive details from organizations regarding available internships for Master students. We have built a student résumé database in partnership with these other business schools, engineer schools and universities (which are for the moment: ESSEC, Ecole Centrale, and CELSA-Paris 4 University). All the students who are in the database have gone through a selection interview to evaluate the seriousness of their candidacy and, often, the elements in their curriculum have been checked. Each university or school belonging to the partnership electronically posts the internship announcements received from firms. Students who are in the database can then see the available internships on line and apply to them by e-mailing or by sending us a motivation letter (we already have their résumé in the data base).

For each available internship, there are generally several student applications. After analysing the candidacy letters, the résumé, and the interviews we previously had with the students, we choose the most qualified candidate for each internship, and contact all of the applicants (successful and unsuccessful) in writing. This process ensures that the internship generally goes very well, though if a student is having major difficulties in an internship, another student can be found to replace him or her.

This is where you come into action. We are going to provide you with files of two candidates: one who was accepted and one who was rejected for an internship. As a recruitment assistant, you have to write to the candidates a letter to inform them that they have been chosen or that they have not been chosen for the job they applied for.

I would like to ask you to try to adapt the letters you write to each particular situation. First, finding an internship is very important for students. Second, it is really crucial for the firms to recruit students suitable for the job. For HEC, it is critical that we have a high quality process to ensure that both students and firms continue using our services. Thank you in advance for the professionalism you are going to show as a recruitment assistant.

Valérie Leroy
HEC, Responsible for the *Master Internship Program*

C.3.4. Letter from the Director of the business school

Paris, October 10, 2006

Letter to the Professors of HEC

Subject : Creation of the “Master internship program” at HEC

Dear faculty Member,

I have the pleasure to announce the creation of an important new project in HEC: the “Master internship program”. Our general aim consists in contacting firms to inform them about our different specializations in business administration and management and also to tell them how they can hire HEC students for internships. At least for the first two years, the program is implemented only for the “Grande Ecole”.

The first project that we are going to implement in the second semester of 2006 consists in the creation of a database to link high quality Master students with internship positions at firms. This project is implemented in collaboration with Ecole Centrale, ESSEC and CELSA-Paris IV University. The students of these schools and universities are eligible to participate in the project.

We commit to:

- 1- Provide firms with candidates for internships, which are of the highest quality and whose qualifications are well suited to the internship offered
- 2- Implement procedures to recruit students, check the quality of students, and ensure the suitability of students for particular internship positions (through interviewing applicants and verifying the information that is in their résumés)
- 3- To use our recruitment procedures equally on behalf of all candidates, regardless of their business school or university
- 4- To offer to students from the participating schools internships that are well suited to their qualifications and interests

We hope that in this way HEC will become even a closer partner of the firms, and be seen as answering an important need. Thank you for informing both your students and firms you are in contact of our high quality internship program.

Hervé Crès
Directeur délégué
HEC

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C.3.5. Letter describing the task

C.3.5.1. Case 1.A.

Thierry Nadisic

To the recruitment assistant Ass 201

Jouy en Josas, June 14

Note to Rodrigue CHASTENET-DE-GERY

You will write letters to two candidates, one who was successful and one who was unsuccessful in obtaining an internship. You will have at your disposal a job description with the tasks that are asked for in this internship and the required qualifications.

The candidate Alexandre Masala reference 115 has been chosen as being the most suitable for offer AEA23 by the HEC recruitment assistant for the *Master Internship Program*.

Marthe Boisvert reference 119 who was the only other candidate who has applied for the same offer was not chosen.

Please write to the candidate Alexandre Masala reference 115 a personalized acceptance letter and to Marthe Boisvert reference 119 a personalized rejection letter. You will find the cover letters and résumés for both candidates in the enclosed file.

Please sign your letter as follows: *For Mathilda August, recruitment assistant number* Ass 201

After you have written your two letters, please put each of them in an envelope and write on the top of each envelope the number of the offer, the number of the candidate and your assistant number.

Then, when you have finished this, please complete the 3 short questionnaires that you will find at the bottom of this file.

Thanks for your participation.

Thierry Nadisic
Paris 13 University, HEC PhD Program

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C.3.5.2. Case 1.B.

Thierry Nadisic

To the recruitment assistant

Ass 211

Jouy en Josas, June 14

Note to

Julien HAYE

You will write letters to two candidates, one who was successful and one who was unsuccessful in obtaining an internship. You will have at your disposal a job description with the tasks that are asked for in this internship and the required qualifications. You will also find the cover letters and résumés for both candidates in the enclosed file.

The candidate Alexandre Masala (reference 115) was first chosen as being the most suitable candidate for Offer AEA23.

Unfortunately, a mistake was made by an employee at HEC who accidentally sent the wrong file (the one from Marthe Boisvert (reference 119)) to the recruiting firm. Unfortunately, because of HEC's mistake, the firm has already contacted the candidate, met her, and decided to hire her.

It would be very difficult to change the situation now. So please write a personalized acceptance letter to Marthe Boisvert (reference 119) and a personalized rejection letter to Alexandre Masala (reference 115).

*Valérie Leroy
Responsible for the Master Internship Program
HEC*

Please sign your letter as follows: *For Mathilda August, recruitment assistant number*

Ass 211

After you have written your two letters, please put each of them in an envelope and write on the top of each envelope the number of the offer, the number of the candidate and your assistant number.

Then, when you have finished this, please complete the 3 short questionnaires that you will find at the bottom of this file.

Thanks for your participation.

Thierry Nadisic
Paris 13 University,
HEC PhD Program

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C.3.5.3. Case 1.C.

Thierry Nadisic

To the recruitment assistant Ass 203

Jouy en Josas, June 14

Note to **Rahul CHOPRA**

You will write letters to two candidates, one who was successful and one who was unsuccessful in obtaining an internship. You will have at your disposal a job description with the tasks that are asked for in this internship and the required qualifications. You will also find the cover letters and résumés for both candidates in the enclosed file.

The candidate Marthe Boisvert (reference 119) was chosen for the Offer AEA23 by our HEC recruitment manager for the Master Internship Program. She knows the candidate personally and believes that Marthe is the best person for the job, regardless of who else applies.

Alexandre Masala (reference 115) who also applied for the same internship was not chosen. It would be difficult for HEC to change it now.

So please write a personalized acceptance letter to Marthe Boisvert (reference 119) and a personalized rejection letter to Alexandre Masala (reference 115).

*Valérie Leroy
Responsible for the Master Internship Program
HEC*

Please sign your letter as follows: *For Mathilda August, recruitment assistant number* Ass 203

After you have written your two letters, please put each of them in an envelope and write on the top of each envelope the number of the offer, the number of the candidate and your assistant number.

Then, when you have finished this, please complete the 3 short questionnaires that you will find at the bottom of this file.

Thanks for your participation.

Thierry Nadisic
Paris 13 University
HEC PhD Program

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C.3.5.4. Case 2.A.

Thierry Nadisic

To the recruitment assistant Ass 210

Jouy en Josas, June 14

Note to Boyan GRIFFEN

You will write letters to two candidates, one who was successful and one who was unsuccessful in obtaining an internship. You will have at your disposal a job description with the tasks that are asked for in this internship and the required qualifications.

The candidate *Claire Coueffe* *reference 377* has been chosen as being the most suitable for offer *PPU11* by the HEC recruitment assistant for the *Master Internship Program*.

Yannick Ternal *reference 221* who was the only other candidate who has applied for the same offer was not chosen.

Please write to the candidate *Claire Coueffe* *reference 377* a personalized acceptance letter and to *Yannick Ternal* *reference 221* a personalized rejection letter. You will find the cover letters and résumés for both candidates in the enclosed file.

Please sign your letter as follows: *For Mathilda August, recruitment assistant number* Ass 210

After you have written your two letters, please put each of them in an envelope and write on the top of each envelope the number of the offer, the number of the candidate and your assistant number.

Then, when you have finished this, please complete the 3 short questionnaires that you will find at the bottom of this file.

Thanks for your participation.

Thierry Nadisic
Paris 13 University
HEC PhD Program

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C.3.5.5. Case 2.B.

Thierry Nadisic

To the recruitment assistant Ass 214

Jouy en Josas, June 14

Note to Yuqing JIE

You will write letters to two candidates, one who was successful and one who was unsuccessful in obtaining an internship. You will have at your disposal a job description with the tasks that are asked for in this internship and the required qualifications. You will also find the cover letters and résumés for both candidates in the enclosed file.

The candidate Claire Coueffe (reference 377) was first chosen as being the most suitable candidate for Offer PPU11.

Unfortunately, a mistake was made by an employee at HEC who accidentally sent the wrong file (the one from Yannick Ternal (reference 221)) to the recruiting firm. Unfortunately, because of HEC's mistake, the firm has already contacted the candidate, met her, and decided to hire her.

It would be very difficult to change the situation now. So please write a personalized acceptance letter to Yannick Ternal (reference 221) and a personalized rejection letter to Claire Coueffe (reference 377).

*Valérie Leroy
Responsible for the Master Internship Program
HEC*

Please sign your letter as follows: *For Mathilda August, recruitment assistant number* Ass 214

After you have written your two letters, please put each of them in an envelope and write on the top of each envelope the number of the offer, the number of the candidate and your assistant number.

Then, when you have finished this, please complete the 3 short questionnaires that you will find at the bottom of this file.

Thanks for your participation.

Thierry Nadisic
Paris 13 University
HEC PhD Program

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C.3.5.6. Case 2.C.

Thierry Nadisic

To the recruitment assistant Ass 206

Jouy en Josas, June 14

Note to Vincent FABRE

You will write letters to two candidates, one who was successful and one who was unsuccessful in obtaining an internship. You will have at your disposal a job description with the tasks that are asked for in this internship and the required qualifications. You will also find the cover letters and résumés for both candidates in the enclosed file.

The candidate Yannick Ternal (reference 221) was chosen for the Offer PPU11 by our HEC recruitment manager for the Master Internship Program. She knows the candidate personally and believes that Yannick is the best person for the job, regardless of who else applies.

Claire Coueffe (reference 377) who also applied for the same internship was not chosen. It would be difficult for HEC to change it now.

So please write a personalized acceptance letter to Yannick Ternal (reference 221) and a personalized rejection letter to Claire Coueffe (reference 377).

Valérie Leroy
Responsible for the Master Internship Program
HEC

Please sign your letter as follows: *For Mathilda August, recruitment assistant number* Ass 206

After you have written your two letters, please put each of them in an envelope and write on the top of each envelope the number of the offer, the number of the candidate and your assistant number.

Then, when you have finished this, please complete the 3 short questionnaires that you will find at the bottom of this file.

Thanks for your participation.

Thierry Nadisic
Paris 13 University
HEC PhD Program

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C.3.6. Scenarios

C.3.6.1. Scenario 1

A perfect internship for travel freaks (Bangalore, India)

Offer AEA23

Location: India | Bangalore

We at Hitiki are travel freaks. Hitiki means community in a Polynesian language. The aim of Hitiki is to create an online multilingual travel guide, using some new and advanced Internet technologies. Hitiki is preparing for market launch in September 2007. As an open travel project the venture has only a partly commercial background.

In India Hitiki is supported by the major Indian portal Greynium.com, an Internet and IT company with about 120 employees.

To support our team we are looking for web savvy trainees to:

- develop travel related content, especially writing of informative and entertaining articles
- support Hitiki users and understand their needs,
- look at what our competitors are doing, i.e., market research
- implement marketing strategies

In addition to a dedicated and independent workflow we expect:

- passion for the Net and ideally some online project experience (e.g. your own blog),
- excellent skills in English and preferably one more European language.
- enthusiasm for writing and travel, preferably experience in tourism
- creativity, dedication to the project.

At Hitiki you will have the opportunity to:

- get to know how an Internet company works,
- work independently,
- obtain experience in an open minded international team (see <http://blog.hitiki.com>), and
- live in Bangalore, the “funkiest town and Silicon Valley of India”

Company name: Hitiki
Branch: Internet, online travel guide
Location: Bangalore, 4th Floor, Shanthishree Complex, # 17/1, Rupena Agrahara, Hosur Road, Bangalore – 560 068, India
Start: ASAP - Duration: min. 6 months - Salary: depends on qualifications

***Please send your application to:
HEC Grande Ecole – Master Internship Program***

August@hec.fr

Mathilda

De : "Marthe Boisvert" <marthebv@orange.fr>
À : "Mathilda August" <august@hec.fr>
Envoyé : lundi 28 mai 2007 23:12
Objet : Dear Sir, dear madam

Paris, May 28

*Application letter
Reference of the offer: AEA23*

Dear Sir, dear madam,

I've the pleasure to apply for the offer you published on the Internet concerning a position in Hitiki.

Indeed, I have the experience of working in an international environment and I really like it. I've worked in Geneve. Plus, I'm able to make a website using Flash. Thus, I could help the firm to develop its website. Besides, I'm passionate about the arts, which I think makes me quite creative when I'm in a situation which needs me to act accordingly. Finally, I'm specialized in communication and Marketing, and would have pleasure to use these skills for Hitiki.

Hoping that you will have a close look at my candidacy,

Warm regards

*Marthe Boisvert
Résumé reference 119
16 bis, rue des Rossays
91600 Savigny sur Orge
France
Phone: 06 18 58 04 66
E-mail: Marthebv@orange.fr; boivertm@hec.fr*

Reference : 119

Marthe Boivert

Student in HEC (3 years completed in a French University)

16 bis, rue des Rossays
91600 Savigny sur
Orge
France

Phone: 06 18 58 04 66
E-mail :
Marthebv@orange.fr

I'm currently looking for an internship job in the following domain :

Sales/Marketing
Advertising/Public Relations

Objectives :

I completed my degree in Information/communication studies. Currently in a Master of Marketing program, and I would like to use my skills for a position such as Marketing Assistant

Education

- Since September 2006 **HEC Grande Ecole**
direct admission in the 2nd year of the program (equivalent of the first year of a 2 years Master)
Specialization : Marketing
- September 2002
June 2006 **University of Savoie**
Bachelor of Science in economics and management and Deug in information-communication.
Specialization : Information-communication
- September 2000
June 2003 **College of Glieres**
Obtained the Baccalaureat Litteraire with major in Visual arts.
Specialization : Literature and Art

September 1997 **College Michel Servet**
June 2000 Graduated from the College.

Experience

February 2005 **GRAPHELF**
April 2005
Title : Graphics Designer
Task : Assistant Graphics Designer, responsible for projects (calling cards, posters, booklets) and design of Web sites. Participation in the publication of the magazine "Akkro" of Mars
Results : Improvement of graphics knowledge and HTML language.

January 2004 **Tribune de Genève**
April 2004
Title : Marketing Assistant
Task : Marketing Assistant, public relations, flyers, participation in the Motor-show of Geneva.
Results : Understanding of international marketing and of event organizing and marketing.

IT knowledge

Software :

Flash MX, Photoshop 7, QuarkExpress, Illustrator, Dreamweaver, Adobe First Pro.

More information :

Created Web site using flash.

Languages

English

Spoken Advanced

Written Intermediate

French

Spoken Native speaker

Written Native speaker

Spanish

Spoken School level

Written School level

Hobbies

Art and Music

I am passionate about the arts, including ballet (danced for 14 years) and hip hop (4 years).

I enjoy painting, the drawing and graphics.
Good knowledge of the arts.

Mathilda

De : "Alexandre Masala" <masala.alex@free.fr>
À : "Mathilda August" <august@hec.fr>
Envoyé : mardi 29 mai 2007 21:21
Objet : Reference of the offer: AEA23

Offer reference: AEA23

Dear Ms. August,

I am contacting you in response to the job posting for an internship in Hitiki, listed with the "Master internship program" postings.

After I graduate, I plan to live abroad. East-Asia and India, in particular, are places where I've already gone as a tourist, and would be happy to work for the first years of my career. I have international work experience in the USA, where I used to be a salesman in a National Park, in Great Britain, where I worked as an international sales assistant, in Spain, where I was in charge of marketing research in an organization and I've lived in Mexico.

These experiences also allowed me to develop relevant competencies in the management of online projects. For example, in London I was in charge of updating parts of the company Intranet. Further, I learned the ropes of the tourism business while working for a travel agency in Spain. I used both experiences to improve my skills in marketing and sales.

I have a strong sense of personal initiative. I've been President of a student association, and I wanted to specialize in project management. I would also say that I give importance to interpersonal communication, that I have a dynamic approach to working on creative projects, and that I work well in a team environment.

I look forward to the opportunity to show you how my skills and experience make me a suitable candidate for this internship.

Yours faithfully

Alexandre Masala

Reference: 115

Alexandre Masala

University (5 years completed)

119 bd Jean Jaurès

92110 Clichy

Phone: 06 16 07 79 53

E-mail : masala.alex@free.fr

I'm currently looking for a Full Time internship in the following domain :

Tourism

Sales/Marketing

Project Management

Objectives :

Young graduate seeking an internship which will allow me to put into practice the knowledge and the experience gained during various training courses, vocational training, and work experience.

Education

- September 2003 **ESSEC**
December 2006 Grande Ecole - Business School
Specialization : Project Management & Multimedia
One year studying in ESADE Business School (Barcelona, Spain)
- September 2000 **Lycée du Parc de Vilgénis**
July 2003 One year in Preparatory Class and 2 year in BTS Accounting and Management.
Diploma of High-level technician
Specialization : Accountancy and Management
- September 1998 **Ecole des Pupilles de l'Air**
July 2000 Military College of the French Air Force.
Diploma: Bac Tertiary Sciences and Technologies, with majors in Accountanting and Management (First Class Honours)
Specialization : Bac STT option Accounting and Management
- September 1994 **Lycée Franco-Mexicain**
July 1996 Franco-Mexican college of Mexico City

Experience

- March 2006 **Internode**
August 2006
Title : International Sales Assistant in London (Great-Britain)
Task : Management of commercial B2B proposals (Web Portals, wap, sms, mms...).
In charge of technology survey and updates to parts of the company Intranet.
Prepare and deliver sales presentations.
- April 2005 **Havas Voyages**
August 2006
Title : Marketing research in tourism area in Barcelona (Spain)
Task : In charge of customers surveys and research on competitors.
Presentation of the results to the board of directors.
- June 2004 **ESPEC**
June 2005
Title : President
Task : Organization of conferences and events concerning stock exchange, financial markets, and economics, in partnership with the bank "Société Générale," for the students of the campus.
Creation of the Web site of the association.
Resources : Help from other members of the association and the support of the ESSEC business School and of other associations of the school.
Results : Implementation of a one-month-long stock market investment game based and leading our missions to the SIFE contest, which proceeded this year into the Senate.
- January 2002 **French Federation of Fencing**
December 2002
Title : Volunteer
Task : Participation in the organization of international fencing competitions
- June 2002 **France Telecom Research & Development**
July 2002
Title : Administrator of contracts and patent licences
Task : Management and audit of contracts within the intellectual property department
- July 2001 **Everglades National Park**
August 2001
Title : Salesperson
Task : Salesperson in the Everglades National park (Florida, US)
- July 2000 **France Telecom OCISI**
August 2000
Title : Data Manager
Task : Data manager for programming department and for corporate Intranet service.

IT knowledge

Software :

Microsoft Office Suite 2003 (Word, Excel, Access, Project, Power Point, Visio...),
Dreamweaver MX, Flash MX,
Magix Video Deluxe,
Hypercam2...

Languages

English

Spoken Fluent
Written Fluent

Spanish

Spoken Fluent
Written Fluent

French

Spoken Native speaker
Written Native speaker

Hobbies

Sports

Fencing (for 13 years), Swimming (for 3 years), Skiing, Tennis (for 1 year), Soccer...

Leisure

Traveling abroad: Europe, South America (Argentina, Brasil, Peru) and Asia (Tibet, Japan, India), new technologies, cinema

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C.3.6.2. Scenario 2

Be part of the most exciting internet web 2.0 start up!

Offer PPU 11

Location: PARIS 75003 and Philadelphia

Who we are: the most innovative social shopping site ever started!

Who you are : a curious, autonomous, dynamic student in marketing looking for a trainee position within your school curriculum (stage conventionné); you must have a very good knowledge of US internet environment (blogs, trends etc) as well as being aware of what's hype, fun, trendy in consuming products.

What you will have to do: US market research, moderate the site, contact the bloggers, the press, the merchants, the partners.

What we will offer: the excitement of a start up, a learning experience and the real possibility of a full time job after the internship is over.

The minimum duration of the internship is 3 months, starting in July and can be extended, depending on your school's requirements.

***Please send your application by e-mail to:
HEC Grande Ecole – Master Internship Program***

August@hec.fr

Mathilda

De : "Yannick Ternal" <ternaly@hec.fr>
À : "Mathilda August" <august@hec.fr>
Envoyé : jeudi 31 mai 2007 11:12
Objet : Internship HEC

Paris, May 31st

*Application letter
Reference of the offer: PPU11*

Dear Mathilda,

I'm happy to apply for the offer concerning a position in Paris and Philadelphia.

Indeed, I have the experience of working in communication., I'm also specialized in British literature and civilization. Finally, I would be very excited by working abroad.

Kindest regards

*Yannick Ternal
Résumé reference 221
Résidence Joseph Francesci
39, rue des Ecoles
94000 France
France
Phone: 06 64 41 17 42
E-mail: ternaly@hec.fr or yan.ternal@free.fr*

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Reference 221

Yannick Ternal

Master (5 years completed)
Graduate

Résidence Joseph Franceschi
39, rue des Ecoles
94000 CRETEIL
France

Phone : 06 64 41 17 42
E-mail : yan.ternal@free.fr

I'm currently looking for an internship or
job in the following domain :

Arts/Culture/Fashion
Sales/Marketing
Advertising/Public Relations

Objectives :

Available soon, I would like to work as a communication manager, ideally in an international environment, with the help of my adaptability, writing skills and sociability.

Education

- November 2005 **HEC**
September 2006 Master 2
Specialization : CEMS MIM
- November 2004 **HEC**
September 2005 Master 1
Specialization : CEMS MIM
- November 2003 **ISERP**
July 2004 Certificate in Public Relations
Specialization : Corporate and Political Communication
- November 2000 **University of Marne la Vallée**
July 2003 3 years completed
English grammar, phonetics, linguistics, literature, civilization,...
Specialization : British literature and civilization
- September 1999 **F.Cabrini High School**
June 2000 French Literary Baccalauréat
Option: Italian
Specialization : Literature and Language

Specialization : Literature and Languages

Experience

November 2004
September 2006

LE PETIT FUTE

Title : Communication Assistant
Task : Internship
Organization of events
Report writing
Translations
Resources : Intranet Website
Office software
Corporate applications

May 2006
June 2006

Vauto events

Title : Production Assistant
Task : Follow-up of the exhibitors and visitors in the framework of events organized by 2 famous automobile groups.

June 2004
September 2004

Chelles City Hall

Title : Communication Assistant
Task : Internship
Updating of the municipal communication mediums
Writing of press extract and press kit

October 2002
July 2003

Carrefour

Title : Cashier
Task : Welcoming and informing the customers
Managing the payment

July 2000
July 2002

Brice, Crédit Agricole, EDF, Disneyland Paris, Prodène Klint...

Title : Temp
Task : Several temporary jobs in various domains: sales, administration, industry, reception, administration

IT knowledge

Software :

Use daily:
Word
Excel

Works
Powerpoint
Internet Explorer

Beginner:
Dreamweaver
Quark X-press

Languages

English

Spoken Fluent
Written Fluent

German

Spoken Intermediate
Written Intermediate

Italian

Spoken Intermediate
Written Intermediate

Hobbies

Cooking

Reading

Classic and contemporary literature
Essays
Newspaper and magazines

Mathilda

De : "Claire Coueffe" <chiara2@tiscali.fr>
À : "Mathilda August" <mathilda.august@hec.fr>
Envoyé : mercredi 30 mai 2007 13:26
Objet : my candidacy for the PPU 11 offer

Paris, May 30

Subject: Candidacy for the PPU11 offer

Dear Madam,

I'm writing to you in order to present my candidacy for the PPU 11 offer. I am extremely interested in this offer, and am confident that my education, interests, and relevant experience make me a strong candidate.

Your offer provides addresses my own desire to work in marketing, my passion for fashion and design, my desire to return to the United States to work, and my knowledge and enthusiasm for the Internet.

As far as my competencies are concerned, I have relevant experience working in the fields of marketing and communication. For example, I have already worked in the fashion, art and music industries, and also have worked as a webmaster. I am an enthusiastic and effective writer, as shown by the more than 120 people who visit my blog (worldview.com) each day. I am looking for an opportunity to work in a startup with products targeting the American market, with which I am pretty familiar.

I look forward to discussing further with you how my international and web experience, my dynamic personality, my enthusiasm for technology and working for a startup, and my range of professional experience, could help me contribute to your firm.

Sincerely

Claire Coueffé

34, rue Guillaume Tell
75017 Paris, France

Tel : +33 (0)6 08 32 24 55
E-mail: Chiara2@tiscali.fr

Reference 377

Claire Coueffé

**34, rue Guillaume Tell
75017 Paris
France**

University (4 years completed)

Phone: +33 (0)6 08 32 24 55
E-mail : Chiara2@tiscali.fr

I'm currently looking for a full time internship
job in the following domain:

International marketing and communication

Objectives :

I would like to work in an Internet environment and to participate in the
marketing of innovative products.

Education

Since September 2006 **Sorbonne, Université de Paris IV, CELSA**
(Ecoles des hautes études en sciences de l'information et de
la communication/ School of higher studies in the information
and communication sciences)
2nd year of Master in Communication

August Dec 2005 **Baruch College, New York**
Fall semester of the Master of Corporate Communications (12
credits)

September 2005 June 2006 **Sorbonne, Université de Paris IV, CELSA**
1st year of Master in Communication
thesis: Olfactive marketing

September 2002 June 2005 **Sorbonne, Université de Paris IV, CELSA**
Bachelor in Literature and Language applied to Culture and
Communication

Experience

May 2006
July 2006 **Saatchi & Saatchi Business Communications, Neuilly**

April 2005
July 2005 **Hypoflash, New York**

April 2004
July 2004 **InClub, Florence (Italy),**
Art consultant and promoter for Italian companies

May 2003
July 2003 **Secret-Service-Style, trends office, Paris**
Assisted the manager in fashion research. Organized and

Sept. 2002 **Galerie Maeght (contemporary art gallery)**
Assisted the gallery staff

Sept. 2002
April 2004 **Sybill Agence, Neuilly**
Hostess for commercial events and exhibitions

IT knowledge

Languages

English
Bilingual

French
Mother tongue

Spanish
Solid working knowledge

Italian
Solid marking knowledge

Hobbies

Swimming, running, drawing, reading, fashion, photography

QUESTIONNAIRE 1

Your name:

Sairaman KALPATHI

Your assistant number:

Ass 215

**Rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements using 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5
(1 = to a small extent to 5 = to a large extent)**

OFFER NUMBER _____ *AEA23* _____

1. After looking at the job posting and the candidates' materials, to what extent do you feel that the candidate number ___ *Masala 115* _____ was well suited for the job?

2. After looking at the job posting and the candidates' materials, to what extent do you feel that the candidate number ___ *Boisvert 119* _____ was well suited for the job?

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C.3.8. Justice scales

Example for scenario 1

- **Questionnaire 2a**
- **Questionnaire 2b**

| | |
|-----------------------|---------|
| Your assistant number | Ass 221 |
| Job reference | AEA23 |

| | |
|---------------------|---------------|
| Candidate name | <u>Masala</u> |
| Candidate reference | 115 |

Rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements using 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 (1 = to a small extent to 5 = to a large extent)

The following items refer to the decision, which consisted of recruiting or not recruiting the candidate for this internship job. To what extent:

- | | | |
|----|--|--|
| 1. | Is the decision consistent with the candidate's qualifications?..... | |
| 2. | Does the decision reflect the candidate's experience?..... | |
| 3. | Is the decision justified given the suitability of the candidates for the internship?... | |
| 4. | Does the decision reflect the quality of the candidates?..... | |

The following items refer to the procedures, which have been used by HEC to make the decision whether to recruit or not recruit the candidate for this internship job. To what extent:

- | | | |
|-----|---|--|
| 5. | Have those procedures allowed the candidate to show his (her) value?..... | |
| 6. | Have those procedures allowed the candidate to influence the decision?..... | |
| 7. | Have those procedures been applied consistently?..... | |
| 8. | Have those procedures been free of bias?..... | |
| 9. | Have those procedures been based on accurate information?..... | |
| 10. | Is the candidate able to appeal the decision arrived at by those procedures?..... | |
| 11. | Have those procedures upheld ethical and moral standards?..... | |

The following items refer to yourself and to your letter. To what extent:

- | | | |
|-----|---|--|
| 12. | Have you treated the candidate in a polite manner?..... | |
| 13. | Have you treated the candidate with dignity?..... | |
| 14. | Have you treated the candidate with respect?..... | |
| 15. | Have you refrained from improper remarks or comments?..... | |
| 16. | Have you been candid in your communication with the candidate?..... | |
| 17. | Have you explained the procedures thoroughly?..... | |
| 18. | Have you given reasonable explanations regarding the procedures?..... | |
| 19. | Have you communicated details in a timely manner?..... | |
| 20. | Have you tailored your communications to the candidate's specific needs?..... | |

Questionnaire 2b

| | |
|-----------------------|---------|
| Your assistant number | Ass 221 |
| Job reference | AEA23 |

| | |
|---------------------|-----------------|
| Candidate name | <u>Boisvert</u> |
| Candidate reference | 119 |

Rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements using 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 (1 = to a small extent to 5 = to a large extent)

The following items refer to the decision, which consisted of recruiting or not recruiting the candidate for this internship job. To what extent:

1. Is the decision consistent with the candidate's qualifications?.....
2. Does the decision reflect the candidate's experience?.....
3. Is the decision justified given the suitability of the candidates for the internship?.....
4. Does the decision reflect the quality of the candidates?.....

The following items refer to the procedures, which have been used by HEC to make the decision whether to recruit or not recruit the candidate for this internship job. To what extent:

5. Have those procedures allowed the candidate to show his (her) value?.....
6. Have those procedures allowed the candidate to influence the decision?.....
7. Have those procedures been applied consistently?.....
8. Have those procedures been free of bias?.....
9. Have those procedures been based on accurate information?.....
10. Is the candidate able to appeal the decision arrived at by those procedures?.....
11. Have those procedures upheld ethical and moral standards?.....

The following items refer to yourself and to your letter. To what extent:

12. Have you treated the candidate in a polite manner?.....
13. Have you treated the candidate with dignity?.....
14. Have you treated the candidate with respect?.....
15. Have you refrained from improper remarks or comments?.....
16. Have you been candid in your communication with the candidate?.....
17. Have you explained the procedures thoroughly?.....
18. Have you given reasonable explanations regarding the procedures?.....
19. Have you communicated details in a timely manner?.....
20. Have you tailored your communications to the candidate's specific needs?.....

APPENDIX C.4.: THE CODING SCHEME USED TO CODE THE LETTERS

Rating Scales:

Advises to the coder

You're going to read some rejection letters that were sent to candidates who applied and were not selected for an internship. These letters were sent by the recruitment assistant of the Master Internship Program, an organization to which the school of the candidates belongs and which links students who are looking for firms to host them for an internship and firms who are willing to propose an internship to students. Your job consists of judging these letters on the criteria of explanations and interpersonal sensitivity.

Below are the criteria to consider and look out for when rating the different aspects of interpersonal and information fairness. There will be, and is supposed to be, substantial overlap between the different items in each scale, though each item is also supposed to focus your attention on specific behaviors. Having said that, some letter writers will do a great job on some parts of explanations or interpersonal sensitivity, and a lousy job on others.

Don't attach TOO much importance to the suggestions for 1-5 ratings, or to the specific criteria or examples under each item. That is, you should also rate based on your FEELINGS. How did you feel during and after the reading of the letter (especially for the first 2 items). Did you FEEL the candidate was being treated politely and courteously? Did you FEEL the candidate was respected as a worthwhile person? Did the person who wrote the letter SEEM concerned about the recipient? Did the explanation SEEM reasonable and satisfy you? Did the explanation FEEL sincere?

(1) Politeness and courtesy

1- The sender is not polite.

- *Doesn't use any form of address (such as "sincerely" or "regards")*

2- The sender does not make any special attempt at politeness.

- *Uses a normal form of address ("sincerely", "regards")*

3- The sender is normally polite.

- *Thanks the candidate for having applied*
- *Uses a more sophisticated form of address ("sincerely yours", "yours truly")*

4- The sender puts emphasis on politeness.

- *Wishes future success at the end of the letter*

5- The overall tone and message is very polite and courteous

- *The sender uses kind words at the start or the end of the letter ("we are pleased...")*
- *For example thanks for the candidate's understanding for the difficult choice the recruiter had to make*

(2) Respect and dignity

1- The sender is disrespectful and does not appreciate the value of the person

- *Doesn't use the candidate's name or surname (doesn't write "Dear X" or "Dear M. Y")*
- *Doesn't end the letter by giving his or her title and number ("for Mathilda August, Recruitment Assistant number Z")*

2- The sender does not make any special attempt at showing respect and dignity.

- *Uses the candidate's name or surname ("Dear X" or "Dear M. Y")*
- *Ends the letter by giving his or her title and number ("for Mathilda August, Recruitment Assistant number X")*

3- The sender is normally respectful

- *As above, plus uses some formal conventions at the beginning of the letter ("address", "date", "subject" ...)*
- *Recognizes the unfavorable situation by using "unfortunately" or "we do not have good news"*
- *Says the decision is not an indication of the candidate's potential*

4- The sender puts emphasis on respect and dignity

- *Acknowledges the hardship by expressing regret ("I'm sorry to announce you", "I regret to inform you" ...)*
- *Praises the candidate by recognizing his-her strengths*

5- The overall tone of the message is very respectful

- *Encourages to remain motivated and to keep trying ("we advise you to keep track on your goals and don't loose your focus on your interest area").*
- *Offers to answer to any further questions at the end of the letter*
- *For example signs with his (her) real name*

(3) Thorough and reasonable explanations

1- No attempt to explain the rationale for the decision.

- *Only states that the candidate has not been chosen, without any justification (for instance: "Unfortunately, we can not offer you the position at this time" or "your application for this internship was unsuccessful")*

2- Only gives a partial and vague explanation for the decision.

- *Refers to the number of applicants (For instance: "an increase in the number of applications with very good profiles made it difficult to extend an offer to you")*
- *Or refers to "limited vacancies"*
- *Tells the candidate can write if he-she wants to have a feedback*

3- Short justification of the decision or some details about the decision process.

- *Only explains that the candidacy doesn't match (for instance: "we were unable to find a match between the competencies required for the position and your profile")*
- *Or gives details about the decision process (for example: after "careful consideration of you application package" or "the selection process is a rigorous process")*

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- *Or talks about an “external event” that made not possible to hire the candidate without giving any other detail*

4- Precisely states the reasons why the decision was made.

- *Tells what did not match (For example: “we were looking for someone with a bit more experience and solid command of the English language”)*
- *Or clearly says that a mistake has been made in the decision process*

5- Comprehensive and detailed explanation for the reasons of the decision.

- *Precisely analyses the strengths and weaknesses of the candidacy in comparison to the job requirements and concludes on what is not adequate (for instance: “Even if your profile shows a set of good achievements, it does not meet all requirements of the position, in terms of studies, working experiences and exposure to foreign environments. On the other side we think that this position is not fitting your objectives and you may probably find other opportunity which are more close to your long term targets.”)*
- *Or explains the kind of mistake that has been made in the decision process (for example: “Unfortunately, due to a clerical mistake we sent another candidate's resumé to the hiring firm who has been selected as well”).*
- *Or explains there has been a bias in the decision process and that the person who was hired had some connections in the selection team*

(4) Tailoring communication

Here is some information about the profiles of the candidates to whom the rejection letters are addressed. The only thing you do not know at this step is how many other candidates applied to the same offer and what's the profile of the one who was hired.

- Alexandre Masala has a very strong curriculum and his competencies are very well adapted to the job offered (experience in online projects and in tourism and an excellent level in English). Plus, his cover letter shows his very strong motivation.
- Marthe Boisvert has a good curriculum but she doesn't master at a high level some of the competencies that are necessary for the job she is applying to (some experience in online projects, no experience in tourism, an intermediate level in English). Her cover letter doesn't show a very strong motivation.
- Claire Coueffé has a very strong curriculum and her competencies are very well adapted to the job offered (very good knowledge of US Internet environment, experience in trendy consumer products). Plus, her cover letter shows her very strong motivation.
- Yannick Ternal has a good curriculum but he doesn't master at a high level some of the competencies that are necessary for the job he is applying to (low knowledge of the US Internet environment, small experience in communication). His cover letter doesn't show a very strong motivation.

1- Did not adapt communication to recipient.

- *Standard letter, with no reference to the candidate's curriculum and cover letter*

2- Only slightly adapted communication to recipient.

- *Minor reference to the candidate's profile (for example: “your credentials are impressive” or “your profile does not exactly suit our need for that position”).*

3- The sender tries to personalize his-her comments

- *Some reference to the candidate's information (for instance, "We were looking for a very specific profile which necessitated previous experience in one US internet environment, and which you lacked").*

4- Extensive reference to the candidate's information

- *Lists and recognizes the strengths and weaknesses of the candidate regarding the requirements of the job and discusses them.*

5. As above, plus adapted discussion and advises about what skills to improve or the kinds of ads to reapply to

- *For instance: "If you wish to enter that business sector we would suggest you to travel to the US or seek exposure to the US in other ways and to take up courses in IT. You could for example open and maintain your own web blog".)*

APPENDIX D: MATERIALS USED FOR THE QUALITATIVE STUDY

APPENDIX D.1.: THE INTERVIEW GUIDE

- Attributes noted:
 - Sex
 - Managerial position (manager or deputy manager)
 - Level (department or service)
 - Activity (production or administrative)

- 1. Describe an event that your subordinates have experienced and that you've found unjust
 - (note: Be sure to understand*
 - 1. the type of injustice that was at stake*
 - 2. the type of antecedent event that was concerned*
 - 3. the type of justice rule violated*
 - 4. the source of the injustice)*

- 2. Describe what you did in reaction to this injustice

- 3. What was your motivation to do what you did ?

- 4. Describe the consequences of your reaction
 - a. Did your behavior help to fix the injustice ?

 - b. How did your subordinates behave after you had reacted to the injustice ?

APPENDIX D.2.: THE N'VIVO® CODING SCHEME

D.2.1. The node structure

➔ The way these nodes are structured:

- a. Mirrors the way the interviews were conducted
- b. Allows to identify corrective justice actions from managers
- c. Allows to identify the antecedents and consequences of managerial corrective actions to injustices

1. The injustice: *The injustice experienced by the employees and its characteristics*

1.1. The type of injustice

| |
|---|
| Distributive injustice |
| 1.1.1. The antecedent event |
| 1. Tasks |
| 2. Bonus and pay increase |
| 3. Cooperation |
| 4. Time off and duration of work |
| 5. Salary |
| 6. Working means |
| 7. Fringe benefits |
| 8. Promotions |
| 9. Offices |
| 10. Sanctions |
| 1.1.2. The justice rule that was violated |
| 11. Equity |
| 12. Equality |
| 13. Need |
| 14. Other |
| Interpersonal injustice |
| Procedural injustice |
| Informational injustice |

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1.2. *The source of injustice*

| |
|--------------------------|
| Manager |
| Firm or upper management |
| Coworkers |

2. The (corrective) reactions to the injustice: *Main reactions, often corrective justice actions, from managers*

| |
|--|
| Used informational justice |
| Tried to fix the problem, at the origin of the injustice |
| Engaged in invisible remedies |
| Kinds of invisible remedies |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Allocated free days off or was more flexible in the allocation of time off• Allocated more bonuses• Recruited more temporary workers• Allocated a higher salary increase• Allocated little gifts• Allocated more training• Helped subordinates be promoted• Improved the subordinates' status• Gave personal help to the subordinates to handle their jobs• Applied a formal allocation rule with flexibility for fringe benefits• Improved working conditions |
| Appealed to a better future |
| Refused to react to the injustice |
| Used procedural justice |
| Asked for help to correct the injustice |
| Used authority to ask perpetrators to respect the rules |
| Used interpersonal justice |
| Managed the way people react to injustice |

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| |
|---|
| Improved working conditions |
| Criticized the decision by upper management |

3. Managers' motivations : *Main motivations*

| |
|---|
| Because it was the right thing to do |
| Relational motives |
| Work performance instrumental motives |
| To avoid problems |
| To help the subordinate |
| Thought there was no injustice |
| To make the subordinate accept the decision |
| To <i>appear</i> as being just |

4. The reactions to the (corrective) reactions: *Employees' attitudinal and behavioral reactions to the managerial (corrective) attempts (from the managers' point of view).*

| |
|--|
| Positive attitudes and behaviors from employees |
| 4.1. Types of positive attitudes and behaviors |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Psychological comfort• Less injustice and frustration felt• Maintained quality of work and performance• Satisfaction• Decision acceptance• Maintained a good social climate• More motivation• People stopped complaining• Maintained a good relationship between the subordinate and the manager• Positive effects only in the short run• Motivated people to report problems to their managers• Subordinates thanked the manager |

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| |
|---|
| Negative attitudes and behaviors from employees |
| No impact |
| Injustice was fixed |
| Ambiguous consequences |
| Employees learned to react differently to the injustice |
| In long run, the injustice disappeared by itself |

D.2.2. The casebook of attributes

1. Managers' hierarchical position

| |
|------------------------|
| Department head |
| Deputy department head |
| Team manager |
| Deputy team manager |

2. Managers' activity

| |
|-------------------------|
| Productive function |
| Administrative function |

APPENDIX E: MATERIALS USED FOR THE SCENARIO STUDY

APPENDIX E.1.: SCALE FOR MORAL IDENTITY (INTERNALIZATION)

Listed alphabetically below are some characteristics that might describe a person:

- | | |
|---|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Caring 2. Compassionate 3. Fair 4. Friendly 5. Generous | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 6. Hardworking 7. Helpful 8. Honest 9. Kind |
|---|--|

The person with these characteristics could be you or could be someone else. For a moment, visualize in your mind the kind of person who has these characteristics. Imagine how that person would think, feel, and act. When you have a clear image of what this person would be like, answer the following 10 questions (by circling the number) using the scale provided below.

| | Strongly Disagree | Mostly Disagree | Slightly Disagree | Neither Agree nor Disagree | Slightly Agree | Mostly Agree | Strongly Agree |
|--|-------------------|-----------------|-------------------|----------------------------|----------------|--------------|----------------|
| 1. It would make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 2. Being someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who I am. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 3. I would be ashamed to be a person who has these characteristics. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 4. Having these characteristics is not really important to me. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 5. I strongly desire to have these characteristics. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

Notice that items 3 and 4 are reverse-scored.

APPENDIX E.2.: SCENARIOS FOR THE SCENARIO STUDY

Three scenarios were used for this study (scenarios 1, 2 and 3). There were 2 (Interpersonal injustice / Interpersonal justice) x 2 (Distributive injustice / Distributive justice) = 4 conditions.

E.2.1. Scenario 1: The project launch

Introduction

You are the manager of an engineering team in TECHNOSURE, a medium-sized firm that provides tailor-made IT solutions to a range of companies. Marc, who is one of your subordinates, has been working over the last twelve months preparing a new project. Marc would love to launch this project now.

Interpersonal injustice

The President called Marc into his office and personally told Marc that he was not chosen to launch the project. When he met with the President, the President told him rather harshly that he would give him only a few minutes. The President was verging on being rude and discourteous.

Interpersonal justice

The President called Marc into his office and personally told Marc that he was not chosen to launch the project. When he met with the President, the President told him that he was happy to give Marc all the feedback he needed. The President said he was really sorry that he could not give Marc this opportunity now, and that the company appreciated his contribution.

Distributive injustice

Marc believes, however, that the person chosen to launch the project is considerably less qualified and experienced than Marc and has poorer results than Marc.

Distributive justice

Marc believes, however, that the person chosen to launch the project is considerably more qualified and experienced than Marc and has somewhat better results than Marc.

E.2.2. Scenario 2: Promotion to Team Leader

Introduction

You are the manager of an engineering team in TECHNOSURE, a medium-sized firm that provides tailor-made IT solutions for a wide range of companies. TECHNOSURE has been expanding rapidly, and as a new project arises, a new Team Lead position becomes available. The position is desirable – it is deemed a promotion and comes with a salary increase. Several applications for the new Team Lead position have been received. One of your subordinates, Marc, has applied for the position; he really would love to get the Team Lead job.

Interpersonal injustice

The President called Marc into his office and personally told Marc that he was not given the promotion. When he met with the President, the President told him rather harshly that he would give him only a few minutes. The President was verging on being rude and discourteous.

Interpersonal justice

The President called Marc into his office and personally told Marc that he was not given the promotion. When he met with the President, the President told him that he was happy to give Marc all the feedback he needed. The President said he was really sorry that he could not give Marc this opportunity now, and that the company appreciated his contribution.

Distributive injustice

Marc believes, however, that the person who received the promotion is considerably less qualified and experienced than Marc, and has poorer results than Marc.

Distributive justice

Marc believes, however, that the person who received the promotion is considerably more qualified and experienced than Marc and has somewhat better results than Marc.

E.2.3. Scenario 3: The bonus

Introduction

You are the manager of an engineering team in TECHNOSURE, a medium-sized firm that provides tailor-made IT solutions to a range of companies. Every year, TECHNOSURE's president makes decisions regarding employee bonuses. Marc, who is one of your subordinates, is expecting a large bonus.

Interpersonal injustice

The President called Marc into his office and personally told Marc that he did not receive a bonus. When he met with the President, the President told him rather harshly that he would give him only a few minutes. The President was verging on being rude and discourteous.

Interpersonal justice

The President called Marc into his office and personally told Marc that he did not receive a bonus. When he met with the President, the President told him that he was happy to give Marc all the feedback he needed. The President said he was really sorry that he could not give Marc a bonus now, and that the company appreciated his contribution.

Distributive injustice

Marc believes, however, that his contribution during the former year was considerably more than others in the company who received bonuses.

Distributive justice

Marc believes, however, that his contribution during the former year could be less than others in the company who received bonuses.

APPENDIX E.3.: MANIPULATION CHECKS AND JUSTICE SCALES

E.3.1. Manipulation checks

Please respond to the following items using the scales below:

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

1. The President treated Marc with sensitivity and respect _____
2. How did Marc's contribution, qualifications and experience compare to his coworker(s) in the scenario (check one):
 - Marc had done more and was more qualified _____
 - Marc was at least equal to his coworkers _____
 - Marc was less qualified than his coworker(s) _____

E.3.2. Justice scales

Please respond to the following items using the scales below:

Very Unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very Fair

1. As Marc's manager, how would you rate the interpersonal treatment provided by the President? _____
2. Even though the decision was unfavorable for Marc, given Marc's experience, qualifications and results, I thought the decision was: _____

The fair hand of managers

ABSTRACT: THE FAIR HAND OF MANAGERS: MANAGERS' VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE CORRECTIVE JUSTICE STRATEGIES AND THEIR ANTECEDENTS

Traditional organizational justice research has documented the impact (in)justice perceptions have on a host of employees' attitudes and behaviors. The present dissertation studied the forms and antecedents of *the managers' corrective justice behaviors* in four complementary ways.

In the first chapter, I investigated the antecedents of managers' tendency *not* to use *interactional justice behavior* to correct for unjust formal procedures and unfair reward allocations – a phenomenon referred to as the “*Churchill effect*”. An *experiment* (n=118) showed that the more *unjust* the managers found a situation, the less likely were they to correct it using *informational justice*. Moreover, the less *assertive* the managers, the less likely were they to correct the injustice using *interpersonal justice*. In addition, managers' *identification* with the organization related negatively to their interpersonal and informational justice behaviors and moderated the relationship between managers' procedural justice judgments and their informational justice behaviors. The results also showed that managers can use other corrective justice strategies in addition to interpersonal and informational justice.

In chapter two, *other corrective justice strategies* were identified. An *exploratory study* (n=35) was conducted and revealed a strategy to correct injustice at work that has received little research attention: a manager allocating extra benefits, belonging to the company, and not for their formal or intended use, to restore justice “under the radar”. I labelled this strategy an *invisible remedies* strategy and I named *Robin Hoodism* the managers' use of it. In this second study the forms and antecedents of this strategy were compared to those of other managerial corrective justice strategies.

In a third chapter, the organizational justice and sociological literatures relating to organizational theft were linked in order to develop a *conceptual model* of Robin Hoodism. Research propositions were offered concerning the forms invisible remedies might take in the workplace and the conditions under which managers are most likely to use them.

In the fourth and last chapter, preliminary empirical support was found for aspects of the proposed model, including the importance of *distributive and interpersonal injustice* and of managers' *moral identity* as predictors of the managers' allocation of invisible remedies. Specifically, a *scenario study* (n=187), showed that a three way interaction between distributive justice, interpersonal justice and managers moral identity predicted managers' Robin Hoodism.

KEYWORDS: Organizational justice, managers' corrective justice strategies, assertiveness, empathy, identification, invisible remedies, Robin Hoodism, moral identity.

RESUME : LA MAIN JUSTE DES MANAGEURS: LES STRATEGIES VISIBLES ET INVISIBLES DE JUSTICE CORRECTIVE DES MANAGEURS ET LEURS ANTECEDENTS

La recherche traditionnelle en justice organisationnelle a montré l'impact que les sentiments de justice et d'injustice ont sur un grand nombre d'attitudes et de comportements des salariés. La présente thèse a étudié *les formes et les antécédents des comportements de justice corrective des managers* de quatre façons complémentaires.

Dans le premier chapitre ont été explorés les antécédents de la tendance des managers à *ne pas* se comporter de façon *interactionnellement juste* pour corriger des procédures formelles injustes et des allocations de récompenses injustes – un phénomène connu sous le nom de « *effet Churchill* ». Une *expérience* (n=118) a montré que plus les managers ont trouvé la situation *injuste*, moins ils ont eu tendance à la corriger en utilisant la *justice informationnelle*. De plus moins les managers étaient assertifs, moins ils ont été enclins à corriger l'injustice en utilisant la *justice interpersonnelle*. Par ailleurs l'*identification* des managers à l'organisation était négativement reliée à leurs comportements d'injustice interpersonnelle et informationnelle et modérait la relation entre leurs sentiments de justice procédurale et leurs comportements de justice informationnelle. Les résultats ont aussi montré que les managers pouvaient utiliser d'autres stratégies de justice corrective en plus de la justice interpersonnelle et informationnelle.

Dans le second chapitre, *d'autres stratégies de justice corrective* ont été identifiées. Une *étude exploratoire* (n=35) a été menée qui a révélé une stratégie de correction de l'injustice au travail ayant fait l'objet de peu de recherches : le manager réalisant des allocations complémentaires de bénéfices appartenant à l'entreprise, pour des utilisations autres que formellement prévues, pour rétablir la justice « sous le manteau ». Cette stratégie a été nommée la stratégie des *remèdes invisibles* et il a été fait référence à son utilisation par les managers sous le terme de *stratégie Robin des Bois*. Cette seconde étude a comparé les formes et les antécédents de cette stratégie à ceux des autres stratégies managériales de justice corrective.

Dans le troisième chapitre la littérature de la justice organisationnelle et celle de la sociologie du vol organisationnel ont été reliées de façon à développer un *modèle conceptuel* de la stratégie Robin des Bois. Des propositions de recherche ont été faites concernant les formes que les remèdes invisibles pouvaient prendre au travail et les conditions qui rendaient plus probable leur utilisation par les managers.

Dans le quatrième et dernier chapitre, certains aspects du modèle proposé ont reçu une confirmation empirique préliminaire, en l'occurrence l'importance de *l'injustice distributive*, de *l'injustice interpersonnelle* et de *l'identité morale* des managers comme prédicteurs de l'allocation de remèdes invisibles par les managers. De façon spécifique, une *étude par scénario* (n=187) a montré qu'une triple interaction entre justice distributive, justice interpersonnelle et identité morale prédisait la stratégie Robin des Bois.

MOTS CLES : Justice organisationnelle, stratégies de justice corrective des managers, assertivité, empathie, identification, remèdes invisibles, stratégie Robin des Bois, identité morale.